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The macroeconomic performance of Latin America and the Caribbean 
during the first decade of the new Millennium was remarkable. During 
2000-2008, the average annual GDP growth in the region was 4.3%, a 
much larger figure than the growth rates obtained in the previous four 
decades. In 2009, as a result of the financial crisis, there was a decline of 
around 2%, but the region rebounded after that with an average growth 
rate close to 6% in 2010, and rates higher than 4% in 2011 and 2012. 
One of the main impacts of those macroeconomic achievements 
occurred on social indicators. According to ECLAC, the incidence of 
poverty decreased in the region from 48.4% in 1990 to 31.4% in 2010, 
while extreme poverty decreased from 22.6 to 12.3 percent during the 
same period. Furthermore, income inequality also showed significant 
improvements across most countries in the region. Even more 
remarkable, by 2010 the region as a whole had met over 80% of the goals 
set in the United Nations Millennium Declaration. 
Those achievements were not only the result of that economic growth, 
but also of the expansion of social spending, the increase in coverage of 
social policies and the establishment of human capital investment 
schemes. Nevertheless, deep social disparities still prevail in the region, 
and there is no way to solve that problem without strengthening the tax 
systems, in order to allow for higher levels of social spending. Indeed, 
the tax effort in the region is very low: in 2010 the average tax burden 
was only 16.7% of GDP. Furthermore, the tax structure is quite 
regressive for international standards: on average, the consumption tax 
collection almost doubles the income tax revenue. 
Is there any space to have new tax reforms in the region? If so, what 
are the most adequate reforms in terms of their impacts on tax collection 
and social welfare? The answers to these questions depend on the 
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specific characteristics of each country. For instance, Guatemala has a 
per capita income level almost four times smaller than Mexico’s, but the 
tax burden is quite similar in both countries (excluding oil revenue in the 
case of the latter); on the other hand, the tax system in Guatemala is 
much more regressive than in Mexico. 
What segments of the population are the most affected in the case of a 
particular tax reform? Is there a way to mitigate the negative impact on 
the poor of, say, a consumption tax by increasing monetary transfers? As 
will be thoroughly explained and exemplified in this book, there is no 
possibility to answer those types of questions without a detailed analysis 
of the data and the construction of large microsimulation models. 
It was a pleasure for the International Development Research Center 
and the United Nations Development Programme to have supported the 
work of the fifteen researchers that contribute to this volume. Although 
their models were built specifically for the case of Brazil, Chile, 
Guatemala, Mexico and Uruguay, it is our expectation that this book will 
soon promote the use of microsimulation models in the rest of Latin 
America and the Caribbean. We are convinced that since these models 
can help to assess the distributional impacts of tax and benefits reforms, 
they can be used in particular to design more inclusive fiscal systems. 
The latter are much needed for renewed social contracts between the 
citizens and their own governments, a critical ingredient to consolidate 
the democratic regimes in the region. 
 
George Gray-Molina, United Nations Development Programme 














This book constitutes the final outcome of the two-year project Fiscal 
Schemes for Inclusive Development (known in Spanish as Fiscalidad 
para un Desarrollo Incluyente), sponsored by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and the International Development 
Research Center (IDRC) from mid-2009 to mid-2011. The objective of 
the project was to contribute towards more equitable, efficient, and 
transparent fiscal and social policy reforms in Latin America, through the 
generation and dissemination of open source microsimulation models for 
five countries in particular: Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico and 
Uruguay. The project aimed to promote the use of non-behavioral and 
behavioral microsimulation models to perform quantitative analysis of 
fiscal changes, as well as to contribute to national debates on the welfare 
consequences of policy reforms. 
This is the second and last book of the project. The first, Sistemas de 
impuestos y prestaciones en América Latina, edited by L. F. López Calva 
and C. M. Urzúa and jointly published in Mexico by BUAP-IDRC-
ITESM-UNDP in 2011, described the current tax-benefit system of each 
of those five Latin American countries in a very detailed fashion. This 
second book presents, on the other hand, several microsimulation models 
that can be used to simulate the welfare consequences of a number of 
policy reforms in each of those five countries. By using micro data from 
national surveys, the models not only characterize the population on the 
aggregate but also on a number of dimensions such as age, family 
composition and income level, which are important for distributive 
analysis. The models also quantify and identify those who win and those 
who lose with a reform. Furthermore, the open-source nature of the 




of the project, but also to build-up technical capacities on the subject 
across Latin America. Indeed, any researcher interested on analyzing 
fiscal and social reforms in the region, may find that the open source 
models, written in Excel and Stata, can serve as a good platform for any 
future work along those lines. 
Turning now to the acknowledgments, aside from the fifteen direct 
collaborators in this volume, several others helped along the way to bring 
the project to a fruitful end. During the first year, the project was 
undertaken under the leadership of Rebeca Grynspan, now UNDP 
Associate Administrator and UN Under-Secretary-General, and Edgard 
Rodriguez, Senior Program Specialist at IDRC. During the second year, 
the project has been under the direction of Heraldo Muñoz, Regional 
Director for Latin America and the Caribbean at UNDP, and Carolina 
Robino, Program Officer at IDRC. The editor is greatly indebted to them 
all. Special thanks to Luis F. López-Calva, former Chief Economist at 
the UNDP’s Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(RBLAC) and currently at the World Bank, who jointly with the editor 
designed, promoted and coordinated the initiative presented in this book. 
Eduardo Ortiz-Juarez, at RBLAC, played a key role in the 
coordination and organization of the project; Amedeo Spadaro, at the 
Paris School of Economics, contributed with his deep knowledge on the 
subject; Guillermo Cruces, Samuel Freije, José Luis Machinea, Carolina 
Robino and Edgard Rodríguez made helpful comments on earlier drafts 
of the chapters; and George Gray Molina and Alfredo González Reyes, 
RBLAC’s Chief Economist and Programme Specialist, respectively, 
supported the publication and dissemination of this book. The editor also 
would like to thank Pedro Manuel Moreno and Stefano Pettinato, at 
RBLAC, for their management advisory; Jacob Trejo, Dante Ruiz and 
Fernando Murillo, from Tecnológico de Monterrey, for their computer 
wizardry; and Elia Carrasco and Jacqueline Estevez, at RBLAC, Carolina 
Quintana, at IDRC, and Adolfo Cermeño and Ernesto Pacheco, at 
Universidad Rafael Landivar, for their support in the administration of 
the project. Last but not least, the editor is greatly indebted to the 
publishing staff from Tecnológico de Monterrey, for their terrific 
editorial support. Needless to add, none of them, nor UNDP or IDRC, 
should be held responsible for the opinions or misunderstandings 

















Over fifty years ago, Guy Orcutt (1957) proposed to construct economic 
models by applying simulation methods on micro databases of 
representative agents in an economy. At that time his advice was largely 
ignored due to limited computer resources and lack of micro data. 
However, this has changed dramatically in recent decades allowing for 
microsimulation, as it is now known Orcutt’s approach, to flourish and to 
be applied in many areas, such as demographics, health, transport, 
housing, taxes and social benefits. Regarding the state of the art of the 
subject, although Merz (1991 and 1994) provided excellent surveys of 
earlier works, we are not aware of any recent attempt to review it. With 
some reason, since the number of researchers and disciplines that 
espouse that approach is now extremely large. 
In particular, tax-benefit microsimulation models have now become 
commonplace in Europe and the United States. Those models calculate 
the tax liabilities and benefit entitlements of individuals from household 
surveys that are statistically representative of the analyzed population. 
Making use of detailed information about socio-economic characteristics, 
these models compute the amount of taxes and benefits following closely 
the underlying legislation. Tax and benefit reforms can be then simulated 
by changing the parameters of the model, and their impact can be 
assessed by comparing ex-ante and ex-post disposable income for each 
household (see, e.g., Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2006). A very important 
advantage of Orcutt’s methodology over, say, the computable general 
equilibrium approach or the typical econometric modeling strategy is that 
the microsimulation models can take into account the heterogeneity of 
the population and, therefore, can capture how the tax-benefit system 
treats households that face different circumstances. 
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It should be noted that those other modeling approaches may be seen 
as complements, rather than rivals, to Orcutt’s approach. A fundamental 
aspect of the original tax-benefit microsimulation models, an aspect that 
is still quite common in applied work, is that they are “arithmetic” in 
their nature. That is, no behavioral responses from the part of the 
economic agents are allowed; if, for instance, the model is used to 
analyze the consequences of an increase in an excise tax on a particular 
good, the arithmetic model does not contemplate the possibility of 
households substituting part of the consumption of that good with the 
consumption of others. A more general approach, closer to the economic 
mainstream, complements microsimulation models with econometrically 
estimated demand responses. As will be seen later, some of the models in 
this book are examples of this behaviorist approach. But the refinements 
to the traditional microsimulation approach do not end there. Another 
approach, quite important in the case of socio-demographic models, 
embeds dynamic features into the models (see the survey by 
Klevmarken, 2008); while still another one merges microsimulation 
models with computable general equilibrium models (see Peichl, 2004).  
All the references contained in the surveys mentioned insofar refer to 
work outside of Latin America. Given the attractive features of 
microsimulation models, one might wonder if its use is also common 
place in the region. Unfortunately, as reviewed by Absalón and Urzúa 
(2011), that is still not the case. For most countries in Latin America, 
fiscal and social reforms are typically subject to pronounced political 
swings, so it should not come as a surprise that tax-benefit systems are 
constantly changing. Furthermore, although social policies tend to be less 
comprehensive and generous in Latin American countries than in the 
European Union, to give the foremost contrasting example, the tax 
systems tend to be as varied, if not more, than those of more advanced 
countries. Finally, Latin American tax-benefit systems continue to be 
under reform also due to economic reasons, as there is still a continuous 
searching for more efficient and equitable fiscal policies. It is perhaps for 
those reasons that the number of microsimulation models is still modest. 
This book attempts to ignite in Latin America an interest on the 
subject by providing several full-size microsimulation models in the case 
of five countries: Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico and Uruguay. In the 
case of all the models described below, their authors not only provide a 
detailed description of them, but also offer simulation examples based on 





the particular case of the arithmetic models, the authors provide internet 
links from which one can download the computer programs of their 
models. Those programs can be used not only to replicate results or 
simulate other possible tax-benefit reforms, but also as platforms for 
more complete microsimulation models to be developed in the future. 
In Chapter 1, Nogueira, Bezerra and De Souza offer a comprehensive 
microsimulation model for the Brazilian economy. The model is capable 
of simulating six monetary social benefits, two non-monetary social 
benefits, nine social security contributions, the personal income tax, and 
two taxes on consumption. As such, their model is a more complete 
version of the pioneer models developed for Brazil by Siqueira, Nogueira 
and Levy (2003), as well as Immervoll, Levy, Nogueira, O’Donoghue 
and Siqueira (2006). An interesting feature of the model is that it may be 
used to simulate changes in household behavior on account of price 
variations. In order to simulate that behavior, it is assumed that 
household preferences can be represented by a linear expenditure system 
for each income group. 
Larrañaga, Encina and Cabezas offer in Chapter 2 a microsimulation 
model for the Chilean economy. The model can be used to study the 
impacts on income distribution and poverty of a series of public policies 
that are to be evaluated ex-ante, such as changes in income taxes, health 
and pension contributions, monetary transfers and specific taxes. The 
model’s operation is exemplified simulating the effect of a one-point cut 
in the value added tax rate and a progressive increase in income tax rates 
while maintaining a balanced budget. In Chapter 3, Cabezas and Acero 
complement that non-behavioral model with a module that allows for the 
possibility of behavioral changes in the case of labor participation. The 
authors then proceed to use the model to evaluate whether or not the 
“ethical family income” program that is currently being implemented in 
Chile has positive effects on income distribution and labor participation. 
In Chapter 4, Castañón-Herrera and Romero present a tax-benefit 
microsimulation model for Guatemala. In that country there have been 
over the years numerous political discussions about the best way to 
increase government revenue, which is much needed for social programs 
and public investment. As reviewed by the authors, the proposed fiscal 
reforms have ranged from changes in the income tax schedule to changes 
in indirect tax rates. The microsimulation model presented in this chapter 
can be used to evaluate the distributive consequences of those possible 
changes in the Guatemalan tax system. 
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Absalón and Urzúa present in Chapter 5 a tax-benefit microsimulation 
model for the Mexican economy. Written in Excel, the model can be 
used to analyze the distributive impact of changes in the personal income 
tax schedule, the value added tax rates, the excise tax rates, and the social 
security contributions. The use of the model is exemplified by examining 
the distributive impact of the tax reform that took effect in 2010. It is 
interesting to note, in passing, that Abramovsky, Attanasio and Phillips 
(2011a) have recently developed, independently from the authors, a 
similar model. In Chapter 6, on the other hand, Castañón-Herrera and 
Urzúa present a behavioral model to examine the optimality, or the lack 
of it, of the current indirect tax system in Mexico. Regarding the use of 
behavioral models to appraise tax reforms, it is somewhat paradoxical 
that, until today, this approach has been preferred in Mexico over the use 
of arithmetic microsimulation models. Urzúa (1994 and 2001) provides 
some early models, while two of the most recent ones can be found in 
Abramovsky, Attanasio and Phillips (2011b) and in this book. 
In Chapter 7, Amarante, Bucheli, Olivieri and Perazzo offer in turn a 
microsimulation model for the Uruguayan tax-benefit system, after 
carefully combining the information on income given in a household 
survey and the information contained in an expenditure survey. As an 
example of the use of their model, the authors explore the distributive 
impacts of alternative designs of direct and indirect taxes, focusing in 
particular in the case of a possible zero value added tax rate for a basket 
of goods consumed by the poorest population. In Chapter 8 the same 
authors, after estimating a full demand system, allow for the possibility 
of having behavioral changes in their model, and then proceed to 
investigate whether or not that extension modifies in a substantial way 
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1 A Brazilian tax-benefit microsimulation 
model1 
 
José Ricardo Bezerra Nogueira, Rozane Bezerra de 






As pointed out by Immervoll, Levy, Nogueira, O’Donoghue and Siqueira 
(2006), given “the great diversity observed among the population and the 
complexity of the Brazilian tax-benefit system, the redistributive analysis 
of the impact of social and fiscal policies requires that a high level of 
disaggregation be used in order to capture in fine detail their effects on 
the various types of individuals, families and households”. 
To carry out such an analysis while taking into account, on the one 
hand, that individuals in the population vary widely in terms of their 
socio-economic circumstances, and that, on the other hand, the different 
policy instruments are highly interdependent, detailed and disaggregated 
information about how taxes and benefits operate at the individual level 
is required. As is often the case when information is not usually available 
in survey data, it is necessary to simulate the operation of taxes and 
benefits on the population. The microsimulation approach is the one that 
permits that such a procedure be performed at the individual level. 
Microsimulation models are built as computer programs that calculate 
tax liabilities and benefit entitlements for each unit of analysis 
(individuals, families or households) in a nationally representative micro-
data sample of the population. The model’s routines calculate each 
element of the tax-benefit system in the legal order so that interactions 
between different elements of the system are fully taken into account. 
Results for each individual, family or household are then weighted to 
provide results at the aggregate population level (Immervoll et al., 2006). 
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This chapter reports the development of a tax-benefit microsimulation 
model for Brazil, as part of the FSID project sponsored by the UNDP and 
the IDRC. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the 
main policy instruments of the Brazilian tax-benefit system. Section 3 
presents the Brazilian tax-benefit microsimulation model, detailing 
which policy instruments (social benefits, not-strictly social benefits, and 
taxes) were selected to be part of the model’s policy set and how they are 
simulated in the model. Finally, Section 4 displays examples of the 
output that the model generates, illustrating them with the simulation of 
the status quo. 
 
 
2. The Brazilian tax-benefit system 
 
Brazil’s tax-benefit system comprises a wide array of social benefits and 
taxes. We briefly describe below its main elements, grouped into four 
categories, namely, social benefits, not-strictly social benefits, social 
security contributions, and taxes, both the personal income tax and taxes 
on goods and services. A more detailed account of the Brazilian system 
can be found in Nogueira, Siqueira and Souza (2011). 
The Brazilian government sector comprises the federal government, 
27 states, over 5,000 municipalities, the federal district and several 
agencies. Due to its federalist structure, the country is divided in states 
and municipalities, Brazil’s tax-benefit system cuts across the three 
different levels of government: federal, state and municipal. However, 
the bulk of the social spending is realized by the federal government. As 
to the Brazilian tax system, about 70% of total tax revenue is raised by 
the federal government. 
 
2.1. Main monetary social benefits 
 
The most important monetary social benefits in Brazil are the following: 
• Age-related pension: benefit paid to private workers at 65 years for 
men and 60 years for women, in urban areas, and at 60 years for men and 
55 years for women, in rural areas, provided that they have contributed to 
social security for at least 15 years, for workers in the rural area, or 
worked for at least 15 years in the rural sector, for workers in the rural 
area. Civil servants have different eligibility rules, retiring at 60 years for 
men and 55 years for women, provided that they have contributed to 
social security for at least 35 years for men and 30 years for women, 
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except for primary- and high-school teachers, who can retire 5 years 
earlier than other civil servants. 
• Length of contribution-related pension: paid to private workers who 
have contributed to social security for 35 years for men and 30 years for 
women, with no minimum retirement age. It is also possible to mix age 
and length of contribution to get a proportional pension. This requires 53 
years of age and 30 years of contribution for men and 48 years of age and 
25 years of contribution for women. 
• Disability pension: benefit paid to workers rendered incapable to 
work due to sickness- or accident-related problems. There is no 
minimum length of contribution in the case of accident, but in the case of 
sickness the worker has to have contributed to social security for at least 
12 months. 
• Sickness benefit: paid to those who are prevented from working for 
more than 15 days due to sickness or accident, provided that they have 
contributed to social security for at least 12 months in the case of 
sickness (in the case of accident there is no minimum length of 
contribution requirement). 
• Accident benefit: paid to those who had already enjoyed the 
sickness benefit and who had their ability to work permanently impaired 
by accident. There is no minimum length of contribution requirement. 
• Imprisonment benefit: paid to the dependents of those who are in 
prison, during all of the imprisonment period. There is no minimum 
length of contribution requirement. 
• Survivors pension: benefit paid to the surviving spouse and the 
children of deceased workers. There is no minimum length of 
contribution requirement. 
• Maternity leave benefit: a payment made to pregnant women for a 
period of 4 months after child birth. There is no minimum length of 
contribution requirement. 
• Family benefit: a means-tested benefit paid to workers with children 
aged less than 14 years or disabled. For each dependent child the person 
receives a pre-determined amount, which depends on the income bracket 
the person is included. Only formal workers are eligible to the benefit. 
• Old age and disability benefit: a means-tested benefit that is paid to 
those aged 65 years or more, or to those who are unable to work because 
of a disability. To be eligible, the family per capita income must be less 
than a quarter of the minimum wage and the person cannot be receiving 
any other social benefit. 
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• Wage bonus: benefit paid to those formal workers who receive up to 
two minimum wages, are registered in one the social savings programs, 
PIS and PASEP, run by the government, and who worked for at least 30 
days in the previous year. 
• Unemployment benefit: paid to those formal workers who are 
unemployed. The person can receive from 3 to 5 installments, depending 
on the number of months worked in the period of 36 months before being 
unemployed. The value of the benefit is income-related. 
• Family grant: benefit paid to poor families a benefit conditioned to 
children’s school attendance and vaccination, to mother’s prenatal 
exams, and the use other social services. The benefit is made up of three 
parts: a basic grant paid only to families in extreme poverty; a variable 
grant paid to all poor families with children up to 15 years of age, to a 
maximum of three children; and a further variable grant paid to all poor 
families with children between 16 and 17 years of age, to a maximum of 
two children. 
• Annual bonus: benefit paid to all retired person receiving a state 
pension in the form of an extra monthly pension annually. 
Table 1 lists the social benefits that are possible to simulate with the 
existing Brazilian data sets. 
 
2.2. Main not-strictly social benefits 
 
Below are two income components that are not strictly part of the benefit 
system but that are important in determining the direct taxes system in 
Brazil. Both are fully simulated in the Brazilian microsimulation model 
described later. 
• Thirteenth wage: Benefit paid to all formal workers in the form of 
an extra monthly wage annually. 
• Holidays bonus: Benefit paid to all formal workers, who are paid an 
extra 30% on top of their wages when on official holydays. 
 
2.3. Social contributions 
 
The social insurance system in Brazil is a pay-as-you-go scheme that 
covers civil servants (at the federal, state and municipal levels), as well 
as workers in the private sector. The main goals of the system are to 
secure maintenance income to those out of work due to old age, 
invalidity, retirement or due to the death of the head of the family, and to 
complement family income. 
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Table 1. Simulation of social benefits 
Treatment Why not fully simulated? 
Age-related pension I No data on contribution history 
Length of pension I No data on contribution history 
Disability pension I No data on contribution history 
Sickness benefit I No data on contribution history 
Accident benefit I No data on contribution history 
Imprisonment benefit I No data on contribution history 
Survivors pension I No data on contribution history 
Maternity leave benefit I No data on contribution history 
Family benefit S 
Old age benefit S 
Disability benefit E No data on contribution history 
Wage bonus S 
Unemployment benefit S 
Family grant  S 
Annual bonus S 
Notes: "E": excluded from the model as it is neither included in the micro-data nor  
simulated; "I": included in the micro-data but not simulated; "S" simulated, although 
some minor or very specific rules may not be simulated. 
 
Brazilians compulsorily contribute to the social security system 
according to their occupational status and their income. There are two 
main regimes. The first is the social security general regime, which 
covers employed workers (including domestic and temporary workers), 
self-employed workers and employers. In this regime contributions are 
calculated as a percentage of wages following a rate schedule. The rates 
vary with income classes for workers, and for employers it is applied a 
constant rate on wages paid. The second is the public servant social 
security regime, which covers workers in the public service. There are 
different schemes for the federal government, the states and the 
municipalities, but there has been a convergence to the scheme followed 
by the federal government. 
In addition to the above social contributions, the system is financed 
by payroll and earmarked social taxes. In the description that follows of 
the components of the social security regimes, we include the payroll-
based social contributions, while the earmarked social taxes will be 
mentioned in the subsection on taxes. 
• Employees’ social contribution: paid by private workers, domestic 
workers, and temporary workers. 
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• Individuals’ social contribution: made by self-employers, employers 
contributing as individuals, and members of religious institutions. 
• Federal civil servants’ social contribution: paid by civil servants in 
the federal government. 
• Military federal servants’ social contribution: paid by military 
servants in the federal government. 
• State civil servants’ social contribution: made by civil servants in 
state governments. 
• Municipal civil servants’ social contribution: paid by civil servants 
in municipal governments. 
• Domestic employers’ social contribution: made by employers of 
domestic workers. 
• Employers’ social contribution: paid by employers (except domestic 
employers). 
• Workers’ support fund: social contribution made by firms to a 
supporting fund to protect workers when they are unemployed or retired 
and finance social housing and urban infrastructure. 
• Education wage: contribution paid by firms based on their payroll 
and used to finance basic education programs. 
• S system (Sistema S): social contribution paid by firms affiliated 
with certain social institutions created to promote professional education 
and deliver social services to their workers. The contribution is on the 
payroll.  
• Contribution for work-related accidents: A federal contribution 
levied on firms based on their payroll to finance work-related accident 
allowances. 
Table 2 specifies which of the above social contributions are 




The power to tax is distributed among the federal, state, and municipal 
governments. A major characteristic of the Brazilian tax system is the 
fact that indirect taxes constitute the main source of tax revenue. Also, 
tax revenue is concentrated on a few of them. About a quarter of total 
revenue comes from a single tax, the ICMS (tax on the circulation of 
goods and transportation and communication services). A list of the main 
Brazilian taxes is presented next. 
• Personal income tax: Tax falling on total personal income. The tax 
base is defined as the difference between gross personal income received 
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Table 2. Simulation of social contributions 
Treatment 
Employees' social contribution S 
Individuals' social contribution S 
Federal civil servants' social contribution S 
Military federal servants' social contribution S 
State civil servants' social contribution S 
Municipal civil servants' social contribution S 
Domestic employers' social contribution S 
Employers' social contribution S 
Workers' support fund S  
Education wage S 
S system S 
Contribution for work-related accidents S 
Note: "S": simulated, although some minor or very specific rules may not be simulated. 
 
in the calendar year and total tax reliefs. Gross income corresponds to 
earned incomes in general, including labor income, rental income, 
pensions and farming income. 
• Corporate income tax: levied on taxable income, which corresponds 
to book profit before taxes, allowing for some additions (for example, 
losses on investments) and deductions (for instance, gains on 
investments). Taxpayers may choose to pay corporate income tax on net 
income on a calendar year or on a quarterly basis. 
• Tax on industrialized products (IPI): a value-added type of tax 
levied on sales by manufacturers. 
• Taxes on foreign trade: duties levied on imports and exports of 
products. 
• Tax on ownership of rural state: levied on the ownership of real state 
outside the urban perimeters. 
• Contribution to the social integration programs (PIS/PASEP): paid 
by firms based on gross revenue. Non-profitable organizations contribute 
based on their payroll. This tax is mainly used to finance unemployment 
benefits and wage bonuses. 
• Contribution for social security financing (CONFINS): tax paid by 
firms based on their gross revenue and earmarked to finance the social 
insurance scheme. 
• Social contribution on net profits (CSLL): tax levied on enterprises’ 
gross revenue and destined to finance social insurance. 
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• Tax on financial transactions: levied on transactions involving 
credit, foreign currencies, insurance, stocks, etc. 
• Tax on the circulation of goods, transportation and communication 
services (ICMS): a general sales tax levied by the states, imposed on the 
transfer of goods at all stages of production and distribution, including 
retail. As mentioned earlier, it is the main Brazilian tax. 
• Tax on the ownership of motor vehicles (IPVA): levied at the state 
level, imposed on the ownership of cars and other motor vehicles. 
• Tax on services (ISS): levied at the municipal level and imposed on 
the supply of services by firms and self-employees. 
• Tax on the ownership of urban real state (IPTU): a municipal tax 
levied on the ownership of real state located within the urban perimeter. 
• Tax on the transfer of urban real state (ITBI): a municipal tax levied 
on sales of urban real state. 
• Tax on the inheritance and donation of assets (ITCDM): a state tax 
levied on assets inherited or donated. 
Table 3 below lists the taxes that are possible to be simulated with the 
available information contained in the Brazilian data sets. 
 
 
3. The model 
 
This section details the model. First, we give an overview of the data set. 
Second, we present the legal rules that determine eligibility to the social 
benefits and payment of the taxes included in the model and how they are 
simulated, taking into consideration information availability and 
restrictions found in the official household survey used to build the 
model’s data set. Third, since the simulation of indirect taxes requires 
that household expenditure information be imputed into the model’s data 
set, we describe the imputation procedure used and how indirect taxes 
are simulated. Finally, we discuss how the model can be used to perform 
behavioral change analysis associated with price variations. In the 
Appendix to this chapter, we briefly sketch the basics of how to run the 
Brazilian model using its Stata commands. The model’s computer code 
is freely and readily available, as described there. 
 
3.1. The Brazilian data set 
 
The data set used in the model was built using household micro data 
from Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD) for the year 
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Table 3. Simulation of taxes 
Treatment 
Why not fully 
simulated? 
Personal income tax S 
Corporate income tax E NIA 
Tax on industrialized products S 
Tax on foreign trade E NIA 
Tax on ownership of rural state E NEI 
Contribution to the social integration program E NIA 
Contribution for social security financing E NIA 
Contribution on banking transactions E NIA 
Social contribution on net profits E NIA 
Tax on financial transactions E NIA 
Tax on the circulation of goods, transportation 
and communication services S 
Tax on the ownership of motor vehicles E NEI 
Tax on services E NEI 
Tax on the ownership of urban real state E NEI 
Tax on the transfer of urban real state E NIA 
Tax on the inheritance and donation of assets E NIA 
Notes: "E": excluded from the model as it is neither included in the micro-data nor 
simulated; "S": simulated, although some very specific rules may not be simulated; 
"NIA": no information available; and "NEI": not enough information available. 
 
2009. PNAD is a rural-urban household survey, covering all Brazilian 
regions, carried out by IBGE, the Brazilian Institute of Geography and 
Statistics. But, as PNAD does not contain expenditure data and this 
information is needed in order to model and simulate indirect taxes and 
medical tax allowances, a separate survey, Pesquisa de Orçamentos 
Familiares (POF) for the period 2008-09, also produced by IBGE, was 
used. Similarly to PNAD, POF covers all Brazilian regions. Table 4 
details the main characteristics of both the PNAD and POF surveys. 
Despite the fact that the main unit of analysis of the model is the 
household, the Brazilian data set displays socio-economic-demographic 
information, separately, for all individuals in the sample. It is so because 
most social benefits and taxes have the individual as the legal unit. An 
aggregation is then performed for each household, over its individual 
members, to get the household total. 
Incomes reported in PNAD are gross of taxes. They incorporate only 
incomes regularly received by individuals. Thus, the benefits such as the 
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Table 4. Description of the Brazilian household surveys 
PNAD POF 
Year of collection 2009 2008-09 
Conducted Yearly At about a 5-year interval 
Publication One year after collection One year after collection 
Period of 
collection 
Sept. 2008 to Sept. 2009 May 2008 to May 2009 
Reference period Month Last 12 months, 3 months, 
month, and week 
Sampling Three-stage sampling 
stratified by municipal, 
2000 official census and 
household levels 
Two-stage sampling 
stratified by geographical 




Coverage National, permanent 
private households only 
National 
Other coverage Representative at the state, 
urban, rural, regional and 
metropolitan areas levels 
Representative at the state, 
urban, rural, regional and 
metropolitan areas levels 
Sample size 153,837 households 55,970 households 
Source: IBGE (2009 and 2010).  
 
unemployment benefit, holiday bonus, and the thirteenth wage are not 
included. On the other hand, the family wage benefit is included in the 
reported incomes. 
There are three sources of labor income: main job, secondary job, and 
other jobs. For simulations requiring information about formal labor 
status, only incomes from main and secondary jobs are considered since 
this information is absent for other jobs. For simulations requiring 
information about contribution to social security, all three sources of 
income are used. 
Some adjustments are made in the construction of the Brazilian data 
set from the original PNAD data. First, since there are some cases where 
the household weight variable in PNAD is negative, the decision taken 
was to exclude these cases from the final data set. There are no 
equivalent problems with the individual and family weights. Second, 
given that some pension incomes are reported in PNAD with a value less 
than the official minimum wage, we impute the official minimum value 
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(equal to the official minimum wage) for these cases. Third, since some 
formal labor incomes are reported in PNAD with a value less than the 
official minimum wage, we impute the official minimum value for those 
cases. Fourth, since some individual incomes are reported as ignored in 
PNAD, we impute a zero value for such cases, which amount to less than 
one percent of total cases. Fifth, the incomes of children less than ten 
years old are not included in the total value of family/household income, 
which includes incomes from all types of sources (labor, pension, rent, 
private transfer, etc.). In the computation of family/household income, 
only the incomes of the head, the spouse, the children ten years old or 
more, and other relatives ten years old or more are included. This is the 
usual procedure adopted in the Brazilian surveys. And sixth, in PNAD 
there is a variable that assigns to every individual a “condition” within 
the household/family. For example, the individual may be the head of the 
household/family, a spouse, a child, a relative, etc. Individuals assigned 
with the condition “boarder” or “domestic employee” are retained in the 
final data only when they are reported as head of some household/family. 
All the others are withdrawn because they do not constitute a member of 
any household/family in the data set. 
 
3.2. Simulation of the Brazilian tax-benefit system 
 
The model simulates six monetary social benefits, two not-strictly 
monetary social benefits, nine social security contributions, the personal 
income tax, and two taxes on consumption. Calculations are performed 
for each individual, family or household, which are then weighted to 
provide results at the population level. 
Monetary values of benefits and taxes are simulated in a monthly 
basis, as are the reported income values in PNAD. This means that those 
benefits that are not regularly received in a monthly basis, like the 
unemployment benefit and the wage bonus, have their annual value 
divided by 12 to get their corresponding monthly value. 
We describe below each policy instrument’s legal rule and how it is 
simulated in the model. The rules described refer to those in force in 
2009, which constitutes the model’s base year. 
 
3.2.1. Social benefits 
 
Only cash benefits are modeled. Benefits are simulated under the 
assumption that all entitled individuals/families actually receive them; 
that is, we ignore non-take-up and targeting problems. Thus, the model 
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simulates the potential impact of perfectly targeted and fully taken-up 
social benefits. 
3.2.1.1. Family wage (salário família). A means-tested benefit paid to 
workers with children aged up to 14 years or disabled. For each 
dependent child the person receives a pre-determined amount, which 
depends on the income bracket in which the person is included. Only 
formal workers are eligible to the benefit. If both parents fulfill the legal 
conditions, they both can receive the benefit for the same children. The 
unit of assessment is the individual, and both fathers and mothers can 
claim the benefit for the same child. For lack of information in PNAD, 
we cannot verify the disability status of individuals. Therefore, the model 
only uses the age of children and individual income to select those 
eligible for the benefit. The benefit is calculated for the main and 
secondary jobs, and then summed up to get the total value of the benefit. 
For other jobs it is not possible to simulate the benefit for lack of 
information about job status (formal or not) in PNAD. 
The model first calculates the number of dependent children for each 
household using the definition of dependent children as those classified 
as son or daughter and being up to 14 years old. Then, the model verifies 
the job status of spouses in order to select only those in formal 
employment. The recipients’ monthly income must fall in one of the two 
income thresholds (up to R$500.41, and above R$500.41 and less than 
R$752.12) for which the benefit applies. The source of income included 
in the income assessment is labor income. For those in the first income 
threshold, the amount of the benefit is defined by the number of 
dependent children times the per children value of the benefit (R$25.66) 
for this threshold. For those in the second income threshold, the amount 
of the benefit is defined by the number of dependent children times the 
per children value of the benefit (R$18.08). 
3.2.1.2. Unemployment benefits (seguro desemprego). Income-related 
benefit that is paid to those formal workers who are unemployed, had 
earned up to two minimum wages monthly in the previous year, and had 
worked for at least 30 days in that period. The person can receive from 
three to five installments, depending on the number of months worked in 
the period of 36 months before being unemployed. The unit of 
assessment is the individual. 
As PNAD contains information only for the period of 12 months 
before the individual being unemployed, the condition of number of 
months previously worked is checked only for that time period, and not 
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for the legal period of 36 months. Due to this information restriction, the 
benefit is also simulated under the assumption that all beneficiaries 
receive five installments. This assumption produced a better adherence 
between simulation results and administrative data. Also, as the family 
wage benefit is not included in the assessment of their income, and as 
original incomes in PNAD include the benefit, it is necessary to deduct 
the simulated value of the benefit from their income base. 
The model selects those who have received unemployment benefits 
and then calculates the amount received. The benefit differ among three 
income tiers (up to R$767.60, in between that and R$1,279.46, and 
higher). The source of income included in the income assessment is labor 
income. The amount of the benefit, which cannot be less than one 
minimum wage (R$465), is calculated as follows: For those in the first 
income tier, their income is multiplied by 0.8. For those in the second 
income tier, their income up to the first tier limit is multiplied by 0.8 and 
the extra income is multiplied by 0.5. For those in the third income tier, 
the amount of the benefit is fixed at (R$870.01). 
3.2.1.3. Wage bonus (bônus salarial). Benefit paid to those formal 
workers who receive up to two minimum wages, are registered in one the 
social savings programs, PIS and PASEP, who worked for at least 30 
days in the previous year. In practice it works as a fourteenth wage paid 
to low-income workers. Given that in PNAD there is no information 
about enrollment in the social savings program, this condition is not 
included in the simulation. The unit of assessment is the individual. 
As with the unemployed benefit, the family benefit has to be deducted 
from the original income reported in PNAD in order to determine the 
individuals’ income base used to calculate the value of the benefit. The 
benefit is calculated both for the principal job and for the second job, but 
not for any other job the individual may have due to lack of job status 
(formal or not) in PNAD data set. The benefit is paid to formal workers 
whose monthly labor income is up to two minimum wages (R$930). The 
amount of the benefit is equal to one minimum wage (R$465). 
3.2.1.4. Annual bonus (bônus anual). Benefit paid to all retired person 
receiving a state pension in the form of an extra monthly pension. The 
unit of assessment is the individual. The model simulates the benefit for 
all those individuals that received that pension. The amount of the benefit 
is equal to the value of the state pension received by the individual. 
3.2.1.5. Family grant (Bolsa Família). A conditional cash benefit paid 
to poor families, conditioned to children’s school attendance and their 
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vaccination, to mother’s prenatal exams, and to the use of other social 
services. However, the model simulates the social benefit without 
conditioning it to vaccination, prenatal exams, and use of social services, 
for lack of this information in PNAD. The unit of assessment is in this 
case the family. 
The model first calculates the number of dependent children aged up 
to 15 years, and then the number of dependent children aged between 16 
and 17 years. This is necessary since the benefit attributes different 
values for these two groups of dependents. Income assessment is made 
on the basis of per capita family income, defined as total family income 
(sum of all sources of income reported in PNAD) less the family wage 
divided by the number of members of the family. 
The benefit is composed of two parts. The first, called basic benefit, is 
independent of presence of children in the family, being target to all 
families considered to be extremely poor (per capita family income equal 
or less than R$70) and its amount is equal to a fixed value (R$68). The 
second part, called variable benefit, is paid to all families considered to 
be poor (per capita family income equal or less than R$140) and with 
children up to 17 years of age. The amount of the variable benefit is 
defined per children and is differentiated according to their age. For 
children between zero and 15 years of age the value of the benefit is 
R$22 per child up to a maximum amount of R$66, corresponding to 
three children. For children between 16 and 17 years of age the value of 
the benefit is R$33 per child up to a maximum amount of R$66, 
corresponding to up to two children. 
3.2.1.6. Old age and disability benefit (LOAS). A means-tested benefit 
paid to those aged 65 years or more or to those who are unable to work 
because of a disability. To be eligible, family per capita income must be 
less than one quarter of the minimum wage and the person cannot be 
receiving any other social benefit. However, the model takes only the 
individual income to assess eligibility to the benefit, since this resulted in 
a better fit with administrative data. The benefit is simulated only for old 
wage people since PNAD does not contain information on disability. The 
unit of assessment is the individual. As the benefit, if received, is already 
included in the “other incomes” variable in PNAD, mixed with several 
other sources of income, this type of income is deducted when 
calculating the individuals’ income. The recipients’ monthly income 
must be less than one quarter of the official minimum wage (R$116.25). 
The amount of the benefit is one minimum wage (R$465). 
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3.2.2. Not-strictly social benefits 
 
Some work-related benefits that enter total income are not strictly part of 
the benefit system. However, they are simulated since they enter in the 
base for calculating social contributions and the personal income tax. 
3.2.2.1. Thirteenth wage (décimo terceiro salário). Benefit paid to all 
formal workers in the form of an extra monthly wage annually. The unit 
of assessment is the individual. The amount of the benefit is equal to the 
value of the monthly wage received by the individual and is attributed 
only to those individuals who are reported as employed in formal, legally 
registered jobs. 
3.2.2.2. Holidays bonus (adicional de ferias). Benefit paid to all 
formal workers, in the form of an extra 30% payment on top of their 
wages when on official holydays. The unit of assessment is the 
individual. The amount of the benefit is equal to 30% of the monthly 
wage received by the individual, who must be reported as enrolled in a 




The Brazilian model simulates most contributions to the social security 
schemes at the federal, state, and municipal levels. 
3.2.3.1. Employee’s social contribution. It is paid by formal private 
sector workers and temporary workers based on their earnings, up to a 
ceiling. Contributory rates vary according to income: 8% for incomes up 
to R$965.67, 9.9% for the next bracket up to R$1,609.45, and 11% for 
incomes greater than R$1,609.45 and less or equal than R$3,218.90. This 
last amount constitutes the contributory ceiling for larger incomes. 
3.2.3.2. Domestic employee’s social contribution. It is contributed by 
formal domestic employees based on their earnings, up to a ceiling, in 
the same way and with the same rates as other formal employees. The 
difference is that, in this case, from the domestic employee’s income 
base it is not possible to deduct the family wage, a benefit they are not 
legally entitled to. 
3.2.3.3. Individual’s social contribution. Contribution paid by self-
employed workers, by applying a flat rate (20%) on their income. The 
model sets the value of the minimum wage (R$465) as the income base 
upon which the contributory rate applies, rather than the actual incomes, 
since this adjusts better the simulation results to administrative data.2 
3.2.3.4. Federal civil servant’s social contribution. It is paid by federal 
government workers based on their earnings, at a flat rate of 11%. 
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3.2.3.5. Federal military servant’s social contribution. It is made by 
military servants working for the federal government based on their 
earnings, on which it is applied a flat rate of 7.5%. 
3.2.3.6. State civil servant’s social contribution. It is paid by civil 
servants working for the 27 state governments plus the federal district, 
with each state having its own social security scheme. However, recently, 
there has been a convergence towards the rate structure applied for 
federal civil servants. Of the 27 states, 22 currently follow the federal 
government’s rate structure, with their civil servants contributing with a 
flat rate (11%) on their earnings. The other five states’ contributions are 
simulated taking their own contributory rates structure.3 
3.2.3.7. Municipal civil servant’s social contribution. It is made by 
civil servants working for municipal governments. As only very few 
(large) municipalities have their own social security schemes, the great 
majority of municipalities have their servants enrolled in the federal 
social security scheme. The model simulates this contribution under the 
assumption that all municipal civil servants pay the same flat rate 
contribution (11%) on their earnings as the federal civil servants. 
3.2.3.8. Domestic employer’s social contribution. Contribution paid 
by those who hire domestic workers, by applying a flat rate contribution 
(12%) on the earnings paid to the workers. 
3.2.3.9. Employer’s social contribution. It is paid by the employers, 
except domestic employers, by applying a flat rate contribution (20%) on 
their payroll. The model simulates it by applying the rate on earnings of 
all formal private sector employees. 
 
3.2.4. Personal income tax 
 
The unit for the personal income tax is mainly the individual. However, 
spouses and dependents can file a joint income tax return, with their 
incomes taxed jointly. Also, some tax allowances and tax credits are 
jointly assessed. Moreover, individuals may choose to file either a 
simplified form or a complete form. In the first case, a standard 
deduction is applied. The objective is to simplify tax reporting for most 
taxpayers who have only a limited amount of deductions. In the complete 
form, individuals have to report all deductible payments. The income 
earned by dependent persons may be reported individually or together 
with one of their parents. The model assumes that spouses and dependent 
persons earning up to the income exemption limit are pulled together 
with the head of the family, their incomes being taxed jointly. The model 
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uses a maximization algorithm that selects the best option (simplified 
form or complete form) for the individual, that is, the alternative that 
generates the smaller amount of tax to be paid. 
3.2.4.1. Taxable income. It is defined as total gross income minus the 
value of the exemptions. Gross income corresponds to earned incomes in 
general, including labor income, rental income, pensions, and farming 
income. Income from stock exchange transactions, called variable 
income, and from the sale of non-financial assets (for example, real 
state), called capital gains, are treated separately, being taxed at the 
moment the transaction is made. Return on financial assets and shares in 
corporate profits and dividends are also taxed separately at the time of 
their realization. For lack of information, however, these incomes are not 
included in the model.  
3.2.4.1. Exemptions. There are several income components that are 
exempt from taxation but that have to be declared when filing the income 
tax return form. The exemptions incorporated into the model are: exempt 
part of the pension and annual bonus income of those aged 65 or more, 
equivalent to the general income exemption limit (R$1,434.59),4 and the 
unemployment benefit. These components are subtracted from pre-tax 
income in order to have the taxable income. 
Income from savings accounts is exempt from the income tax. 
However, in PNAD this type of income is reported together with income 
from several other sources such as government cash transfer programs, 
dividends, and investment incomes, some of which are taxable while 
others are not. As there is no way of separating out these income sources, 
the model is run under the assumption that these bundled incomes, 
labeled “other incomes”, are not taxable. 
3.2.4.2. Tax base. The income tax base is defined as the difference 
between taxable income and total tax allowances. Aside from the social 
security contributions, the tax allowances built into the model are: 
allowances for dependents, medical expenses, and educational expenses. 
The dependent persons are made of spouses, children or relatives up to 
21 years of age, children or relatives enrolled in university studies or 
technical colleges up to 24 years of age, and relatives who earn less than 
the exemption threshold (R$1,434.59). A standard deduction is applied 
for each dependent person (R$144.20). In the case of two-earner 
households, only one can claim the allowance. 
Medical expenses, including those related to dependent persons, are 
fully deducted from gross income. However, there are some types of 
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medical expenses not eligible to the tax allowance, such as expenses with 
medicines, glasses and eye lenses. For modeling medical expenses it is 
necessary to impute medical expenditure into the PNAD-based data set. 
In order to do that we use the separate household expenditure survey 
POF since PNAD does not contain data on expenditure. The method 
employed is to calculate average values of medical expenses for each of 
10 income groups, formed using the deciles of per capita regular 
monetary income,5 in the POF data set, and then imputing these average 
values to the corresponding income groups in the PNAD-based data set. 
In the case of the taxpayer’s and his/her dependents’ education 
expenses, these are subject to a pre-determined limit (R$225.75) per 
taxpayer. This tax allowance is simulated attributing that limit to those 
individuals who are attending a private school or a private university. 
3.2.4.3. Tax schedule and deductions. Table 5 below presents the 
Brazilian personal income tax’s rate structure. The individual may opt for 
filing his tax return using a simplified form consisting in applying a 
standard deduction (20% of taxable income, up to R$1,061.97) to his 
taxable income in order to determine his/her tax base. This option 
releases the individual of having to detail and, eventually, give proof of 
all deductible expenses incurred. The model sets a value for the standard 
deduction equal to whichever is greater, 20% of taxable income or 
R$1,061.97. Our model simulates both the complete tax return (detailing 
all deductible expenses and applying the income tax schedule) and the 
simplified tax return (using the standard deduction) for all individuals 
and chooses the one that minimizes their tax payments. 
 
3.2.5. Indirect taxes 
 
The indirect taxes in Brazil that are possible to be simulated are those 
levied on the consumption of goods and services, namely the tax on 
industrialized products, IPI, and the tax on the circulation of goods and 
transportation and communication services, ICMS. The first is a tax 
levied by the federal government on manufactured products. There are 
several different tax rates that apply to different groups of products (like, 
for example, motor vehicles, alcoholic beverages, tobacco, etc.). The 
ICMS, on the other hand, is a tax levied at the state level on transactions 
involving goods in general and on specific services related to 
transportation and communication. There are 28 different tax laws for the 
ICMS, corresponding to the 27 Brazilian states plus the Federal District. 
Tax rates can change within and across the states. 
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Table 5. Personal income tax schedule, 2009 
Income (R$ per month) Rate 
Up to 1,434.59 Exempt 
1,434.60 up to 2,150.00   7.5% 
2,150.01 up to 2,866.70 15.0% 
2,866.71 up to 3,582.00 22.5% 
Greater than 3,582,00 27.5% 
Source: Receita federal, Brazilian Ministry of Finance. 
 
3.3. Simulation of indirect taxes for Brazil 
 
The simulation of the tax on industrialized products and of the tax on 
goods and services involves some degree of complexity. As PNAD has 
no information about household expenditure, another data set, POF, has 
to be used. This implies that some form of expenditure imputation, from 
POF to the PNAD-based data set, has to be carried out. 
The imputation procedure involves three main steps. First, aggregate 
groups of consumption expenditure are created in the POF data set. 
Second, total consumption is econometrically estimated and imputed into 
the model’s data set. And third, average budget shares are calculated 
from POF and imputed into the model. Below we describe more 
precisely the imputation procedure adopted in developing the model. 
 
3.3.1. Expenditure imputation 
 
The nine expenditure groups that we create in POF are: food, alcoholic 
beverages and tobacco, clothing, housing, electricity and domestic fuel, 
health and education, transport and communication, recreation and 
culture, and other goods and services. Expenditure on these groups is 
imputed to the data set by econometrically estimating total expenditure 
for a range of household types in the POF data set, and using the 
estimated parameters to impute total expenditure in the PNAD-based 
data set. Average budget shares are then calculated in the POF data set 
for ten household income groups, using total regular monetary household 
income and socio-economic variables. These average budget shares are 
then imputed to the model’s corresponding household income groups. 
The use of the concept of regular monetary income as the basis to 
group households in income strata is due to the fact that there is a marked 
difference between the components of total household income in both 
data sets. POF reports regular and eventual monetary incomes plus non-
monetary incomes. PNAD reports only regular monetary incomes and a 
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very small fraction of non-monetary incomes. In order to make the two 
data sets compatible, we create a new definition of household income 
which includes only regular monetary incomes. This procedure dispenses 
with the estimation of a complete demand system for Brazil. Such a 
procedure is adequate when one has problems with available data for 
estimating a complete demand system. In the case of Brazil, POF has 
price data only for food. Elsewhere we can find recent price data only for 
food, urban transport and fuel, and that only for metropolitan areas. 
3.3.1.1. Imputation of total consumption.6 The functional form to be 
estimated for total expenditure in the POF data set is: 
 
(1) , lnln   POFPOFPOF YC θX  
 
where C is total household consumption, Y is total household income, X 
is a vector of socio-demographic characteristics, and , , and θ are 
coefficients, with θ being a vector. 
The socio-demographic characteristics to be considered are as 
follows: household total income, sex of the head of household, age of the 
head, conjugal condition of the head of household (married or not), state 
of the federation, urban or rural area, household occupation condition 
(rented or not), education of the head of household, job occupation of the 
head of household, number of people in the household receiving income, 
number of children aged 0-6 years, number of children aged 7-14 years, 
number of children aged 15-17 years, number of adults aged 18-65 years, 
number of old people aged 66 or more years 
The coefficients in equation (1) above are estimated by ordinary least 
squares and then used to impute total consumption into the PNAD-based 
data set according to the following equation: 
 
(2) , ˆˆlnˆˆln   PNADPNADPNAD YC Xθ  
 
where the disturbance term is simulated assuming that it is normally 
distributed with zero mean and variance equal to that of the residual of 
the POF regression given before. This is to ensure that in both POF and 
the PNAD-based data sets we have the same variance of consumption. 
3.3.1.2. Imputation of budget shares. Budget shares for the nine 
consumption groups included in the Brazilian model are obtained in the 
POF data set by dividing expenditure on each consumption group by 
total household income. This procedure is followed in each decile of 
household regular monetary income. Average budget shares are next 
calculated for each income group by adding up the budget shares in the 
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group and dividing it by the total number of households in it. These 
average budget shares are then imputed into the corresponding household 
income groups of the model’s PNAD-based data set. 
 
3.3.2. Calculating indirect tax payments 
 
The tax on industrialized products and the tax on goods and services, 
even though they are in principle value-added type of taxes, present in 
fact some degree of cumulative effects due to problems associated with 
the implementation of tax refunds, with the tax burden passed along to 
indirect firm purchases, and to final demand. This implies that legal tax 
rates may not be appropriate to calculate the tax burden faced by 
individuals and families. Instead, one has to estimate effective tax rates. 
Estimation of these rates for the IPI and ICMS is carried out outside the 
microsimulation model, following the method in Siqueira, Nogueira and 
Souza (2001), using POF and the Brazilian 2005 input-output matrix. 
The vectors of the IPI effective rates and the ICMS effective rates, 
with one rate for each of the nine consumption groups, are introduced as 
fixed parameters into the microsimulation model. With these effective 
rates so introduced for each of the consumption groups, the model 
simulates the amounts of IPI and ICMS paid by households, in the status 
quo, by multiplying the household expenditure on each of the nine 
consumption groups by the respective tax rate. Household expenditure on 
each consumption group is calculated in turn by multiplying the average 
budget shares by total household expenditure. 
 
3.4. Simulation of behavioral changes 
 
The model may be used to simulate changes in household behavior on 
account of price variations. Household reaction to price variations takes 
the form of changes in the composition of total expenditure. In order to 
simulate the reaction, it is assumed that household preferences can be 
represented by the linear expenditure system (LES).7 Households within 
the same income group are assumed to have the same preferences, but 
these vary according to the total expenditure of each group. Demand 
(expenditure), for each of the nine consumption groups, is given by: 
 
(3)    9 1i iiiiiii pEpxp   , 
 
where pi is the price of the composite good i, xi its consumption, γi is the 
subsistence consumption level (so that xi > γi), E is total household 
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expenditure, and βi is the expenditure weight. These last marginal budget 
shares have to add to one. 
Broadly speaking, the following procedure, to be detailed later, is 
used to estimate the parameters in equation (3): Engel curves, giving the 
relationship, for each of the nine groups of consumption, between the 
budget shares (proportion of income allocated to the purchase of each of 
the nine consumption groups) and total household expenditure, are first 
estimated for each household group. Then, using the estimated 
parameters of the Engel curves, expenditure (income) elasticities are 
calculated. These elasticities are, in turn, used to determine the marginal 
budget shares. Finally, the estimated values of these parameters, together 
with assumptions about the committed expenditure on the several 
consumption groups, allow the model to simulate behavioral changes 
associated with price variations. 
More precisely, the marginal budget shares are calculated using the 
fact that, for a linear expenditure demand system, 
 
(4) iii w   , 
 
where εi is the expenditure (income) elasticity of demand and wi is the 
(average) budget share of consumption group i. Budget shares for each 
household income group are imputed directly from POF, as explained 
above. Expenditure elasticities are determined by first estimating, in the 
POF data set, for each of the ten household income groups, and for each 
of the nine consumption groups, the following budget share equation:8 
 
(5) )/1(ln 321 EEw iiii    . 
 
The last equation specifies the relationship between total household 
expenditure E and the proportion of the total household expenditure 
allocated to the consumption group i = 1, …, 9. Expenditure elasticities, 
for each group and each household type (in terms of total income), can 
then be expressed as: 
 
(6)      1/ln   1/1 32132  iiiiii EEE   . 
 
Then the estimated elasticities, nine for each household income group, 
are imputed into the model’s corresponding income groups. After that, 
the marginal budget shares are calculated in the model’s data set using 
equation (4). 
In the case of subsistence consumption, it is determined by first 
assuming that total committed expenditure, ∑i piγi, is equal to R$70 per 
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capita and per month. This last amount is equal to the value of the 
absolute poverty line recently set by the Brazilian government. However, 
it should be understood neither as an endorsement of this particular level 
of the poverty line nor as an assessment of it. Rather, it should be seen 
merely as one possible alternative to be used, among several that can be 
thought of, for purpose of illustrating the model’s output.  
Given that amount of committed expenditure, the minimal level of 
consumption of composite good i is determined, in a per capita basis, by: 
 
(7)   pcipciii EEp  70  , 
 
where Epc is the total household expenditure per capita, while Epci is the 
expenditure on consumption group i. The committed quantity consumed 
is then determined by dividing the expenditure on the item by its price. 
 
3.4.3. Behavioral analysis 
 
If we want to consider the impact of price changes on household 
consumption behavior, it is first necessary to determine the consumer 
prices under the status quo. For each of the nine consumption groups, 
and after setting producer prices to one and using the definition of a tax-
inclusive rate, the consumer price is given by: 
 
(8)   1)1/(  iii ttp  . 
 
The tax rate ti is equal to the sum of the IPI effective tax rate and the 




ii ttt   . 
 
In order to illustrate a possible price change, we can use the example, 
called Reform 2 in the next section, of a tax reform that exempts food 
from the payment of ICMS. Operationally, this means that the ICMS rate 
for food is made equal to zero. We thus have that the new composite tax 
rate on food becomes ti = ti
IPI + 0 = ti
IPI and, consequently, the price of 
food becomes: 
 
(10)   1)1/(  IPIiIPIii ttp  . 
 
With this post-reform price, the model calculates the new level of total 
household expenditure and the new amount spent on each of the 
consumption groups after the reform. It also calculates the new tax 
revenue raised by the government. 
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4. Model’s output 
 
Simulations carried out with the model generate information, for each 
household in the data set, about the impact of changes in the benefits and 
taxes on several definitions of income (initial, gross, disposable, and 
final). This information constitutes the model’s basic output, upon which 
distributional, poverty, and inequality statistics are calculated. 
The simulation output is displayed in the form of tables of results. 
Below we show examples of some of these tables based on simulation 
results for the status quo scenario, or base run, and for two policy 
reforms. However, one should take care in interpreting the simulation 
results. The model, for instance, does not take into account tax evasion 
and the non-take-up of social benefits.  
What the model is primarily aimed at is to quantify the potential 
impact of the policy instruments by simulating the tax-benefit legal rules 
as close as possible given the available data. Sometimes, as with the 
unemployment benefit, the data base might underestimate the number of 
entitled individuals. In other instances, as with the personal income tax, 
since the model ignores tax evasion, it might overestimate the total value 
of the policy instrument.9 One should also note that the results presented 
below are not intended as being the outcome of a thorough analysis of 
Brazil’s current system of taxes and social benefits or of possible reforms 
to it. Rather, they should only be seen as illustrations of the model’s 
output capabilities. 
Results are shown taking the household as the unit of analysis. The 
results are generally aggregated for certain groups of household income. 
This aggregation is made using the concept of per capita equivalent gross 
regular monetary income (equivalent gross income, for short), which is 
defined as follows: 
 
Equivalent gross income = Gross income / Nα , 
 
where N is the number of persons in the household and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. For the 
simulations presented here, α was set equal to one.10 
 
4.1. Base-run simulation results 
 
The starting point in the presentation of simulation output is to display, 
for the base-run, named here as the status quo, the average monthly 
household income according to the several income concepts mentioned 
above. The objective here is to give a picture of how household income 
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is affected by the receipt of social benefits and the payment of taxes. This 
is done by calculating initial income (defined as income before benefits 
and taxes), gross income (initial income plus social benefits plus not-
strictly social benefits), disposable income (gross income minus direct 
taxes), and final income (disposable income minus indirect taxes) for 
different groups of household income. That picture is shown in Table 6 
below.11 The results presented there are but a tiny example of the several 
types of outcomes the model is capable to generate. A variant, for 
example, could be obtained by classifying household groups according to 
other socio-economic-demographic characteristics as those mentioned in 
the vector of household characteristics used in the imputation of 
expenditure described in subsection 3.3.1.1 above. Going back to Table 
6, the results presented there may be interpreted as suggesting that gains 
associated with the receipt of social benefits, as captured in the gross 
income definition, are somewhat lessened by the payment of taxes; 
especially, in the case of the poorer households, by the payment of 
indirect taxes. 
Table 7 shows, for the status quo, a good number of poverty statistics 
associated with the different household income concepts given above. 
The first statistics is the headcount index, which gives the incidence of 
poverty; that is, the number of people in the total population whose 
income is below a given poverty line. The headcount ratio gives, on the 
other hand, the proportion of poor people in the whole population. The 
third statistic is the poverty gap, which gives the depth of poverty or how 
 
Table 6. Initial, gross, and disposable household incomes under status quo 
Mean monthly income (R$) 
Income Initial Gross Disposable Final 
groups income income income income 
1 206.73 357.94 354.69 286.99 
2 507.51 700.59 685.34 553.70 
3 742.13 904.05 876.44 716.82 
4 782.22 1,018.31 982.85 814.86 
5 1,030.20 1,301.27 1,250.10 1,050.52 
6 902.01 1,294.20 1,246.23 1,068.39 
7 1,422.13 1,788.25 1,701.45 1,463.35 
8 1,735.24 2,162.16 2,042.68 1,779.38 
9 2,317.58 2,940.20 2,743.50 2,435.55 
10 5,994.81 7,401.24 6,375.90 5,942.11 
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Table 7.  Poverty indicators under status quo 
Initial Gross Disposable Final 
Poverty indicators income income income income 
Headcount (millions) 29.1 7.1 7.2 12.2 
Headcount ratio 15.2 3.7 3.7 6.3 
Poverty gap (R$billions) 1.5 0.21 0.2 0.4 
Poverty gap ratio 0.72 0.36 0.36 0.44 
FGT index 0.097 0.007 0.007 0.024 
 
far off households are from the poverty line. It is obtained by adding up 
all the shortfalls of the poor, relative to the poverty line. The poverty gap 
ratio is calculated dividing the poverty gap by the maximum value of this 
statistics (that is, the number of poor times the poverty line). Finally, the 
FGT index is a combination of the headcount ratio, the poverty gap ratio 
and a measure of the income inequality among the poor.12 It should be 
noted that the poverty line used is R$70, which has been established by 
the Brazilian government as its reference extreme poverty line. 
Table 8 shows, also for the status quo, some inequality measures for 
the different income definitions. The Gini index is the most commonly 
used measure of inequality; the coefficient varies between zero, which 
reflects complete equality, and one, which indicates complete inequality 
(one person has all the income or consumption, all others have none). 
The concentration index, on the other hand, gives the cumulative share of 
total income going to individuals in the population, with people ranked 
from the poorest to the richest. The Kakwani index is the difference 
between the concentration index and the Gini coefficient. In the case of 
taxes, it shows the difference between the share of each household group 
in total tax revenue and the share of each group in total expenditure. 
 
Table 8. Inequality indicators under status quo 
Initial Gross Disposable Final 
Inequality indicators income income income income 
Gini index 0.60 0.55 0.53 0.55 
Concentration index 
     IPI 0.23 0.19 0.19 0.11 
     ICMS 0.27 0.24 0.24 0.16 
Kakwani index 
     IPI -0.37 -0.35 -0.34 -0.45 
     ICMS -0.33 -0.30 -0.29 -0.39 
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As a general result, the tables show that the reduction in poverty and 
inequality obtained with benefit transfers to poor households is 
considerably diminished on account of the payment of indirect taxes by 
these same households. The negative sign of the Kakwani index implies, 
in particular, that the share of the poorer households in total tax revenue 
is greater than their share in total expenditure. 
 
4.2. Simulation of policy reform 
 
Two hypothetical policy reform scenarios are simulated as illustrations 
of the model’s output capabilities. In the first, Reform 1, the value of the 
Family Grant (Bolsa Família)’s basic benefit is raised from R$68 to 
R$116.25. This new value corresponds to one quarter of the 2009 official 
minimum wage. In the second policy scenario to be considered here, 
Reform 2, food is exempted from the ICMS. 
 
4.2.1. Reform 1 (no behavioral change) 
 
Reform 1 consists in simulating a rise in the basic benefit element of the 
Bolsa Família. In 2009 this benefit was worth R$68 for all entitled 
families. Tables 9, 10, and 11 present results for the case where the value 
of the basic benefit is raised to R$116.25. 
Overall, these tables suggest, as expected, that the rise in the Family 
grant benefit contributes to bring poverty and inequality down, but again 
the indirect tax system considerably lessens this gain in poverty and 
inequality reduction. 
 
Table 9. Initial, gross, and disposable household incomes under Reform 1 
Mean monthly income (R$) 
Income Initial Gross Disposable Final 
groups income income income income 
1 211.49 414.39 411.08 341.44 
2 511.17 733.44 717.92 581.57 
3 746.43 909.68 882.64 724.10 
4 791.75 1,021.06 985.98 812.90 
5 1,036.90 1,300.42 1,250.13 1,057.14 
6 913.45 1,296.06 1,248.23 1,059.49 
7 1,421.74 1,775.72 1,690.80 1,444.61 
8 1,743.27 2,155.72 2,037.73 1,763.68 
9 2,340.25 2,949.58 2,752.91 2,460.33 
10 6,137.91 7,609.18 6,527.41 6,090.42 
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Table 10.  Poverty indicators under Reform 1 
Initial Gross Disposable Final 
Poverty indicators income income income income 
Headcount (millions) 29.1 5.4 5.4 9.8 
Headcount ratio 15.16 2.80 2.80 5.13 
Poverty gap (R$billions) 1.5 0.1 0.1 0.3 
Poverty gap ratio 0.724 0.276 0.281 0.406 
FGT index 0.097 0.002 0.003 0.021 
 
 
4.2.2. Reform 2 (behavioral change analysis) 
 
Reform 2 is used to illustrate how behavioral change analysis can be 
introduced into the model, in the form of the impact of price changes on 
household consumption behavior. To that extent, assume that a tax 
reform is introduced that exempts food from the payment of ICMS. In 
the model, this means that the ICMS rate for food is made equal to zero. 
Applying the modeling procedures detailed in subsection 3.4 above, the 
model calculates the new consumer price of food and the new 
distribution of total expenditure on the nine different consumption 
groups among the households.  
Table 12 shows the composition of household expenditure before 
(status quo) and after Reform 2, by household group. Comparing the 
tables’ results, one can gauge how the households reacted to the tax 
reform by changing the amount of total expenditure allocated to the nine 
consumption groups. As a result of the reform, expenditure on food, a 
necessary good, is reduced across all income groups, with households 
using their extra disposable income to increase the consumption of other 
items such as transport and communications. 
 
Table 11. Inequality indicators under Reform 1 
Initial Gross Disposable Final 
Inequality indicators income income income income 
Gini index 0.60 0.54 0.52 0.55 
Concentration index 
     IPI 0.23 0.17 0.16 0.07 
     ICMS 0.26 0.24 0.24 0.15 
Kakwani index 
     IPI -0.37 -0.38 -0.36 -0.48 
     ICMS -0.33 -0.30 -0.28 -0.40 
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Table 12. Household expenditure under status quo and Reform 2   
Spending in consumption under status quo (R$ billions/month) 
Income 
group 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
1 0.78 0.03 0.18 0.19 0.26 0.18 0.36 0.82 0.16 
2 1.50 0.06 0.33 0.38 0.45 0.34 0.59 0.14 0.29 
3 1.70 0.07 0.42 0.45 0.56 0.44 0.88 0.18 0.41 
4 1.90 0.10 0.50 0.53 0.69 0.56 1.14 0.20 0.52 
5 2.20 0.11 0.57 0.59 0.83 0.67 1.50 0.27 0.70 
6 2.70 0.14 0.63 0.77 1.10 1.09 1.69 0.29 0.82 
7 2.50 0.17 0.68 0.67 1.04 1.00 2.07 0.34 0.88 
8 3.10 0.19 0.84 0.78 1.38 1.35 2.94 0.44 1.22 
9 3.40 0.19 0.96 0.83 1.83 1.88 3.92 0.58 1.61 
10 3.90 0.17 1.37 0.83 3.21 2.84 6.11 0.94 2.49 
Spending in consumption under Reform 2 (R$ billions/month) 
Income 
group 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
1 0.65 0.03 0.16 0.12 0.26 0.17 0.55 0.77 0.19 
2 1.46 0.05 0.33 0.20 0.44 0.33 0.79 0.13 0.33 
3 1.79 0.04 0.41 0.16 0.53 0.44 1.10 0.18 0.47 
4 1.98 0.10 0.52 0.18 0.68 0.53 1.44 0.21 0.57 
5 2.18 0.09 0.57 0.27 0.79 0.66 1.83 0.29 0.75 
6 2.63 0.12 0.68 0.41 1.04 0.98 2.17 0.31 0.86 
7 2.35 0.15 0.70 0.31 1.01 1.01 2.52 0.35 0.95 
8 2.78 0.16 0.85 0.46 1.34 1.39 3.50 0.45 1.29 
9 2.93 0.16 0.95 0.88 1.64 1.90 4.48 0.58 1.62 
10 3.41 0.15 1.45 0.57 3.12 2.81 6.78 0.92 2.56 
Notes: I. Food; II. Alcoholic beverages and tobacco; III. Clothing; IV. Electricity 
and domestic fuel; V. Housing; VI. Health and education; VII. Transport and 
communications; VIII. Recreation and culture; and IX. Other goods and services. 
 
 
Appendix: How to run the model 
 
This appendix briefly describes the basic steps for running the Brazilian 
tax-benefit microsimulation model. The model is freely available in the 
address http://ideas.repec.org/c/ega/comcod/201102.html through the 
Ideas-RePEc site. 
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The Brazilian microsimulation model was developed using the Stata 
software, version 10.0. To run the simulations one needs the model’s 
Stata codes, that details the computer commands that are necessary to 
perform the simulations, and the data set on which the commands are 
applied. The zip file that can be downloaded in the address given above 
contains two types of files (aside from the Word and Excel files that 
serve as documentation): as separate text files (for example, one for the 
social benefits, one for the personal income tax, etc.), and as a Stata do-
file containing the whole set of simulation commands. The text files 
could also be brought together but are presented separately to facilitate 
their reading and manipulation. 
To begin using the model in a computer, the user should first create a 
folder where the model’s Stata codes files and the data set file can be 
saved. Once this is done, go to the command files, both in the text files 
and in the do-file, and where it is indicated a data set file pathname, 
insert the same data set file pathname as created in the user’s computer. 
To run the model, the user can choose between: 
 (i) Open the Stata program and, in the command window, paste 
the simulation commands from the text files (the user can paste and run 
each file separately or paste and run all files altogether); 
 (ii) With the Stata do-file editor, open the model’s do-file and 
execute it using the execute do-file button. 
 (iii) Open the Stata program and, in the command window, type 
the name of the model’s do-file and give the enter command. 
After doing the simulations, the model computes the aggregate results 
necessary to construct the output tables. The commands for doing this are 





1 Chapter prepared for the project “An Integrated Framework for the Assessment 
of Equitable, Pro-Growth Fiscal Reform in Latin America and the Caribbean: 
Fiscal Schemes for Inclusive Development (FSID)”, co-funded by UNDP and 
IDRC. Any errors or opinions are the authors’ and do not necessarily represent 
the views of the United Nations Development Programme, or those of the 
International Development Research Centre. 
2 This suggests that, in practice, most self-employed workers actually choose to 
contribute based on the value of the official minimum wage. 
3 These differentiated rate structures are not presented here, but are detailed in 
the model’s Stata codes. 
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4 All personal income tax’s parameter values presented are monthly. 
5 The reason for using this concept of household income is explained below, 
when discussing the simulation of indirect taxes. 
6 For more details on the technical procedures, see O’Donoghue, Baldini and 
Mantovani (2004). 
7 For an exposition and discussion of the linear expenditure system, see, for 
example, Lluch, Powell and Williams (1977), Creedy (1998), and Creedy and 
Sleeman (2006). 
8 For further discussion of this particular specification of budget share equations, 
see, for instance, Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), and Creedy and Sleeman 
(2006). 
9 On the other hand, one may use simulation results to have an idea, imperfect as 
it may be, of the extent of tax evasion 
10 Ideally, sensitivity analysis of the results to different adult equivalence scales 
should be performed. This is easily done by changing the value of α and running 
the simulations again. 
11 The results in the table could be further disaggregated by policy instrument. 
12 For further information on these indicators, see, for instance, Coudouel, 
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2 A microsimulation model of distribution 
for Chile1 
 







Microsimulation models have become increasingly important tools for 
the preliminary assessment of public policies. Although they are still 
relatively uncommon in Latin America, a good number of those models 
have been developed over the years for the industrialized countries, such 
as EUROMOD for the European Union, CBOLT for the US, and 
NATSEM for Australia (see, e. g., Absalón and Urzúa, 2011). According 
to Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006), the main strengths of these models 
are the use of the heterogeneousness of the databases in contrast to the 
models of representative agents, as well as the possibility of obtaining 
results on the economic level by aggregating individual results. 
In this chapter we present a microsimulation model that has been 
developed for Chile with the explicit purpose of determining the 
distributive impacts of changes in tax policy and social spending. It is a 
free-access model, meaning that it can be used by all those interested in 
public policy issues. Along these lines, the model has a user-friendly 
interface that facilitates its use on the part of interested parties. 
Our model is an instrument for analyzing public policy, inasmuch as 
it can assess in advance the effects that reforms and public policies will 
have on the population’s welfare, the income distribution and poverty 
indicators. It is an arithmetic type of instrument; that is, it does not 
contemplate variations in the agents’ behavior in response to policy 
changes. This, which could be considered a limitation, has the advantage 
of allowing a broad range of policies to be evaluated, from taxes to 
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subsidies or social security, or combinations of the same. Furthermore, as 
it is later shown in Chapter 3 of this book, it is also possible to use this 
basic model to create more advanced modalities that contain functions on 
the reactions of economic agents. 
Specifically, the simulation possibilities in our arithmetic model 
include indirect taxes (the value added tax, as well as specific taxes on 
tobacco, alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages, and fuels), the income 
tax for individuals, and the main monetary transfers that are used to fight 
poverty; namely, the single family subsidy, the family allowance, the 
basic solidarity pension, and the Chile solidario bonus. It can also 
simulate the distributive effects of changes in the contributions to the 
public health and pension system, and of changes in the poverty line. 
This article has two central objectives: first, to present the model in 
terms of its characteristics and the modality of its construction; and 
second, to undertake an application by evaluating the impact on 
distribution and poverty of a tax reform that would cut the value added 
tax (VAT) by one per cent, from 19% to 18%, while keeping a balanced 
budget with a progressive increase in the personal income tax. The 
objective of the balanced budget is to focus the analysis on the impact of 
the tax reform without having to make any changes in the levels of social 
spending. The purpose of the exercise is to illustrate the model’s 
operation and to demonstrate its potential contribution to the public 
policy debate by quantifying the expected effects that policies will have 
on the population’s economic welfare. It is shown that the joint effect of 
the policies analyzed is a tax cut for the population in deciles one through 
nine, along with a tax increase for households in the top decile. 
The chapter is organized in the following way: the model, its scope 
and characteristics follow this introduction. In particular the database 
construction process is described, along with the elements to be 
simulated and the premises used. The third section explains the tax 
policies to be simulated. The results are subsequently presented in the 





Our microsimulation model is an instrument for estimating the 
distributive effects prior to public policy changes, especially those 
related to taxes, pension contributions and monetary transfers.2 Thus, it is 
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possible to determine which socioeconomic, demographic or geographic 
groups will be benefited or affected by changes to the aforementioned 
policy instruments. 
In the Chilean model, the distributive impact of changes in direct 
taxes can be analyzed, specifically the income tax for private individuals, 
as well as changes in indirect taxes. With regard to the latter, the results 
refer to households, while when it comes to direct taxes the unit of 
analysis is the individual. The first result is derived from the traditional 
assumption that the household is the relevant economic unit in 
consumption and that household resources are part of a common budget. 
In contrast, direct taxes affect income at the point where it is generated, 
and it is therefore natural to refer to them in terms of the individuals who 
pay them. In Chile there is no different tax treatment in the event that 
more than one member of a household generates an income. Aside from 
those tax applications, the model can also be used to analyze the 
distributive impact of changes in pension contributions, in addition to the 
monetary transfers provided by the state, among which family benefits 
and welfare pensions stand out. 
 
2.1. Characteristics of the model 
 
The microsimulation model is arithmetic in nature and partially balanced. 
That is, it does not contemplate behavioral changes in individuals in the 
face of public policy changes, nor does it consider dynamic effects as a 
consequence of the changes analyzed. However, the base model can be 
expanded to consider the aforementioned aspects of behavior and 
dynamics. It was developed based on the Stata statistics software, which 
is widely used in the country and provides sufficient calculation power to 
be able to work with large samples. The model uses the total sample of 
the 2009 national survey known as Casen (acronym for Encuesta de 
Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional). 
The model is freely and readily available in the internet address 
http://ideas.repec.org/c/ega/comcod/201103.html through the Ideas-
RePEc site. Its use is facilitated by an interface that consists in dialogue 
boxes that specify the policies to be considered. Figure 1 shows the 
dialogue box that allows one to generate the scenarios that are to be 
simulated. It contains all of the simulation possibilities and the reference 
values of the base scenario in view, in addition to allowing one to obtain 
help from a description of each variable and its simulation possibilities 
by clicking on the question mark in the lower left corner. 
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Figure 1. Dialogue box of the microsimulation model 
2.2. Databases 
As said before, the microsimulation model is built on the database of 
households contained in the 2009 Casen survey, the main socioeconomic 
characterization survey in the country. The survey is held every three 
years and is used for the effects of assessing, analyzing and evaluating 
social policy, poverty indicators and income distribution, among others. 
It provides information through seven modules: socio-demographic 
information, education, health, housing, income, occupation and others. 
The Casen’s coverage is national and is representative at a regional 
level, and also at the urban and rural levels. The sample is stratified by 
conglomerates and the reference period of the incomes declared is 
monthly; specifically, incomes from the month prior to the one when the 
survey was taken. In 2009, 71,460 households were interviewed, 
equivalent to 246,924 individuals and representative of the 4,685,490 
households and 16,607,007 people nationwide, respectively. 
The Casen survey contains the base information required to simulate 
the impact of changes in indirect taxes, pension contributions and 
monetary transfers. However, it does not contain the information on 
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consumer spending needed to analyze the effect of changes in indirect 
taxes. For that end the information provided by the Family Budget 
Survey (EPF) 2006-2007 is used. The purpose of this survey is to 
measure consumer spending in private households, and its traditional use 
has been the derivation of the weighting factors for the consumer price 
index. It is undertaken every ten years and covers a sample of 10,092 
households that are nationally representative. The EPF asks about 
acquired consumption expenditures. That is, the goods and services 
acquired in the reference period are accounted for, regardless of whether 
the money is disbursed at a later time or in installments (all prices are 
referenced to April 2007). The microsimulation model requires 
transferring information on consumer spending from the EPF to the 
Casen survey to engage in an integrated and consistent analysis of public 
policies. This is done via an imputation process using the hot-deck 
method, which is described in the following section. 
 
2.3. Imputation process 
 
The hot-deck imputation process consists in transferring information on a 
level of subgroups or “cells” of households defined in variables that both 
databases have in common, after correcting for inflation so that the 
amounts are expressed in the same nominal terms. Specifically, 
households are considered grouped into percentiles of income per capita 
in each household. Other specifications were tried (combinations of 
variables) to obtain subgroups, but the best imputation is achieved when 
the subgroups consist in the aforementioned percentiles. 
The procedure consists in assigning each subgroup in the Casen to the 
amounts spent on consumption by the same subgroup in the family 
budgets survey. This procedure is based on the assumption that within 
each group or cell the distribution of the variable is similar in both 
surveys. In this way, if the unavailable data is random, the process will 
result in unbiased estimators of the measure. Thus, the process begins by 
randomly assigning values from the EFP database to the Casen. A given 
piece of data in each percentile of the Casen is duplicated in the same 
percentile in the EPF. This number is randomly selected from within the 
group and assigned to its counterpart with the missing observation. This 
can be done several times to increase consistency and in general between 
two and ten repetitions are used. In our case, five repetitions were done 
since the process makes intensive use of computer resources. 
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The hot-deck procedure ensures that the variables being imputed have 
the same average level of sampling observations. However, there is a 
need to guarantee the equivalence of the variables on a population level, 
for which the imputation process needs to be undertaken with the 
variables multiplied by the expansion factors of the respective surveys. 
Furthermore, the imputation was undertaken on a household level, as that 
is the most disaggregated unit in the EPF survey. 
Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics of spending in the survey of 
origin, the EPF, while the final result of the imputation is presented in 
Table 2 with descriptive statistics on the spending imputed in Casen. The 
imputation was undertaken on eight variables corresponding to 
expenditures associated with the seven indirect taxes to be simulated, 
plus the spending that is exempt of VAT, identified as “Exempt” in the 
tables below. Each category identifies the levels of spending. 
A comparison of both tables shows that the two surveys are not the 
same in terms of expanded sample. The EPF represents close to 2.6 
million households, while the Casen represents the existing 4.6 million. 
This difference is due to the fact that the EPF only covers regional 
capitals and their metropolitan areas. The hot-deck imputation shows 
positive results when one compares the spending averages in the EPF 
with what is imputed in the Casen. However, the variance of the 
imputations is less than what was observed in the EPF. 
There should not be any effects from the reduced variance in 
spending, as the effect is produced in both directions. That is, for income 
in any given centile, a lower variance will have similar and inverse 
effects in both directions on the income distribution within the centile. 
 
 Table 1. Descriptive statistics of variables in EPF (by household) 
 
Variable Obs. Obs. expand. Avg. Std. dev. 
Exempt goods & services 10,088 2,649,429 78,207 179,265 
Beverages 10,088 2,649,429 10,367 10,604 
Wine 10,088 2,649,429 2,195 6,890 
Liquor 10,088 2,649,429 4,715 11,001 
Tobacco 10,088 2,649,429 6,151 12,076 
VAT 10,088 2,649,429 452,913 562,654 
Buses 10,088 2,649,429 15,841 23,503 
Public transportation 10,088 2,649,429 7,443 15,747 
Gasoline 10,088 2,649,429 6,957 26,912 
  Source: EPF 2006–2007. 
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 Table 2. Descriptive statistics of variables imputed in Casen (by household) 
 
Variable Obs. Obs. expand. Media Std. dev. 
Exempt goods & services 71,460 4,685,490 80,998 62,622 
Beverages 71,460 4,685,490 10,412 2,075 
Wine 71,460 4,685,490 2,245 1,616 
Liquor 71,460 4,685,490 4,853 2,627 
Tobacco 71,460 4,685,490 6,169 1,628 
VAT 71,460 4,685,490 472,038 387,039 
Buses 71,460 4,685,490 15,985 4,587 
Public transportation 71,460 4,685,490 7,692 2,771 
Gasoline 71,460 4,685,490 7,331 9,805 




Calibration consists in adjusting the spending levels and/or expansion 
factor reported in the surveys so that the total amounts collected, 
spending, and the number of taxpayers and beneficiaries can coincide 
with the administrative data that the respective agencies maintain: the 
internal tax service, social program administrators, etc. Discrepancies can 
originate in problems with the representativeness of the surveys, in 
mistakes made while collecting data (both on the part of the interviewer 
as well as the interviewees), or, in the case of tax payment, in evasion 
practices that make effective collection differ from the amounts forecast 
in the model. The calibration assumes that the totals reported in the 
administrative data are free of significant errors. 
Calibration is done in two sequential steps: adjustment in the number 
of homes or individuals using expansion factors, and adjustments in the 
per-capita amounts. For indirect taxes only household level results are 
available in the poll, while administrative data does not provide 
information on “households-taxpayers”, meaning that this calibration is 
only undertaken with the spending levels. In the case of subsidies and 
health coverage payments, the poll contains data on a personal level. The 
administrative data informs on the number of beneficiaries (or 
contributors) and the total amounts. Thus, the calibration consists in 
adjusting the expansion factors and the amounts of the benefits declared 
(or contributed) per person. 
Regarding direct taxes, the administrative records give figures on the 
number of taxpayers based on total collection. The expansion factors are 
corrected based on this information. However, in order to correct for the 
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tax amounts paid, a structure of evasion rates by tax bracket is used 
based on a study by Barra and Jorratt (1999), adjusted to level according 
to effective collection in 2009. 
Table 3 presents the results of the calibrations of indirect taxes, 
subsidies,  health coverage contributions, and income taxes for 2009. The 
 
Table 3. Results of model calibration 
 
Official amounts Pre-calibration amounts 
  $Millions N   $Millions N 
VAT 6,999,560 * 5,695,034 * 
Tobacco 556,651 * 195,860 * 
Special 194,627 * 190,540 * 
Fuels 745,457 * 1,032,151 * 
Family allocation 98,881 2,130,103 104,486 887,870 
PBS 531,735 581,315 571,074 634,527 
SUF 129,905 704,968 75,016 904,284 
Unemp. subsidy 2,479 217,380 1,369 94,368 
Chile solidario 19,380 222,044 4,811 273,732 
Health contr. 1,023,350 4,798,769 1,444,887 4,716,564 
Income taxes 2009 1,393,699 1,329,397   3,223,368 1,675,241 
Calibration Post-calibration amounts 
  Exp. factor Factor   $Millions N 
VAT * 1.229064 6,999,559 * 
Tobacco * 2.842080 556,651 * 
Special * 1.021454 194,627 * 
Fuels * 0.722236 745,457 * 
Family allocation 2.399116 0.394461 98,881 2,130,103 
PBS 0.916139 1.016346 531,735 581,315 
SUF 0.779587 2.221298 129,905 704,968 
Unemp. subsidy 2.303535 0.786143 2,479 217,379 
Chile solidario 0.811173 4.965693 19,380 222,044 
Health contr. 1.017429 0.708187 1,023,250 4,798,768 
Income taxes 2009 0.793496 Evasion rate   1,393,102 1,329,297 
Source: EPF 2006-2007, Casen 2009, and own estimations. 
                  A microsimulation model of distribution for Chile                  59 
administrative information, the results prior to calibration, the calibration 
procedure, and the final results are presented for each variable, in terms 
of the amount collected and the number of taxpayers or beneficiaries. 
The calibration allows one to undertake a precise adjustment of the 
official numbers and the database that was built, as can be observed upon 
comparing the table’s first and last two columns. 
 
2.5. Policies that can be evaluated 
 
The model makes it possible to evaluate the distributive effect that the 
diverse public policies specified below have. 
 
2.5.1. Direct taxes 
 
The income tax charged to private individuals, also known as the global 
complementary tax, is an individual and progressive tax. For dependent 
workers it is withheld from their salaries every month and paid for by 
their respective employers. In the case of independent workers, they must 
pay 10% of their wages every month. Then, once a year, all taxpayers 
must calculate their total tax payment and if the amount to be paid is 
greater than what they have already paid they must pay for the 
difference. Should the opposite be the case, then the surplus is refunded 
to them. 
Table 4 shows the structure of this tax and the base scenario on which 
simulations are carried out, which consists of changes in tax rates and/or 
the limits of each income bracket. 
 
2.5.2. Indirect taxes 
 
The indirect taxes that can be simulated in the framework of this model 
are the value added tax and the specific taxes on tobacco, alcohol (wine 
and liquor), non-alcoholic beverages, gasoline and diesel. 
VAT is the main source of tax revenue in Chile. This tax is applied to 
all the goods and services, with the exception of exports, health services, 
public transportation, and interest from financial instruments and 
education. The tax is a flat 19% for all goods and services. The specific 
tax on tobacco is calculated as 50% of the sales price, after VAT. The tax 
on wine is 15%, while with other alcoholic beverages is 27%. The tax on 
non-alcoholic beverages is 13% (plain water is exempt). 
The fuels tax is 1.5 UTM per cubic meter for diesel and 6 UTM for 
gasoline.3 However, it is not applied directly in the construction of the 
model, but rather as the proportion of the tax that households spend on 
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Table 4.  Income brackets and tax rates (2009 pesos) 
 
public transportation, buses, and while using their automobiles. Thus, the 
rate that constitutes the base scenario must be built. The proportional 
gasoline tax that households pay corresponds to the percentage of the 
final price that is due to the tax, which is calculated at close to 31%. In 
the case of diesel it is estimated that the specific tax is equivalent to 11% 
of the price of diesel, which in turn is 26% of bus fares. One can 
therefore deduce that about 3% of the fare corresponds to taxes. Lastly, 
to calculate how much of public transportation spending corresponds to 
the specific tax, the assumption is made that the proportion of fuels tax in 
the fare is 26% (the same as with the buses). Thus, the proportion of 




Five monetary transfers are included in this microsimulation model: the 
basic solidarity pension (PBS), the family allowance, the single family 
subsidy (SUF), the unemployment subsidy, and the Chile solidario 
bonus. 
The PBS is provided to men and women over the age of 65 who do 
not receive a contributory pension and who are part of the 60% of the 
population with the lowest socioeconomic levels. In addition to this, a 
PBS for disability is paid to those considered to have a physical and 
mental disability and who are between the ages of 18 and 65. The 
pension amounts to close to US$160 per month. 
The family allowance is a benefit paid to salaried workers with low 
wages. The benefit is equal to US$13 per months and per family 
dependent for salaried workers who earn less than US$340 per month; it 
is US$10 for salaries between US$340 and US$580, and US$3 per 
Bracket Lower limit Upper limit Deductible Rate 
1 0 497.651 0 0% 
2 497.651 1.105.890 24.882 5% 
3 1.105.890 1.843.150 80.177 10% 
4 1.843.150 2.580.410 172.334 15% 
5 2.580.410 3.317.670 430.375 25% 
6 3.317.670 4.423.560 662.612 32% 
7 4.423.560 5.529.450 883.790 37% 
8 5.529.450 And more 1.049.673 40% 
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month per dependent for salaried workers who earn between US$538 and 
US$912 per month. Higher salaries do not receive the benefit. 
The SUF is paid for every minor under the age of 18 in the poorest 
40% of households. Those who do not receive the Family Allocation 
receive this benefit. The benefit is US$8 per month for every minor 
under the age of 18. 
The unemployment subsidy is a cash benefit that dependent workers 
who have lost their jobs receive. The benefit is provided for a year and 
the amounts gradually drop. 
Finally, the Chile solidario bonus is a benefit that is provided to the 
families who complete the Puente Programme. The benefit is paid 
monthly for three years and is close to US$12 per month. 
 
2.5.4. Social security contributions 
 
The elements to be simulated with regard to social security are: health 
coverage contributions, withholding for pension savings, withholding for 
the disability insurance coverage, and the commission charged by the 
AFPs (pension fund administrators). These are paid by all taxpayers and 
discounted every month from their gross income, after which the tax base 
for income tax payment is calculated. Thus, variations in the withholding 
rates affect workers’ disposable income. 
The withholding for coverage by the public health fund (Fonasa) is 
7% of income. All salaried workers must make an obligatory health 
payment and can choose between the aforementioned public health 
system and private health insurance institutions (Isapre). 
Every month workers must deposit 10% of their income in a savings 
fund for pensions in an individual capitalization system. In addition, 
together with this savings, 1.4% of earnings are withheld for a disability 
and premature death policy and 1.5% in commissions for the fund 
administrators. 
 
2.5.5. Poverty lines 
 
It is possible to undertake simulations with different poverty lines. Urban 
and rural poverty lines are calculated at $64,134 (US$136) and $43,242 
(US$92), respectively. Thus it is possible to alter the basic food basket 
(CBA) and the factors that are used to calculate the lines by zone. The 
cost of the CBA in urban areas is $32,067 (US$68.2) and in rural areas it 
is $24,710 (US$52.6). The basket is multiplied by a factor of 2 in urban 
areas and 1.75 in rural ones. 
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2.6. Model assumptions 
 
The model was built while making a series of assumptions for its 
operation. They are as follows: 
 Consumers absorb the totality of the effect that tax changes have 
on prices. 
 Being an arithmetic model, no behavioral changes in the agents 
are foreseen in response to changes in their budget limitations 
(due to income or price effects). 
 Changes in contributions or in the income tax affect agents’ net 
income. This is a short term assumption, as in the long term 
workers are expected to ask for salary adjustments to compensate 
for changes in contributions. This is particularly so in the public 






The VAT is the most important tax in Chile, as it provides close to half 
of the taxes collected and has low evasion rates, between 8% and 15%, 
for the period spanning 2002-2008. It is therefore natural to resort to 
VAT increases when there is a need to increase tax collection. Thus, in 
2003 the rate was increased by one percentage point (from 18% to 19%) 
to compensate the drop in customs income from the signing of free trade 
agreements with other countries. It was supposed to be a transitory 
increase, as the new businesses that would be started under the treaties 
would compensate the reduced customs. More recently, in the aftermath 
of the February 2010 earthquake, there were proposals to increase the 
VAT again to raise funds for reconstruction activities. 
Notwithstanding its desirable qualities in terms of collection and 
evasion, the VAT is a regressive tax. The lowest-income households pay 
a larger proportion of their income in this tax, considering that their 
average propensity to consumption is higher than that of other groups. 
The influential work by Engel, Galetovic and Raddatz (1999) contains 
one of the first microsimulation models for evaluating the effects of the 
tax burden on income distribution. The article’s main conclusion is that 
the tax system is in the best of cases neutral from a distributive 
perspective, but somewhat regressive when considering that social 
spending (financed with taxes) results in fiscal action that ultimately 
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favors lower income households. They also show that the regressive 
pattern of the VAT tends to be compensated with income tax, which has 
a progressive structure.  
The simulation exercise done below consists in returning to a VAT of 
18%, its pre-2003 level, and to finance the reduced collection with an 
increase in income tax paid by the taxpayers in the highest income 
bracket. The exercise keeps the level of social spending constant, as 
fiscal revenues will not be altered.  
The expected effects of the policy being simulated are a lower tax 
burden for lower income households, together with a greater effect on the 
part of taxes on the income of more accommodated households, thus 
reducing after-tax income inequality and lowering the poverty rate. The 






This section presents the distributive results of a one-point VAT 
reduction and a compensatory increase in income taxes. The effects of 
these policies on income distribution and poverty are described 
separately and then jointly. 
 
4.1. VAT from 19% to 18% 
 
The results show that a one-point VAT reduction causes tax collection to 
drop by some 6%, equivalent to $424.121 trillion (US$902 million). 
Total VAT collection in 2009 was $6.999 trillion (US$14,892 billion), 
but the amount collected for this concept after the tax cut would be close 
to $6.575 trillion (US$13.99 billion). 
Table 5 shows the VAT burden on income, spending, and total taxes 
paid per household, by per capita income decile. The results in the first 
column illustrate the VAT’s regressive nature. The higher income deciles 
pay a smaller fraction of their incomes in VAT: the 10th decile pays 
14.3% of its income, while the first decile pays close to 19.8%. The 
second column shows the tax’s impact in the simulated scenario. With a 
VAT of 18%, the impact (tax paid as a percentage of income) drops for 
all deciles, but to a greater degree in the first ones, as can be seen in the 
final column. The impact of the VAT drops 1.2 points in the first decile 
and the effect is diminished for the higher income deciles. 
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Table 5. Impact of the VAT on income (% household income paid in taxes) 
 
Decile Base scenario Simulated scenario Difference 
1 19.75 18.56 -1.20 
2 19.40 18.23 -1.18 
3 19.11 17.95 -1.16 
4 18.49 17.37 -1.12 
5 18.63 17.50 -1.13 
6 18.66 17.53 -1.13 
7 17.82 16.74 -1.08 
8 17.56 16.50 -1.06 
9 17.99 16.90 -1.09 
10 14.25 13.39 -0.86 
 
4.2. Income tax increase 
 
The increase in the income tax rates is applied to the highest income 
taxpayers and the amount collected compensates the cut in the value 
added tax. The model allows for different tax rate structures to be tested 
until one that maintains balanced fiscal accounts is found. The structure 
that is finally chosen maintains the first income tax bracket exempt; the 
second bracket sees an increase from 5% to 6%; the third from 10% to 
12%; the fourth from 15% to 18%; the fifth from 25% to 29%, the sixth 
from 32 to 37%; the seventh from 37% to 43%; and the final from 40% 
to 48% (see again Table 4). Under that new tax structure, the income tax 
that can be collected increases by 31.7%, from $1.393 trillion in 2009 to 
$1.834 trillion in the simulated scenario. The difference is close to 
$441.543 billion. 
The first column in Table 6 shows the tax impact as a percentage of 
household income (before taxes). The burden is positive after the fourth 
decile, fluctuating between 1% in that decile and 7.6% in the 10th decile 
in the base scenario. The effects of the variation in tax rates, in the third 
column, show an increase of between one hundredth of a percentage 
point to 2.4 points. 
The following columns in that table show the average per capita 
income per decile. The fourth and fifth columns correspond to the 
averages in the base scenario and the simulated one, respectively. The 
final column shows the percentage variation of income between the two 
scenarios, which is significant after the seventh decile and has the 
greatest impact on the 10th decile, where per capita household income 
falls by 5.1%. 
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Table 6. Impact and per capita income by decile (individuals) 
 














1 0.00 0.00 0.00 27,895 27,895 0.0 
2 0.00 0.00 0.00 55,119 55,119 0.0 
3 0.00 0.00 0.00 72,862 72,861 0.0 
4 0.01 0.01 0.00 90,166 90,162 0.0 
5 0.04 0.05 0.01 109,842 109,831 0.0 
6 0.08 0.09 0.02 134,594 134,553 0.0 
7 0.18 0.22 0.04 168,520 168,397 -0.1 
8 0.39 0.48 0.08 220,156 219,785 -0.2 
9 0.80 0.98 0.18 320,665 319,513 -0.4 
10 7.64 10.00 2.37 920,369 873,669 -5.1 
 
4.3. Joint effects 
 
The model allows combinations of policies to be evaluated and provides 
results on a household level. The results of the proposed tax policy are 
presented below. 
Total tax collection in the base scenario, considering all of the 
model’s taxes, is close to $9.889 trillion and the amount collected in the 
simulated scenario is close to $9.899 trillion or a positive difference of 
$10.069 billion, equivalent to 0.1% of total tax collection. The 
importance of analyzing the two policies together is reflected in the 
variation in total collection. The variation in the VAT collection was less 
than $424.121 billion, while the variation in income tax collection was 
over 441.563 billion. The difference between the two concepts is over 
$17.422 billion, greater than the difference obtained. This is due to the 
fact that a change in the VAT also affects collection of other taxes like 
tobacco and gasoline. 
Table 7 shows the effects in terms of impact on income before tax on 
a household level. The first column shows the base scenario, the second 
the simulated one and the third the difference in terms of percentage 
points. The impact of the total tax burden, both on the base scenario as 
well as the simulated one, is shown to be greater on the lower income 
deciles, ranging from 30% in the first one to 21.3% in the 10th. The 
variation in the impact caused by the simulated policies indicates that it 
drops until the ninth decile and that the impact is concentrated on the 
highest-income decile. 
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Table 7. Effects in terms of impact on taxable income and its distribution 
 
 Impact on taxable income 
Indirect taxes 






















1 30.23 28.98 -1.25 100 100 0.00 0.93 0.76 0.78 
2 27.50 26.29 -1.21 100 100 0.00 2.12 1.87 1.92 
3 26.98 25.79 -1.19 99.99 99.99 0.00 2.92 2.64 2.70 
4 24.78 23.64 -1.14 99.94 99.92 -0.02 3.84 3.54 3.62 
5 24.71 23.57 -1.14 99.79 99.73 -0.06 4.84 4.54 4.64 
6 24.04 22.90 -1.13 99.61 99.50 -0.11 6.07 5.81 5.93 
7 22.63 21.58 -1.05 99.05 98.79 -0.26 7.75 7.57 7.71 
8 21.83 20.85 -0.98 97.95 97.39 -0.56 10.23 10.23 10.42 
9 21.80 20.91 -0.90 95.99 94.90 -1.10 14.89 15.11 15.32 
10 21.29 23.03 1.74 63.66 55.59 -8.07 46.40 47.92 46.97 
 
The next three columns in Table 7 illustrate the proportion of taxes 
that correspond to indirect taxes in the base scenario, the simulation and 
the difference between them. One can observe that the proportion of 
indirect taxes is close to 100% until the seventh decile. Only in the 10th 
is the proportion of direct taxes that are paid significant, which explains 
why the impact of the income tax increase is greater than the drop in the 
VAT for this decile. This could be explained by the falling marginal 
performances in consumption. That is, there is a maximum level of 
consumption that satisfies people’s needs regardless of the income level. 
Therefore, if the difference between income and consumption is very 
great then the income tax will manage to attain greater representativeness 
in the total amount of taxes that are paid. 
The last three columns of Table 7 present the results on income. The 
seventh column contains the income distribution before the payment of 
any taxes. The next column shows the current scenario and the final one 
considers the payment to be made under the simulated tax structure. 
Upon comparing income distribution between the fourth and fifth 
columns, one can see the distortion in income distribution that the tax 
burden generates, where the imposition of a tax system generates greater 
concentration in the higher-income deciles. 
The simulation exercise shows that the tax system is not efficient as a 
redistributive policy, since even with the significant income tax increases 
and the reduction of a regressive tax like the VAT, the initial income 
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distribution structure remains without major changes. However, the new 
taxation structure does generate funds to finance social spending, which 
can be very effective in redistributive terms. 
Upon comparing both tax systems, the base scenario and the 
simulated one, it can be seen that the latter manages to improve slightly 
the income distribution profile, although, as it might be expected, the 
improvement is very slight. One way to analyze this is with certain 
indicators of inequality, such as the percentage ratios D10/D1 and 
Q5/Q1, as well as indicators related to the Lorenz curve: the Gini and the 
Kakwani indexes. The former is more sensitive to income transfers that 
are close to the average, while Kakwani is more sensitive to transfers on 
the distribution extremes. 
As shown in Table 8, the ratio of deciles D10/D1 in the distribution of 
before-tax income is 47 times, which increases to 55 in the base scenario 
tax structure. The income distribution produced by the simulation results 
in a ratio of D10/D1 is close to 53 times. The change is less pronounced 
in the ratio of quintiles Q5/Q1, going from 21.9 times in the base 
scenario to 21.6 times under the simulated scenario. The Gini index is 
between the ones corresponding to before-taxes and the base scenario, 
with a value of 0.58. The Gini income distribution index before taxes is 
0.57 and the one corresponding to the base scenario is 0.59. Likewise, 
the Kakwani index shows similar variations. 
The findings in Table 8 are complemented by Figure 2, which shows 
the distance between the Lorenz curve for the base scenario and the 
simulation in the case of after-tax income. It reveals that the positive 
effect on distribution is very small and concentrated in approximately the 
50th centile. As can be seen from the figure, the only significant negative 
effects are found in the last percentiles. 
Figure 3 shows, on the other hand, the difference between the tax 
payment concentration curves that arise in both scenarios. It reveals that 
the concentration of the tax payments drops in the higher percentiles. 
That is, with the new tax structure the upper deciles end up paying a 
larger proportion of the taxes. 
 
Table 8. Inequality indicators 
 
 D10/D1 Q5/Q1 Gini Kakwani 
Before-tax income 47.1 19.5 0.57 0.27 
Base scenario 55.2 21.9 0.59 0.29 
Simulated scenario 52.8 21.6 0.58 0.28 
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Figure 2. Distance between Lorenz curves for base and simulated scenarios 
Figure 3. Difference in tax payment concentration curves
Distance between Lorenz curves
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4.4. Effect on poverty 
 
The one-point reduction in the VAT rate not only has an effect on the 
impact of taxes, but also on poverty according to the measurement 
method used in Chile. Since 100% of the goods and services included in 
the basic food basket are subject to the VAT, a reduction in this tax 
therefore means that the cost of the basket falls. The urban poverty line is 
$64,134 (US$136) and that of rural areas is $43,242 (US$92). Cutting 
the VAT rate from 19% to 18% causes the poverty line to drop by $641 
(US$1.4) and $432 (US$0.9), respectively, and poverty levels to fall 
from 15.1% to 14.8%. 
 
 
5. Final comment 
 
The objective of this work has been to present a microsimulation model 
for the Chilean economy. The model, which is freely available and 
written in Stata, allows us to study the impacts on income distribution 
and poverty of a series of public policies that are to be evaluated ex-ante, 
such as changes in income taxes, health and pension contributions, 
monetary transfers and specific taxes. The ultimate purpose of the model 
is to serve as a support tool for the design and evaluation of public 
policies, as can be observed in the practice of developed countries. The 
model’s operation was exemplified simulating the effect of a one-point 
cut in the VAT rate and a progressive increase in income tax rates while 





1 Chapter prepared for the project “An Integrated Framework for the Assessment 
of Equitable, Pro-Growth Fiscal Reform in Latin America and the Caribbean: 
Fiscal Schemes for Inclusive Development (FSID)”, co-funded by UNDP and 
IDRC. Any errors or opinions are the authors’ and do not necessarily represent 
the views of the United Nations Development Programme or those of the 
International Development Research Centre. 
2 A detailed account of the tax-benefit system in Chile is provided in Larrañaga, 
Cabezas and Encina (2011). 
3 UTM stands for unidad tributaria mensual (monthly tax unit), which is an 
inflation-pegged accounting unit. It was equivalent to US$80.5 as of April 2011, 
at an exchange rate of $470 per dollar. 
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3 Effects of the ethical family income on labor 
participation, income distribution and 
poverty1 
 






In August 2007, the then President of Chile Michelle Bachelet convened 
a group of experts and representatives of civil society to sit on the 
Presidential Advisory Council on Labor and Equity, which was created 
with the purpose of coming up with proposals to fight inequality and to 
achieve greater equity in the labor market. In this way, after eight months 
of work, the Council proposed a series of measures to foster an 
“inclusive, modern progress in Chilean society that promotes 
competition and provides opportunities”. Since this report, the concept of 
an “ethical family income” (ingreso ético familiar) has gained strength. 
According to the way that the current authorities define it, the objective 
is to eliminate extreme poverty by 2014 with a series of proposals that 
involve policies focused on the most vulnerable people. 
The Sebastián Piñera administration implemented the first component 
of the program in March, 2011. It involves a subsidy to the poorest 
comprised by a base bonus and an additional bonus for the fulfillment of 
certain commitments. The base amount consists in a monthly sum for 
each family member. The increments are additional sums for fulfilling 
certain conditions on schooling and health for minors. In addition, there 
is a component to promote female employment, with a single bonus for 
women who start work while in the program and who have not worked 
for the last two years. 
The second component of the ethical family income, as the authorities 
have said and as suggested in the report by the Advisory Council, should 
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be a policy that stimulates employment. It is hoped that an announcement 
will be made in the coming months. For this very reason our simulation 
exercise to be given below uses the proposal formulated in the Council, 
since the final scheme ought to be in line with the proposal, as it was the 
case when defining the bonus. The Council proposed a subsidy for the 
income of formal workers to stimulate the incorporation of new members 
of the household into the job market, to increase formal employment and 
with it the quality of work, in addition to increasing the income of the 
poorest people.  
As it has been defined, the ethical family income program is 
comprised by the two components already mentioned. For this reason, 
the two policies are jointly considered here, since both affect the 
employment decisions of lower income families. An increase in the 
poorest families’ income is expected as a consequence of implementing 
the program, in addition to reduced poverty and increases in labor 
participation. Thus, our work methodology consists in evaluating the 
proposals as a whole, with a model with or without behavior, for three 
groups of potential workers: heads of households, their partners and 
other adults in the household. 
The next section details the characteristics of the ethical family 
income. After that, Section 3 presents the methodology and data to be 
used, while Section 4 presents the microsimulation model. The effects on 
labor supply of the ethical family income program are presented in 
Section 5, and the effects on income, inequality and poverty are reported 
in Section 6. The final section contains the conclusions. 
 
 
2. The ethical family income 
 
What follows is a detailed description of the two components of the 
ethical family income program. The first is a social bonus, which 
corresponds to the first part of the program and, as said before, it is 
already being implemented, while the second is a labor subsidy 
corresponding to the proposal made by the Advisory Council. 
 
2.1. The social bonus 
 
The social bonus is the first step toward creating the ethical family 
income program in the country. Its composition consists of a base 
component, called the base bonus, and another bonus that depends on the 
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fulfillment of a series of conditions that are related to schooling and 
health treatment for minors, in addition to women’s participation in the 
job market.  
The beneficiaries of the bonuses are the families that belong to an 
existing social program known as Chile Solidario, which provides certain 
transfers to the households that score under 4,213 points in the so-called 
Ficha de protección social (FPS).2 The new base bonus is provided to the 
head of the household, or to the partner of the head of household in case 
that the head is a man. The base amount consists of a monetary transfer 
for each family member, and it varies depending on the family’s score in 
the FPS. For families with a score of less than 2,515 points the benefit is 
$7,500 (about US$16).3 For those with scores between 2,515 and 3,207 
points the allocation becomes $6,000 (US$13), while households with 
scores in between 3,207 and 4,213 points receive a benefit of $4,500 
(US$10) per member. 
The additional bonuses for the fulfillment of commitments consist of 
a series of transfers as certain conditions are fulfilled. The increments are 
given for child health checkups, schooling, and women’s insertion into 
the workforce. The first case consists of a variable bonus, according to 
the FPS score, for each minor in the family under the age of six whose 
health checkup file is up-to-date. The amount of the benefit is obtained 
by multiplying $5,000 (US$10.60) by the number of months in the 
program. That is, for those who have been in the program the entire time 
the number of months will be nine (from March to December). Families 
with FPS scores of less than 2,515 points receive 100% of the benefit, 
those with scores in between 2,515 and 3,207 receive 80%, and those 
with scores in between 3,207 and 4,213 points receive 60%. 
The schooling bonus consists in one allocation for enrolment and 
another for attendance. Families receive an additional allocation for all 
minors between the ages of six and eighteen if they are enrolled in an 
educational establishment, and another additional variable amount if their 
attendance is equal to or greater than 85%. The amount of both 
increments is calculated identically to the way in which the increment for 
child health checkups is calculated, with the difference being the number 
of months in the program. The increase for enrolment is calculated based 
on the number of months in the program between the months of April 
and May, or a maximum of two months. In contrast, the increment for 
attendance is calculated according to the months in the program between 
June and December. 
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The bonus for women’s insertion into the workforce consists of a 
subsidy to the salaries of women over the age of 18 who did not work in 
between January 2009 and March 2011, and who register health and 
pension contributions for at least 3 consecutive months in between April 
and August 2011. The amount of the benefit depends on the salaries that 
they receive. If the average of the monthly remunerations between April 
and October is lower than $172,000 (US$366), then the subsidy is 10% 
of that average multiplied by three. If the average is in between $172,000 
and $215,000, then the increment is a single payment of $51,600 
(US$110). And if the average is in between $215,000 and $387,000, then 
the increment is three times the difference between $17,000 and the ten 
percent of the difference between the average and $215,000. 
 
2.2. Labor income subsidy 
 
The labor income bonus recently proposed by the Advisory Council 
consists of a 30% subsidy, for a maximum of 7.5 UF per month.4 It is 
distributed 20% in direct payment to the worker and the other 10% to the 
employer. Then, as income increases the subsidy ought to be gradually 
reduced until reaching zero for incomes equivalent to 15 UF. 
This subsidy has been designed for formal workers. That is, salaried 
workers or self-employed workers who contribute to a pension fund, 
health insurance, and unemployment coverage. The subsidy is focused 
on the group of poor and vulnerable workers. For this reason, the 
households that benefit from it are those belonging to the first and second 
deciles as reflected in their FPS scores. This proposal is aimed at 
achieving various objectives: first, to increase the income of the poorest 
families via formal workers’ salaries; second, to incentivize hiring; and 
third, to increase formal employment and its quality in the medium term.  
 
 
3. Methodology and data 
 
3.1. Discrete-choice models of labor supply 
 
Ex-ante policy analysis of tax-benefit reforms has been one of the major 
concerns of public economics. The use of microsimulation models is a 
significant breakthrough in the field, allowing for observed heterogeneity 
that previous models based on representative individuals could not 
capture (Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2006). 
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Within this framework, consumers are regarded as utility-maximizing 
individuals who choose the optimal combination of consumption and 
leisure according to their preferences. The first generation of models of 
this type relied on maximizing continuous utility functions, facing 
serious problems due to the existence of non-convex budget constraints. 
This obstacle can be overcome by restricting the attention to discrete-
choice models where individuals must choose among J alternatives: 
 
, ),( ijiijij UV  ZX  
 
where the expected utility of alternative j for household i depends on a 
vector Xij of variables, specific to alternative j and household i, a set of 
socio-demographic characteristics Zi, plus an error term. If we assume 
that εij follows a type I extreme value distribution, it can be proved that 
















The estimates of the underlying conditional/multinomial logit model are 
obtained by standard maximum likelihood techniques. 
The framework above can be applied to describe the choice of the 
working hours of an individual that faces J alternatives, corresponding to 
a set of different work durations and labor supplies. In this chapter we 
posit the following general quadratic form: 
 






where Yij and Lij stand, respectively, for the hourly disposable income 
and the number of leisure hours under alternative j for individual i, and 
Zi is a vector of individual characteristics. These include age, schooling, 
number of children, zone (urban or rural), poverty condition, and dummy 
variables for part-time categories in order to capture the disutility of 
inflexible arrangements (see Wagenhals, 2009). The model is computed 
for all potential workers, irrespective of their actual working status. This 
means that hourly disposable income must be estimated using Mincerian 
equations for those individuals whose labor income is not observed. This 
can be done with a straightforward OLS model or correcting for selection 
bias using a two-step Heckman procedure. 
Once an hourly income has been obtained for all individuals, the 
model simulates the potential income for each of the work options and 
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then compares the corresponding levels of utility. In order to make the 
model sensitive to unobservable components of labor supply, for each 
individual an error vector is extracted based on the type I extreme value 
distribution. Finally, the new post-reform incomes are calculated and the 
maximum-benefit option is identified. This process is repeated 50 times, 
so that for each individual a post-reform distribution of hours is obtained, 
conditional to the observed work hours. Thus, the option of post-reform 
hours chosen will be the distribution mode, with this option being the 
most likely, conditioned by individuals’ observed characteristics and 




The data to be used in the simulation comes from the 2009 national 
survey Casen (acronym for Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica 
Nacional). Casen, is a household survey, statistically representative at 
national and regional levels, and for Chile’s main cities. In the 2009 
survey, 71,460 households were interviewed and information from 
246,924 individuals was gathered. The Ministry of Planning conducts the 
Casen survey every three years and collects socioeconomic data on all 
household members, with questionnaire modules on income, socio-





The group included in the simulation of the ethical family income is 
made by the families that belong to the Chile solidario program, since 
the FPS scores are not available for all of them.5 This focalization is the 
best approximation to the actual beneficiary group, as the families 
belonging to the program are those living in extreme poverty nationwide. 
For this reason, the amounts simulated for the social bonuses, which 
depend on FPS score ranges, are simulated as average amounts, after 
assuming that the proportion of families in each bracket is similar. 
Not all family members are included in the labor supply simulation. 
The group of potential workers is defined as all people over 18 years of 
age and under retirement age (60 years for women and 65 for men) who 
are not attending any sort of educational establishment. Thus, it is in the 
group of potential workers that it is possible to find people who are in 
fact working and those who are not. Otherwise the analysis becomes 
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quite complex by having to model decisions on study-work 
(Bourguignon, Ferreira and Leite, 2003) or reinsertion into the labor 
market (Rogerson and Wallenius, 2010). The proportion of potential 
workers in the Chile solidario group of families is 47.4%, while in the 
rest of the population is 53.3%.  
Once the potential workers are identified, they are classified as heads 
of households, partners of the heads of households, and others. Heads of 
households are understood to be primary income recipients; their partners 
are the secondary ones, and their decision to participate in the labor 
market is influenced by the decisions that the primary ones make. 
Regarding the others, it is assumed that the complementariness of their 
income is related to the total income of the main recipients. Descriptive 
statistics for each of these are presented in Table 1. 
After establishing the universe where some sort of effect is expected, 
the model’s discrete work hour ranges are defined. Five equal ranges 
were chosen for each of the groups: not working (0 hours), 1-15 hours 
per week, 16-31 hours per week, 32-45 hours per week, and, last, over 46 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of potential workers and their classification 
  Sample Mean Std. dev. 
Number of members in family 273732 3.5 1.5 
Minors under 6 years 162852 1.7 0.9 
Minors between 6 and 18 years 175857 1.7 0.9 
Sector (urban = 1, rural = 0) 273732 0.8 0.4 
Hourly income of heads 147,007 $1,662 $2,308 
Hours worked by heads 222,779 29.1 23.6 
Age of heads 222,779 40.6 10.5 
Schooling of heads (years) 222,779 8.6 3.7 
Sex of head (male = 1, female = 0) 222,779 0.5 0.5 
Hourly income of partners 48,383 $1,572 $2,343 
Hours worked by partners 132,605 15.4 21.8 
Age of partners 132,605 38.9 10.1 
Schooling of partners (years) 132,605 8.5 3.6 
Sex of partner (male = 1, female = 0) 132,605 0.2 0.4 
Hourly income of others 47,421 $1,290 $1,386 
Hours worked by others 97,343 21.5 22.8 
Age of others 97,343 27.7 10.1 
Schooling of others (years) 97,343 9.6 3.9 
Sex of others (male = 1, female = 0) 97,343 0.7 0.5 
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hours. The mode for each of these ranges is 0, 8, 30, 45, and 48 hours per 
week, respectively. 
 
4.1. Salary estimation 
 
In order to estimate the hourly salary of potential workers who are not 
participating in the labor market, Mincerian equations are estimated to 
predict the corresponding salary. The estimates are made for all potential 
workers, not just those belonging to the Chile solidario program, as that 
could bias the results. 
The classification of potential workers by sex indicates that 14.5% of 
men have no income, while this proportion rises to 44.1% in the case of 
women. Thus, only in the case of women the estimated hourly salary 
should be corrected for selection bias. In order to estimate the income 
generation capacity we control for years of schooling, age, age squared 
and a dummy to identify people living in urban areas. As shown in Table 
2, the results turn out to be significant and with the expected signs. 
Schooling, age, and belonging to urban areas have all positive effects, for 
 
Table 2. Estimates of potential workers’ hourly salary 
Males Females 
Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic 
Ln hourly income 
Schooling 0.111 35.49 0.139 31.96 
Urban = 1 0.117 8.64 0.289 10.73 
Age 0.032 5.16 0.0311 6.13 
Age squared -0.00016 -1.96 -0.00020 -3.12 
Constant 5.214 51.02 4.040 33.3 
Selection equation 
Schooling 0.091 26.66 
Age 0.00268 2.67 
No. children < 14 yrs. -0.100 -10.74 
Head of household = 1 0.433 16.51 
Urban = 1 0.196 9.63 
Constant -1.398 -22.62 
Ath rho 1.032 13.52 
Ln sigma -0.0628 -2.51 
Censored obs. 38,117 
Uncensored obs. 26,343 
N 51,103 64,460 
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both men and women. Regarding the selection equation, the following 
variables are used: schooling, age, number of children under the age of 
14 and dummies identifying female heads of households and whether 
people live in urban areas. As shown in Table 2, schooling, age, being 
head of household and living in urban areas have positive effects on 
labor participation, while the number of younger children has a negative 
impact on the likelihood that people will be working. 
Once an hourly salary has been predicted for the potential workers 
who are not participating in the labor market, the coefficients and errors 
that represent their preferences according to the aforementioned 
classification were estimated. Table 3 presents the results obtained by 
estimating a conditional logit model for heads of households, partners, 
and other adults in the family. Note that that the explanatory variables 
that appear twice (age, schooling, children, their squares, and urban) 
interact in their first appearance with income and the other with leisure. 
The model assumes dependence in decisions. That is, partners of the 
heads of households include the primary recipient’s incomes in their 
utility function and those identified as others act similarly when making 
decisions regarding how much to work toward household income. 
The marginal utility of income is positive for the three groups of 
potential workers. In all of them it is shown that the indirect utility 
function regarding income is convex. However, the marginal utility of 
leisure hours is negative. This could be due to the sample chosen for the 
simulation, as they are members of poor families who would prefer to 
work an extra hour to increase their incomes. 
Upon observing the appreciation of leisure on the part of partners and 
other adults in the household regarding the income of the head of the 
household and the total income of the two main recipients, it is observed 
that the appreciation is positive. That is, the marginal benefit of the 
partners’ leisure time is more positive the higher the income of the heads 
of households is. In the same way, other adults in the household have a 
greater positive appreciation of an additional hour of leisure time the 
higher the joint incomes of the head and the partner are. 
 
 
5. Effects on labor supply 
 
The effects on labor supply for all the potential workers simulated here 
(that is, those belonging to the Chile solidario program), are presented in 
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Table 3. Estimates by group of potential workers 
Heads Partners Others 
Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. 
Income sq. -8E-7 -43.3 -1E-6 -34.0 -1E-6 -17.7 
Income 5E-2 115  3E-2 36.9  6E-2 50.0 
   Age -5E-4 -35.2 -8E-4 -21.0 -4E-5 -1.0 
   Age sq. 6E-6 32.3 1E-5 23.4 -3E-6 -4.9 
   Schooling -2E-3 -64.6 2E-4 6.2 -2E-3 -41.9 
   School. sq. 9E-5 66.3 -1E-5 -5.9 8E-5 36.4 
   Children 4E-4 7.2 5E-3 40.0 -2E-3 -13.2 
   Child. sq. -1E-4 -8.5 -1E-3 -29.1 2E-4 3.1 
   Urban = 1 -5E-4 -8.6 -6E-3 -34.2 -5E-4 -3.3 
   1 to 15 -2E-2 -72.7 -1E-2 -24.3 -3E-2 -34.0 
   16 to 31 -3E-2 -103 -2E-2 -49.3 -4E-2 -39.3 
   32 to 45 -3E-2 -110 -2E-2 -55.7 -4E-2 -42.2 
   46 or more -3E-2 -119 -3E-2 -63.9 -5E-2 -49.2 
   Inc. head 4E-6 32.3 
   Leis. head 7E-5 35.5 
Leisure sq. 4E-3 162 6E-3 146 6E-3 137 
Leisure  -9E-1 -124  -1.5 -129  -1.5 -116 
   Age -8E-3 -74.7 -5E-3 -24.2 -6E-3 -31.5 
   Age sq. 9E-5 67.5 6E-5 26.1 7E-5 23.8 
   Schooling -8E-3 -51.6 2E-3 11.9 -1E-2 -42.3 
   School. sq. 5E-4 47.9 -8E-5 -6.1 4E-4 27.0 
   Children -7E-3 -16.9 2E-2 34.1 -2E-2 -18.2 
   Childr. sq. 4E-4 3.8 -4E-3 -27.4 2E-3 6.5 
   Urban = 1 -6E-3 -16.1 -3E-2 -47.4 -4E-3 -6.3 
   Indigent 6E-2 128 6E-2 60.4 5E-2 59.0 
   Poor 2E-2 77.5 2E-2 54.1 4E-2 79.1 
   Inc. recip. 1E-6 1.3 
Sample size 1,113,895 631,905 486,715 
Log-likelih. -294,843   -135,773   -112,961 
 
the first matrix given in Table 4. The results show that, for the population 
as a whole, after the ethical family income program is implemented the 
decisions regarding how many hours to work tend to drop. Before the 
ethical family income, 43% of potential workers do not participate in the 
labor market, while after it the percentage increases to 52%. Regarding 
the potential workers who remain on the labor market, it can be observed 
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Table 4. Labor supply transition matrices
Pre-reform ranges Post-reform ranges
All 0 1 - 15 16 - 31 32 - 45 46 & more Total 
0 43.27 0 0 0.08 0 43.36 
1 – 15 0.96 4.18 0.01 0.22 0 5.38 
16 – 31 2.78 0.01 4.17 0.72 0.05 7.74 
32 – 45 3.10 0.01 0 24.47 0 27.58 
46 & more 2.38 0.09 0.02 0.44 13.03 15.95 
Total 52.49 4.30 4.20 25.92 13.08 100 
Heads 
0 30.59 0 0 0.11 0 30.70 
1 – 15 0.16 5.90 0.01 0.03 0 6.10 
16 – 31 1.55 0 8.19 0 0 9.74 
32 – 45 0.39 0.02 0 32.39 0 32.81 
46 & more 0.31 0.06 0.02 0.07 20.19 20.66 
Total 33.01 5.98 8.22 32.61 20.19 100 
Partners 
0 61.08 0 0 0.1 0 61.17 
1 – 15 1.75 2.80 0.02 0.45 0 5.02 
16 – 31 5.18 0.05 0.31 0.47 0 6.01 
32 – 45 8.71 0 0 8.61 0 17.32 
46 & more 5.88 0.21 0 0.52 3.86 10.47 
Total 82.59 3.06 0.33 10.16 3.86 100 
Others 
0 48.04 0 0 0 0 48.04 
1 – 15 1.73 2.14 0 0.33 0.02 4.23 
16 – 31 2.32 0 0.26 2.69 0.24 5.51 
32 – 45 1.67 0 0 27.93 0 29.59 
46 & more 2.34 0 0.02 1.16 9.12 12.63 
Total 56.10 2.14 0.28 32.10 9.38 100 
Men 
0 25.25 0 0 0.18 0 25.43 
1 – 15 0.82 3.06 0 0.25 0.01 4.14 
16 – 31 0.91 0 4.26 1.16 0.03 6.37 
32 – 45 1.42 0.02 0 38.41 0 39.84 
46 & more 1.64 0.06 0.03 0.9 21.58 24.22 
Total 30.03 3.14 4.29 40.91 21.63 100 
Women 
0 58.36 0 0 0 0 58.36 
1 – 15 1.08 5.12 0.02 0.19 0 6.41 
16 – 31 4.34 0.03 4.1 0.34 0.07 8.88 
32 – 45 4.51 0.01 0 12.8 0 17.32 
46 & more 3 0.11 0 0.05 5.87 9.03 
Total 71.29 5.27 4.12 13.38 5.94 100 
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that the percentage of people who increase their work hours is larger than 
the group that reduces them. This is proved by adding what is below and 
above the main diagonal, respectively: a 1.1% increase the supply of 
hours, and 0.08% even enter the market, but only 0.57% reduce the 
number of hours. 
The next three matrices in Table 4 present the results of the 
simulation according to the considered typology of potential workers: 
head of household, partner and other adults. The results show the 
existence of heterogeneous effects according to the type of potential 
worker. Partners and other adults in the household are the groups that are 
the most affected. In these groups the predominant effect is to leave the 
labor market. Regarding the potential head of household, it is observed 
that only 3% decide to leave the labor market and 0.17% reduce the 
number of hours offered. Meanwhile, only 0.15% increase them. The 
effects on this group are minor. 
The effect on the partners of heads of households is significant. 
Before the ethical family income, 61% of them did not participate in the 
labor market, but after it the percentage was close to 83%. The 
percentage of potential workers who continue working but with a 
reduced number of hours is 0.78%, while 1.04% increase them. There is 
also a larger percentage of other adults in the family who leave the labor 
market. The variation is close to 8%. However, this is the only group that 
increases the hours offered by close to 3% in the case of those who were 
already in the market.  
The analysis by gender shows differences between men and women, 
as shown in the last two transition matrices in Table 4. For the group of 
men, close to 4.7% leave the labor market, a number that is almost three 
times lower than with women. The variations in hours among those who 
stay in the market are minor: 1% of men reduce the number of hours and 
1.6% of them increase them. In the case of women, 0.2% reduce them 
and another 0.6% increase them. 
 
 
6. Effects on income, inequality and poverty 
 
The results in this section present the effects of the ethical family income 
on income distribution, inequality and poverty. Three scenarios are given 
for comparison: the base scenario, corresponding to the results of the 
2009 Casen survey, the scenario with the effects of the proposal without 
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considering behavioral changes (only arithmetic), and, finally, the results 
considering variations in labor supply due to the introduction of the 
subsidy, whose effects were presented in the previous section. 
In general the effects on each of these dimensions are positive, even 
after considering variations in labor supply and the rates at which people 
leave the market. It is important to note that to obtain these results the 
calculations are done on a household level. Table 5 illustrates the results 
on income distribution. The results on average incomes by autonomous 
income decile indicate that the autonomous income increases for all 
deciles. Monetary income increases in the same way; however, the 
variations in averages are higher in the latter. Indeed, as implied by the 
table, there are no significant variations in the distribution of autonomous 
income, while in the case of monetary income the percentage of total 
income for the first decile can be seen to increase by 0.1%. 
Table 6 presents the effects that the ethical family income has on 
inequality. As shown there, the program contributes toward reducing 
inequality between the extremes of the income distribution, and the 
improvements are greater in the case of monetary income: the ratio of 
deciles for monetary income goes from 25.8 times to 25. This is a 
significant reduction and it reflects the weight that the transfer 
component of the ethical family income has. The same indicator in the 
case of autonomous income also drops, but to a lesser degree, while the 
Gini index is barely affected by the change in the distribution of income. 
Finally, there is a significant effect on poverty. Table 6 shows how 
the implementation of the ethical family income program would manage 
 
 Table 5. Effects on average autonomous and monetary income by decile 
  Autonomous income Monetary income 
D Base Arithm. Behav. Base Arithm. Behav. 
1 64574 65103 64928 114519 118371 118222 
2 197684 200931 201095 230701 236925 237205 
3 273527 274432 274357 300120 303340 303083 
4 341200 341496 341881 360987 362955 363076 
5 408560 410553 410675 425020 428734 428896 
6 518246 518787 519233 532956 534620 534933 
7 625845 628872 628819 637082 640788 640921 
8 819056 818549 819841 827128 827073 828404 
9 1149245 1149319 1150724 1155157 1155559 1157059 
10 2958696 2958701 2959647 2960783 2961047 2962009 
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Table 6. Inequality indexes and poverty statistics 
Base Arithmetic Behavioral 
Autonomous income 
Gini index 0.552 0.551 0.551 
p10/p1 45.7 45.4 45.4 
q5/q1 15.7 15.4 15.4 
Monetary income 
Gini index 0.534 0.531 0.531 
p10/p1 25.8 25 25 
q5/q1 11.9 11.6   11.6 
Poverty rate 15.1 14.4 14.5 
Poverty gap 0.050 0.048 0.048 
 
to reduce the poverty rate from 15.1% to 14.5%. It should also be noted 
that the difference between the arithmetic scenario and the one that 
considers a simulated behavior implies a 0.1% increase in the poverty 
rate, mainly due to variations in labor supply. The table also shows that 
the poverty gap is, on the other hand, reduced from 0.050 under the base 
scenario to 0.048 assuming that the ethical family income program is 
implemented (both, according to the arithmetic model and the one that 





We have shown that an ethical family income program like the one 
presented in this chapter has positive effects on income distribution, 
inequality and poverty. However, the same cannot be said regarding 
labor participation. The effects on labor participation indicate that the 
social bonus has a negative impact on the work hours offered, and that 
the component proposed by the Council to incentivize labor participation 
is not enough to compensate the effects of people leaving the labor 
market. Along these lines, any proposal that accompanies the social 
bonus when implementing an ethical family income for the country must 
incorporate elements that incentivize labor participation and also that 
compensate for the transfer effects. Finally, it should also be mentioned 
before concluding that the results presented here might be biased 
downwardly due to the survey’s problems with self-reporting and the 
focalization of simulated policies. 
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Notes 
 
1 Chapter prepared for the project “An Integrated Framework for the Assessment 
of Equitable, Pro-Growth Fiscal Reform in Latin America and the Caribbean: 
Fiscal Schemes for Inclusive Development (FSID)”, co-funded by UNDP and 
IDRC. Any errors or opinions are the authors’ and do not necessarily represent 
the views of the United Nations Development Programme or those of the 
International Development Research Centre. 
2 The Ficha de protección social, which can be translated as “social protection 
file”, is the main instrument for focalization in the country. Its origins date back 
to the late 1970s, when it was called the CAS file and it measured households’ 
socioeconomic condition. Later, in 2007, it was replaced by the current FPS, 
which seeks to identify families in vulnerable situation. This corresponds to the 
risk of poverty, which includes both poor households as well as those with a 
high likelihood of being so. 
3 In May 2011 the prevailing exchange rate was about $470 per dollar. 
4 The UF (unidad de fomento) is a monetary unit that is indexed to the inflation 
of the previous month. As of May 27, 2011, it was worth $21,801.41. At an 
exchange rate of $470 per dollar, this was approximately equal to US$46.40. 
5 See Larrañaga and Contreras (2010) for more in-depth information on the 
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4 A microsimulation model for Guatemala: the 
case of direct and indirect taxes1 
 






The fiscal system in Guatemala can be characterized as one with a very 
low tax burden compared to most countries in Latin America (including 
Central America), as well as one that is quite regressive. Almost 
everybody in the country would agree with the statement that the 
government needs to count with more fiscal resources if it wants to 
improve the social welfare of the population. The proposed mechanisms 
to increase government revenue range from changes to the income tax 
rates to changes to the rates of some indirect taxes, such as the value 
added tax (VAT), and excise taxes for gas consumption, the use of cell 
phones, vehicular circulation, etc.  
There are conflicting positions on that matter, however, as the 
business sector and some academic researchers consider that the current 
rates of the corporate income tax limit private investment and have 
negative effects in generating more employment, therefore affecting the 
tax collection. Their proposal is instead to lower government 
expenditures and/or to increase indirect taxes. On the other hand, most 
members of the civil society point out that such an increase in the 
indirect taxes would bring greater tax revenue but at a very high social 
cost, since the extra tax burden would be borne mostly by the poor. This 
claim is important, since Guatemala is a country where 51% of the 
population is poor, with a 15.2% being extremely poor. Furthermore, the 
country has also a very high income inequality: in the year 2007, and as 
measured by the Gini index, Guatemala had an inequality index of 55.1, 
which placed it on the eleventh place from a total of 135 countries.2 
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As a result of that debate, there is an urgent need to be able to assess, 
in an ex-ante fashion, the social welfare impact of possible tax reforms in 
Guatemala. It is the purpose of this work to provide a micro-simulation 
model that can be used for that end, in the case of possible changes to the 
personal income tax or the indirect taxes. Before presenting the model, 
the next section gives a brief overview of the current Guatemalan tax 
system, while Section 3 gives an account of some of the proposals for tax 
reform that ended up being rejected in the past. That section ends with a 
description of a new tax proposal recently made public. Section 4 then 
details our microsimulation model, which is used in the rest of the paper 
to evaluate some possible tax changes as an example of its use. 
 
 
2. Brief remarks on the Guatemalan tax system 
 
Although a detailed account of the tax-benefit system in Guatemala has 
been given already in Romero and Pineda (2011), it is worthwhile to 
briefly mention here the main aspects of the prevailing tax structure. The 
first point to make is that, as is illustrated in Table 1, the tax revenue of 
the Guatemalan central government has never been greater than 12.1% of 
GDP, in spite of several tax reforms that have been proposed over the 
years (to be reviewed later). 
As can also be seen from that table, about three quarters of the 
revenue comes from indirect taxes. Among these, the foremost is the 
value added tax. Currently the general VAT rate is 12%. There are some 
exceptions, among which there is a zero rate in the case of the food 
bought in informal markets, and non-piped water, while education is 
exempted. On the other hand, there are specific taxes in the case of 
alcoholic beverages, gasoline and other fuels, tobacco products, and 
vehicle circulation for private use. 
In the case of direct taxes, the major source of government revenue is 
the personal income tax (its features will be detailed in Section 4 below). 
 
 Table 1. Tax revenue of the Guatemalan  central government (% of GDP) 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Indirect  8.2 8.7 8.6 8.7 8.3 8.5 8.7 8 7.2 7.4 
Direct 2.6 3.1 3.0 2.8 2.9 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.1 
Total  10.8 11.9 11.7 11.5 11.2 11.9 12.1 11.3 10.3 10.5 
 
 Source: Finance ministry. Note that, due to rounding errors, the sum of indirect and 
 direct taxes can be different from the total. 
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There is also a corporate income tax, as well as a special tax known as 
the solidarity tax (impuesto de solidaridad, ISO). This contribution is 
made by all individuals or corporations that have commercial or 
agricultural activities in the national territory and obtain a margin of at 
least 4% over their gross income. Finally, it is also worth mentioning that 
the evasion in the case of income taxes (both personal and corporate) 
oscillate around fifty percent of the potential tax revenue.3 
 
 
3. Failed past reforms, and a recent proposal 
 
During the last decades, any attempt of fiscal reform has been received 
either by confrontation, by the private sector, or a negotiation between 
political and business elites, resulting in minor reforms that have 
consisted mainly in the imposition of temporary taxes, simplification of 
the tax system, or the erosion of direct taxation. 
The year 1996 marked a transcendental point in the history of 
Guatemala, due to the peace agreements signed between the Government 
and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (an umbrella 
leftist organization). These agreements became a point of encounter and 
understanding, laying the groundwork to modernize the country. In 
particular, the agreement known as “Socio-economic aspects and 
agrarian situation” called for a new tax system that would be fair, 
equitable, progressive, universal, and compulsory; another requirement 
was that it would encourage savings and investment. That particular 
agreement stipulated that before 2000 the Guatemalan government would 
have to increase the tax burden by 50% compared to 1995, equivalent to 
a new tax burden of 13.2% of GDP.4 It was also agreed that spending on 
health and education would be increased by 50% between 1996 and 
2000. There were supposed to be also increases in spending on housing 
and the judicial sector, and reductions in military spending. 
Before reaching the year 2000, the government recognized that such a 
goal could not be met and called for a rescheduling, determining the new 
due date as the year 2002. Along with that postponement, the 
government established a series of fiscal measures, out of which the 
following four stood out: the establishment of a new tax on corporate 
income (impuesto a las empresas mercantiles), the reformulation of 
property taxes at the municipal level, the adoption of better tax collection 
mechanisms, and the call for a fiscal covenant. 
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3.1. The Fiscal Pact and other attempts of reform5 
 
The pact was an initiative of the commission in charge of following up 
the advance of the peace agreements. The main idea behind the covenant 
was that any tax reform would only be possible and sustainable with the 
consent of all the different social sectors. For that end, a preparatory 
commission was appointed to carry out consultations among different 
sectors and make a proposal. The result was made public in December 
1998. The proposal was based on a series of principles aimed toward the 
medium and long term. It was discussed at a national forum, and 
eventually led to the signing of the Fiscal Pact in May 2000. 
The discussion of concrete measures to reform the tax system was led 
by three main players: representatives of the civil society, the business 
sector, the Congress, and the Ministry of Finance. Because of 
disagreements between the business sector and civil society, on the one 
hand, and between the former and the government, which attempted to 
introduce new reforms, the agenda was left unfinished. What got 
approved instead by the Congress was not only partial, but it was also 
soon defied by the business sector. 
The constitutional challenges raised by the private sector to oppose 
the tax measures before the Court resulted in a decline in resources in 
2007. This situation led the government to create a technical committee 
that was to draft a new tax proposal. At last, a modification to the income 
tax was approved after creating two possible ways of taxation: 5% over 
gross income (in the case of the simplified regime) or 31% over profits. 
Exporters to Central American countries were exempted from paying 
direct and indirect taxes, and an anti-evasion law was approved, which 
allowed the tax administration entity to have a greater enforcement 
power. Also, it was established a temporary tax of 2.5% over net sales 
known as IETAAP (impuesto extraordinario y temporal en apoyo de los 
acuerdos de paz), as well as an excise tax on alcoholic beverages (with a 
variable rate depending on the type of liquor and its process). It may also 
be noted that when the temporary tax IETAAP came to an end, during 
the current UNE administration, it had to be replaced by the already 
mentioned solidarity tax (ISO) to arrest the fall in tax revenues. 
 
3.2. Still another attempt of a reform 
 
From 2008 up to date, the main effort to promote a new tax reform has 
been made by a group sponsored by the peace agreements commission. 
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Following its recommendations for the modernization of the Guatemalan 
tax system, the government presented a package of fiscal measures that 
included the following: to improve the quality of public expenditures, to 
have more transparency in the case of government activities, and to 
increase the tax revenue coming from income taxes. As a general goal, a 
proposal was made to raise the total tax burden up to 13.2% of GDP. 
The reform contemplated in particular three changes in the case of 
income taxes: First, the tax rate was to be raised from 5% to 7% of gross 
income (excluding exempted income) for the simplified regime. Second, 
in the case of the general corporate income tax there was supposed to be 
a reduction in the rate from 31% to 25%, in exchange for the limiting of 
some deductions. And third, for the case of the personal income tax the 
proposal established a reduction of income brackets to just two, and in 
both of the new brackets a reduction in the tax rates. At the end, perhaps 
because of its own misgivings about the final impact of the reform on tax 
revenue, the government itself decided not to present the proposal for the 
consideration of the Congress. 
 
3.3. The latest proposal 
 
In April 2011, it was submitted to the Guatemalan Congress a new tax 
initiative (iniciativa de ley 4317). At the moment of this writing, it is 
unknown whether or not the proposal will be approved, but it is worth to 
mention some of its features. The main goal of the reform is to reduce tax 
evasion by strengthening the documentation requirements for: first, the 
corporate income tax, especially in the case of the declarations about 
wages effectively paid; second, the VAT exemptions; and third, the 
vehicles circulation tax. It also proposes to increase the penalization for 
tax evasion, and to stimulate tax payments through electronic means. On 
the other hand, as in the other reform mentioned earlier, the corporate 
income tax rate is to be reduced from 31% to 25%, in exchange for the 
limiting of some deductions. 
 
 
4. A Guatemalan microsimulation model 
 
As can be appreciated from the variety of tax proposals described in the 
last section, there is a need for developing simulation models that can be 
used by policy makers and legislators to evaluate possible tax reforms. 
This section contains a description of our microsimulation model, which 
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can be used to assess the impact of possible changes in the case of the 
personal income tax, the value added tax, and three specific taxes: the tax 
on beverages (the acronym in Spanish is ISDB), the tax on tobacco and 
its products (ISTP), and the tax on gasoline and other petroleum products 
(ISPPD). Our simulator, arithmetic in nature, was written using Excel 
(2007 or later), because it is a simple program and with easy access for 
the majority of the population. The model can be downloaded freely in 
the internet address http://ideas.repec.org/c/ega/comcod/201104.html 
through the worldwide economic database known as Ideas-RePEc. In 
some of the discussions below it is helpful to have already perused 
through the worksheets of that Excel file (note that one has to enable the 
macros in order to run the model). 
 
4.1. The data base 
 
The most appropriate source of information to simulate a tax system in 
Guatemala is the income and expenditure survey known as Encuesta 
Nacional de Condiciones de Vida (ENCOVI). There are two surveys 
available at the moment of this writing, for the years 2000 and 2006, and 
each one has detailed information about the economic characteristics of 
the households: their incomes, expenses and their living conditions 
during those years. In particular, the ENCOVI 2006 was collected 
between March and September 2006. It contains information about 
68,641 individuals living in 13,686 households. Its sample design is 
reviewed in Romero and Pineda (2011), but for our purposes here it just 
suffices to say that it is representative at the national level. 
 
4.2. Modeling the personal income tax 
 
The ENCOVI, as in the case of most household surveys, contains 
information about the net income received by the workers in each 
household, but not about their gross income; that is, their income before 
taxes and social security payments. Thus, our first task is to recover from 
the answers given to the survey the original income earned by the 
members of the household that happen to work. For that end, we first 
make the following assumptions: 
• The individuals to be considered working in the formal sector for 
our simulation model are the ones that make social security contributions 
to, or receive social benefits from, the Instituto Guatemalteco de 
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Seguridad Social (IGSS). We also include the workers that report in the 
survey that they have a private insurance plan. 
• Due to the regionalization of the contributions to social security by 
the IGSS, we consider all the localities (departamentos) to belong to the 
first region, except for Petén, Santa Rosa and El Progreso, which are 
included in the second region. The social security contribution rates in 
the first region are 10.67% for the employers, and 6.67% for the 
employees. In the case of the second region, the contribution rates are 
4.83% and 2.83% respectively. 
• In those cases where the employees earn a net income of less than 
the minimum salary and they are registered at the IGSS, a minimum 
salary is attributed to them instead. 
• The imputation of the net minimum wage is made according to each 
worker’s activity. In the case of an agricultural activity, the daily 
minimum wage is 42.46 quetzales, while in the non-agricultural sectors 
is Q43.64. Note that those minimum wages correspond to 2006 (as it 
should be, since the ENCOVI that is being used in the microsimulation 
model was made in that year). 
• Finally, it is also assumed that taxes apply to the worker’s total 
income, which could be earned not only from a primary job, but also 
from secondary jobs (if any).  
As it can be seen when opening the Excel file mentioned earlier, the 
microsimulation model is made of several worksheets. For the purposes 
of this subsection, which focuses on the direct taxes, the important ones 
are four: the first is the Presentación, which is the front-sheet and allows 
for the possibility of changing the personal income tax rates; on the other 
hand, DISR, SISR and RISR contain, respectively, the data set, the 
simulator itself and the results that would be obtained after running the 
microsimulation model. 
The data set given in DISR contains selected information for the 
13,686 households. It starts first with the column named Folio whose 
nine digits establish the administrative region, the locality and the area 
where the household is located, as well as its identification number. The 
next column, Región de IGSS, assigns the household to one of the two 
IGSS regions in order to determine the corresponding minimum wage, as 
mentioned earlier. The next columns provide information about whether 
or not the working members of the household are enrolled in IGSS or in 
a private insurance plan. Finally, the rest of the columns list the different 
income sources, based on the ENCOVI items detailed in Table 2. 
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Table 2.  Monetary income items 
Questions Codes 
Main job 
What was the gross monthly salary before deductions? P10B08A 
Did you work extra hours last month? P10B09A 
Did you get money from commissions or gratuities? 
How much did you receive? P10B10A 
Did you get money from a bonus in June (Bono 14) 
How much did you receive? P10B11A 
Did you get money from a December bonus? 
How much did you receive? P10B12A 
Did you get money from a differed 15th salary? 
How much did you receive? P10B13A 
Did you get money from a vacation bonus? 
How much did you receive? P10B14A  
Did you get money from productivity bonuses? 
How much did you receive? P10B15A 
Are you enrolled in IGSS as…? 
How much did you pay to IGSS? P10B26A 
Secondary jobs 
Aside from your main job, did you have another one last week? P10C01 
How much did you get from commissions, extra hours…?  P10C06A 
Did you get any bonuses from your second job? 
How much did you receive? P10C09A 
Did you get money from a 15th salary, productivity bonus or 
incentive? 
How much did you receive? P10C10A 
Pensions 
Did you get money from retirement or pension? 
How much did you receive? P11A04A 
Did you get money from scholarships or transport bonuses? 
How much did you receive? P11A07A 
  Source: INE, ENCOVI 2006. 
 
The next worksheet in the Excel file is SISR, which contains all the 
operations that are needed to estimate the original (gross) income, using 
the net income reported in ENCOVI and the tax and social security laws 
prevailing in 2006. Theoretically, this task can be described as follows: if 
Y denotes the gross income and Ynet the net income, then 
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(1) SSIYY neto   ,  
 
where I and SS are the personal income tax payments and the social 
security contributions. Thus, if the exempted income is exentoY , then 
 
(2) )]([ LYYtCI exentoy   ,  
 
where C, ty, and L are, respectively, the flat amount of income tax 
payment in the individual’s tax bracket (if any), the corresponding tax 
rate, and the lowest income in the tax bracket. The last variable on the 
right-hand side of (1) is SS, which, assuming that the income that is tax 
exempt is exactly the same as the one that is exempted from the social 
security contribution, is given by 
 
(3) ][ exentos YYtSS   ,  
 
where ts is the social security contribution rate. Finally, if we substitute 
(2) and (3) in (1), then the original income, before taxes and social 
















Consequently, in order to calculate for each household the 
corresponding gross income, one has to find, to start with, its net income. 
This is done in Tabla 1 and Tabla 2 in the SISR worksheet. Note that 
those calculations, as well as the rest in the worksheet, correspond only 
to the first household in the survey. Once the model is run, a macro in 
Excel repeats the same calculations for the rest of the households. 
Returning to equation (4), the next key variable to estimate is the 
exempted income. This is done in Tabla 3 and Tabla 4 in the worksheet, 
where the monthly income items are grouped into total taxable and non-
taxable income. Then, in Tabla 5, the estimated values are transformed to 
an annual basis. 
The next table in the worksheet, Tabla 6, presents in its last columns a 
colored area that contains information about the personal income tax 
rates and social security contribution rates prevailing in Guatemala when 
the ENCOVI was collected, Note that it integrates the personal income 
tax rates and the two levels of the IGSS contribution in a single table. 
Thus, the corresponding values of C, ty, L, and ts for each member of the 
household can be retrieved all at the same time from there. 
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The other tables in the worksheet are used to estimate, for each 
member in the household, the amount of tax payments, the social 
security contributions, and, at the end, the original (gross) income by 
making use of equation (4). 
Finally, the RISR worksheet presents the results for the particular tax 
and social security structures established by the user in the first 
worksheet mentioned earlier. In RISR one can find, for the chosen 
scenario, the estimated gross income, the estimated income tax payment, 
and the estimated social contribution for each of the 13,686 households 
reported in ENCOVI 2006. 
 
4.3. The simulator for the value added tax 
 
In the same Excel file one can find the second component of our 
microsimulation model, which estimates the impact of changes in the 
value added tax rates, as well as in some specific tax rates. This 
component shares the same Presentación worksheet with the personal 
income tax simulator. The other worksheets are: DIVA, SIVA and RIVA. 
These contain, respectively, the data set, the simulator and the results that 
would be obtained after running the model. 
For most goods and services the current general VAT rate is 12%. As 
shown in Table 3 below, there are some exceptions, among which there 
is a zero rate in the case of food bought at informal markets, non-piped 
water, coal and wood, while education is VAT exempted. On the other 
hand, aside from the value added tax rate of 12% there are specific taxes 
in the case of beer (6%), other alcoholic beverages (30%), tobacco 
products (160%), and fuels for vehicles for private use (a quantity tax 
rather than an ad-valorem tax). In order to simulate the consequences of 
new VAT rates or new excise tax rates for the baskets listed in Table 3, 
the user simply has to fill out the new rates in the corresponding column 
of the second table in the Presentación worksheet. 
On the other hand, the worksheet DIVA records the spending on each 
of the baskets by each of the 13,686 households. The microsimulations 
corresponding to the new indirect tax rates are performed in the 
worksheet SIVA in a manner similar to the direct tax case: the data that 
appears in the worksheet correspond only to the first household in the 
survey, and once the model is run, a macro in Excel repeats the same 
calculations for the rest of the households. Finally, the worksheet RIVA 
presents the spending on each of the baskets in Table 3 made by the 
13,686 households if the new indirect tax reform were implemented. 
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Table 3. Goods and services in the microsimulation model  
Goods and services Codes 
0% VAT rate or VAT exempted 
     Food expenses at informal markets P13a03a, P13a15 
     Non-piped water P01d14b 
     Coal P01e03_4 
     Wood P01e03_7 
     Education expenses (exempted) P06b12b 
12% VAT rate 
     Supermarket expenses P13a12b, P13a13 
     Food and beverages out of home P13b03a, P13b04 
     Household goods P13b07a, P13b08 






     Uniforms, books and school materials P06b13b, P06b20b 
     Health services 
P05c09c, P05c09a  
P05c09b, P12a12a  
P05d14b, P05d16b 
P05d17b, P05d19b 
     Housing services P01b03 
12% VAT rate plus excise tax 
     Beer P13a03a, 913a15 
     Other alcoholic beverages  P13a03a, P13a15 
     Tobacco products P13a03a, P13a15 
     Fuel for vehicles for private use P13b03a, p13b04 
  Source: INE, ENCOVI 2006. 
 
 
5. Is the current tax system progressive? 
 
In this section we illustrate the use of our microsimulation model by 
examining the progressivity, or the lack of it, of the current Guatemalan 
tax system. We use both components of the model, so that we examine 
all the cases considered earlier: the personal income taxes, the social 
security contributions, the value added tax, and the special (excise) taxes 
listed in Table 3 above. Although we do not consider other taxes, such as 
the corporate income tax, our coverage seems to be adequate. 
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For that end, we first group the Guatemalan population into three 
different categories: households that are not in a poverty situation 
(67.4%), households that are poor but not extremely poor (28.0%), and 
households that suffer extreme poverty (4.6%). This classification is 
made by estimating, using the first component of our microsimulation 
model, the gross income earned by each of the 13,686 households in the 
ENCOVI survey, and then using the two poverty lines established by the 
Guatemalan government for the year 2006: Q3,206 (extreme poverty) 
and Q6,574 (poverty). 
After that classification is obtained, we then estimate for each 
household its total income tax payments (made by all the workers in the 
family), as well as the corresponding social security contributions. Table 
4 shows those results for the three groups of interest. As can be 
appreciated from that table, the direct tax system in Guatemala is quite 
regressive. This is so because, out of their own taxable income, the 
poorest individuals contribute in percentual terms to the government’s 
tax collection (and social security contributions) almost the same, in 
relative terms, as the more affluent ones. 
The regressivity of the Guatemalan direct taxes would not come as a 
surprise after examining the model’s first worksheet, Presentación. One 
can find there the following personal income tax schedule: individuals 
have to pay a rate of 15% when their annual taxable income is less or 
equal than Q65,000 (about 8,825 US dollars using the exchange rate 
prevailing in the middle of 2011); 20% on the next increment up to 
Q180,000; 25% on the next increment up to Q295,000; and 31% on an 
annual taxable income above Q295,000. Thus, there are only four tax 
brackets, and, as opposed to other countries (see, for instance, the case of 
Mexico in the next chapter), an individual with a taxable income of even 
one quetzal has to pay taxes at a very high initial rate (15%). Table 4 also 
shows the same pattern in the case of the social security contributions, 
but this is to be expected given that there are only two flat contribution 
rates depending on the region where the worker resides. 
 
Table 4.  Incidence of direct taxes and contributions 





Extreme poverty 1.32% 1.23% 1.32% 
Poor but not extremely 9.71% 9.04% 9.59% 
Not poor 88.97% 89.73% 89.09% 
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Using the second component of our microsimulation model, Table 5 
presents a similar examination, but now in the case of the indirect tax 
system. For that end we consider that the 0% and 12% VAT rates apply 
to the different consumption baskets as given in Table 3, and also 
consider the following excise tax rates: 6% for beer, 30% for other 
alcoholic beverages, 160% for tobacco products, and the quantity tax of 
Q4.65 per liter in the case of fuels. 
As can be appreciated from Table 5, and as one would expect a priori 
in any country in the world, the value added tax is highly regressive, with 
the poorest households contributing with 3.21% of total VAT revenue, 
even though their income only represents 1.32% of the total. In the case 
of the specific taxes, the regressivity in the case of the poorest 
households is ameliorated. This is so simply because few have a vehicle, 
and they can consume less alcoholic beverages and tobacco products 
than the rest of the population. But note that in the case of the next 
category, the poor but not extremely poor households, the regressivity 
persists if their contribution to tax revenue is compared, in relative terms, 
to the contribution made by the more affluent. 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
All policy makers in Guatemala hold the view that the current tax system 
requires an integral reform. We sympathize with that view, but we also 
think that such a reform has to be designed taking into account not only 
the potential extra-revenue that would come from it, but also its social 
welfare impacts. This chapter has presented a microsimulation model 
that can be used to illuminate those issues in the case of possible changes 
in the personal income taxes, social security contributions or 
consumption taxes. Needless to add, the model can be further enriched 
taking into account other important variables, such as social benefits, yet 
we believe that our model is the first step on the right direction. 
 
Table 5.  Incidence of the valued added tax and special taxes 
Income group Imputed income VAT paid 
Special taxes 
payment 
Extreme poverty 1.32% 3.21% 1.09% 
Poor but not extremely 9.71% 17.19% 11.47% 
Not poor 88.97% 79.60% 87.45% 




1 Chapter prepared for the project “An Integrated Framework for the Assessment 
of Equitable, Pro-Growth Fiscal Reform in Latin America and the Caribbean: 
Fiscal Schemes for Inclusive Development (FSID)”, co-funded by UNDP and 
IDRC. Any errors or opinions are the authors’ and do not necessarily represent 
the views of the United Nations Development Programme or those of the 
International Development Research Centre. 
2 See http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/eco_gin_ind-economy-gini-index (last 
visit on May 16th, 2011). 
3 Cabrera (2009) reviews some of the studies on fiscal evasion. 
4 Guatemala changed the System of National Accounts in 2001. In 1996 the 
objective was actually to raise the tax burden to a 12% of GDP. 
5 Fuentes and Cabrera (2005) present a detailed and precise exposition about the 
Fiscal Pact. 
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5 Distributive effects of the 2010 tax reform 
 in Mexico: a microsimulation analysis1 
 






There have been many attempts of comprehensive tax reforms in Mexico 
over the years. As early as 1960, the government commissioned no other 
than Nicholas Kaldor to draft an integral income tax law, but his 
proposal was vetoed by the private sector. Proposals have come and go 
since then, and the only important fiscal change that have taken place 
was in 1980, when a number of federal and state sales taxes were 
replaced by a single value added tax. That Mexico does need urgently a 
wide-ranging reform can be illustrated by the fact that, not counting its 
oil revenue (about 8% of GDP in 2011), the government’s annual tax 
revenue has been less than 10% of GDP for a long time. This tax burden 
is so low that Mexico can be placed in that respect at the bottom of at 
least a dozen and a half Latin American countries.2 With the hope of 
contributing to a much needed open (and reasoned) discussion on that 
subject, this chapter presents a microsimulation model for Mexico that 
can be used to analyze, in an ex-ante fashion, the social welfare impact of 
tax reforms that involve changes in the personal income tax schedule, in 
the value added tax rates, in the excise tax rates, and in the social security 
personal contributions.  
As in the case of the other microsimulation models presented in this 
book, the model’s computer program is freely available in the internet 
address http://ideas.repec.org/c/ega/comcod/201105.html through the 
Ideas-RePEC site. However, it should be noted that, as opposed to the 
majority of the other models, it is written using Excel (2007 or later) 
rather than Stata. This election would seem to be at first sight quite 
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dubious in terms of computational efficiency, but we would like to give 
here three reasons for that choice. First, Excel, version 2007 or later, 
allows for 214 columns and 220 rows, so that any household survey that 
we know of can be easily accommodated in a worksheet. Second, the 
Excel macros are flexible enough to make programming a relatively easy 
task, and the handling of numerical operations can be faster than one 
would think (we invite the reader to take a look at the macros in the 
program). And third, by far the most important reason, by using an Excel 
format we can visually show to the readers that are unfamiliar with 
microsimulation the basic building blocks in the case of tax models. 
The next section starts with a description of the main features of the 
current Mexican tax system, and ends with a description of a (minor) tax 
reform that took place in 2010, when the government tried to correct for 
a drastic fall in its revenues because of the economic collapse in 2009. 
The third section, on the other hand, describes in a detailed way our 
microsimulation model, which is made of three modules: for direct taxes, 
for indirect taxes, and for welfare indexes. Subsequently, the fourth 
section exemplifies the use of the model by examining the welfare and 
revenue impacts of the 2010 reform, and the final section concludes. 
 
2. The Mexican tax system and a minor tax reform 
 
As is evident from the long exposition in Absalón and Urzúa (2011), the 
Mexican tax-benefit system is a bit too complex to be explained in a few 
pages. Here we just focus on the case of federal taxes, leaving aside not 
only the social programs, but also the contributions imposed by the states 
and the municipalities. 
 
2.1. Basic characteristics of the main taxes 
 
The personal income tax, from now on denoted by ISR (impuesto sobre 
la renta de las personas físicas), can be filled out only individually, an 
important feature to be taken into account in the model to be given in 
Section 4 below, and its tax base is quite broad. Mexican residents are 
taxed on all their income, from whatever source, and the main exceptions 
and deductions are the following: 
• In the case of earnings for overtime work, if the worker perceives at 
most the minimum wage salary, the exemption is 100%; otherwise is 
50%. In the first case the exemption is valid provided the worker does 
not exceed three hours of daily overtime for at most three days per week. 
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In the second case, the exemption is valid provided the same condition 
and that the amount does not exceed five minimum wages per week. 
• Social security benefits (mostly pensions) used to be exempt as long 
the amount did not exceed nine times the monthly minimum wage salary. 
In 2011, however, the Congress decided to fully exempt the social 
security benefits, a regressive measure that is quite uncommon across the 
world. In the case of retirement and other associated benefits from the 
part of the employer, these are exempt if the benefits do not exceed 90 
times the minimum wage salary for each year of service. 
• Profit sharing to employees and vacation allowances are exempt for 
at most 15 days of the daily minimum wage salary; annual bonuses are 
exempt if they don’t exceed a monthly minimum wage salary; and 
interest paid on saving deposits is exempt as well. 
• The tax allowances (which here are synonymous of deductions) 
contemplated in the ISR law are: voluntary contributions to the 
individual retirement funds, medical services, medical insurance, funeral 
expenses, donations, and school bus transportation. It should be noted 
that the law sets some limits on the amounts of some of those deductions 
(see Absalón and Urzúa, 2011). Also, the government decided in 2011, 
for political reasons, to make private education expenses tax deductible 
(up to some amount which depends on the education level). 
• There are no tax credits in the current ISR law, if we understand by 
them deductions from tax due that are not refundable. On the other hand, 
we can define a tax subsidy as a deduction from tax due that could be at 
least partly refundable (from the part of the employer). If that is so, then 
for workers with low wage-earnings the corresponding income tax could 
turn out to be negative after subtracting from the tax due the subsidy for 
employment. In fact, as will be evident in the simulations below, this 
happens in the case of about one third of the workers in the formal sector. 
We now turn to the other income tax, the one for firms. Although it is 
not modeled below, it is interesting to note that it is the typical corporate 
income tax that one may find elsewhere, except for a good number of 
exemptions in the case of special activities (e.g., farming and 
transportation), and a large number of deductions. Thus, revenues 
accruing from this tax are quite low for international standards. This was 
the reason for the introduction in 2008 of a new cash flow tax that is 
complementary to it, the IETU (impuesto empresarial a tasa única). 
There is a flat IETU rate, currently at 17.5%, and its tax base is 
calculated by netting the following inflows: cash collected from the sale 
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of inventory or other assets, cash collected from independent services, 
and cash collected from rental of property, from the following outflows: 
cash payments for purchases of assets, cash payments for services, and 
cash payments for the rental of property. For our purposes, it should be 
noted that individuals that receive payments from professional services 
or from rents are also required to pay the new tax. Although those self-
employed individuals are supposed to pay also the personal income tax 
mentioned earlier, they are not included in our simulation model since 
there is not enough data that are public and trustworthy. Tax evasion has 
always been widespread among the members of that group, and it is only 
recently, with the introduction of the IETU, that such a behavior has 
started to change. 
Regarding indirect taxes, the value added tax, from now on IVA 
(impuesto al valor agregado), has three different regimes (aside from a 
special rate at the border with the US): a general tax rate, which was 15% 
for more than a decade until, as will be explained soon, it was raised to 
16% in 2010; a 0% rate in the case of food, medicines and exports; and 
some exemptions in the case of education services and agricultural 
activities. There are also excise taxes on some specific products, such as 
gasoline, diesel, beer, alcoholic beverages, and tobacco products. 
Finally, the social security contribution rates vary according to the 
employee’s social security system. The two main institutions in Mexico 
are the Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS) for private sector 
workers, and the Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales de los 
Trabajadores del Estado (ISSSTE) for public sector workers. There are 
some other systems at the federal level, such as the military security 
system, and the one for the workers in the oil company PEMEX, as well 
as some more at the state level (particularly in public universities). An 
interesting point is that, since 1997 in the case of IMSS and 2007 in the 
case of ISSSTE, pension regimes have been changed from a pay-as-
you-go design to an individualized one. These changes are irrelevant for 
our model, however, since for all practical purposes there are no retirees 
under the new regime at this point in time. 
 
2.2. The 2010 reform 
 
In 2009 the gross domestic product of the Mexican economy dropped 
6.2%, the largest fall in the Americas during that crisis. Given the 
accompanying drop in tax revenues, of 8.9% and 14.5% in the case of 
income taxes and VAT, respectively, the government decided in 
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September 2009 to submit to Congress a bill that proposed an increase in 
several indirect and direct taxes. We do not want to argue here whether 
or not that call for tax increases was reasonable during a recession 
period, instead we want to focus on the proposal and the eventual 
congressional resolution since they led to the most recent tax reform that 
have taken place in Mexico, even if it turned out to be a minor one. 
The original proposal was actually somewhat bold. The government’s 
most important point was to create a new fiscal “contribution to fight 
poverty”. It called for a new sales tax of 2% that would be applied in a 
generalized fashion. As opposed to the case of the VAT that leaves them 
untouched, the new tax would affect in particular the final sales of food, 
medicines, and educational services. Part of the extra revenue thus 
obtained would be then used to bolster up programs against poverty such 
as Oportunidades (described in, e.g., Absalón and Urzúa 2011).  
Among the other points in the proposal, there was to be a temporary 
increase of two percent in the maximum income tax rates for individuals 
and also corporations, an adjustment in the personal income tax rate rates 
in the five highest brackets, and an increase in the excise rates for beer, 
other alcoholic beverages, gambling and tobacco products. The tax rate 
on cash deposits, a contribution that is used to combat money laundering, 
was to be increased from two to three percent, and the exemption cash 
limit for that tax was to be lowered from 25,000 to 15,000 pesos. 
The final tax reform turned out to be lighter. Most representatives in 
the Congress rejected the so-called contribution to fight poverty, and 
ended up agreeing only on an increase of one percent in the VAT general 
rate (without taxing food, medicines and education). Regarding the 
income tax rates, these were increased. In the case of the corporations the 
tax rate went up temporarily to 30%; but it will go down to 29% in 2013, 
and to 28% in 2014. In the case of the personal income tax, the rates for 
the three higher brackets were increased (instead of only for the highest, 
as in the bill), with the maximum rate being also 30%. The new tax 
schedule for the personal income tax is given in Table 1, while the old 
one can be found in the first worksheet of the Excel program. 
The changes in the tax on cash deposits were also ratified, while the 
excise tax rates were raised (most in a temporary fashion). In particular, 
the tax rate on beer went up to 26.5% from 25%, on other alcoholic 
beverages to 53% from 50%, and on gambling to 30% from 20%. The 
typical cigarette pack ended up with an extra quantity tax of $0.80 in 
2010 (in 2011 a new reform changed it to $7.00). 
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Table 1. Personal income tax schedule, 2010 
Lower limit Upper limit Fixed quota 
Rate on the 
excedent 
$0.01 $5,952.84 $0.00 1.92 
$5,952.85 $50,524.92 $114.24 6.40 
$50,524.93 $88,793.04 $2,966.76 10.88 
$88,793.05 $103,218.00 $7,130.88 16.00 
$103,218.01 $123,580.20 $9,438.60 17.92 
$123,580.21 $249,243.48 $13,087.44 21.36 
$249,243.49 $392,841.96 $39,929.04 23.52 
$392,841.97 $73,703.40 30.00 
Source: Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, 2010. 
 
 
3. A microsimulation model for Mexico 
 
In this section we describe the three modules of our microsimulation 
model for the Mexican tax system: the first (ISR) can be used to simulate 
the consequences of changes in the structure of the personal income tax; 
the second (IVA) does the same for the case of the value added tax and 
other indirect taxes; and the third (Índices) calculates several well-known 
indexes that can be used to assess the impact of a given tax reform. 
The data set derives from the Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos 
de los Hogares (INEGI, 2009), from now on ENIGH. This income and 
expenditure survey is by far the most appropriate source of data for 
microsimulation in the case of Mexico. The survey is biannual, and, at 
the moment of the writing of this chapter, the most recent one was taken 
in the second semester of 2008. The ENIGH 2008 provides information 
on the occupational and socio-demographic characteristics of 29,846 
households. As is detailed in Absalón and Urzúa (2011), the survey 
contains information about 78 possible sources of income, and on the 
expenditure side it covers more than 660 goods and services. 
 
3.1. The ISR module 
 
In order to build up the personal income tax simulator, the first task, 
simple but cumbersome, is what can be called an exercise in “reverse 
engineering”. That is, from the survey we have to recover the pre-tax 
income, called from now on gross income, for each worker in the 
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household (as we said before, in Mexico it is not possible to file taxes 
jointly). For that end, there are some initial points that deserve to be  
mentioned in order to fully understand the model: 
• Since we are using the ENIGH 2008, the Mexican tax and social 
security laws to be used for building the microsimulation models are the 
ones prevailing in 2008. 
• For the simulation model at least, workers are considered to be in 
the formal sector if they receive any of the following social benefits from 
primary or secondary employment: IMSS, ISSSTE, state ISSSTE, 
PEMEX, the Army or the Navy. 
• It is assumed that each worker complies with all his/her tax and 
social security obligations, that taxable income comes from principal or 
secondary jobs, and that the tax impact falls entirely on the worker. 
• For those public sector workers who have medical services from 
ISSSTE, state ISSSTE, PEMEX, the army or the navy, we apply the 
contribution rates mandated by ISSSTE. 
• We assume that all formal workers receive at least a minimum daily 
wage (otherwise it would be, at least in principle, unlawful). For the few 
cases when the reported income is less than that, then we impute a gross 
minimum daily wage by type of regime (IMSS or ISSSTE). In all cases, 
the minimum daily wage corresponds to the one prevailing in Mexico 
City in 2008: $52.59 pesos. 
We urge the reader to open up at this point the Excel file that contains 
the first module of the simulator (please note that in order to run it you 
have to enable the use of macros). It has the following worksheets: 
Presentación, Datos, Simulador and Resultados. In the first of these the 
simulations are run. Also, there are two tables that contain the structure 
of the income tax rates for different income levels and the employment 
subsidy (a wage credit). In these tables one can change the upper limits 
of the income brackets, the income tax rates and the amount of subsidy 
granted. By selecting the button 2008 that appears in these tables, one 
can restore the original values that were in effect that year. 
The Datos worksheet contains, on the other hand, the complete data 
set for the 29,468 households. Each row provides the relevant 
information for a particular household, which is distributed along at most 
248 columns (most of them empty). This large number of columns is 
needed since all possible sources of income accruing from work have to 
be considered for each relevant member of the family. The income items 
according to the ENIGH are given in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Sources of income according to the ENIGH 2008 
Source of income Code 
Wages and salaries P001 
Piecework P002 
Commissions and tips P003 
Overtime work P004 
Incentives, rewards and prizes P005 
Bonuses and additional wages P006 
Holiday bonuses and allowances in cash P007 
End-of-the-year profit-sharing P008 
End-of-the-year bonus P009 
Wages and salaries from main work in cooperatives and associations P011 
Other income from main work in cooperatives and associations P013 
Wages and salaries from secondary subordinated work P015 
Other income from secondary subordinated work P017 
Income from secondary subordinated work P018 
End-of-the-year profit-sharing and bonus from secondary work P019 
Retirement and pensions P032 
 
The Simulador worksheet contains thirteen tables (tablas in Spanish) 
that have to be used for running the model. The first of them, Tabla 1, is 
apparently incomplete, since it is made of a single row which contains 
only the relevant information for the very first household in the survey. 
Actually, when the model is run it iterates from one household to the 
next in the Datos worksheet, and a macro replaces the old information 
with the new one and modify all the subsequent tables accordingly. The 
first six columns in Tabla 1 can be described as follows: Factor is the 
expansion factor for that household. Estrato indicates the size of the 
locality where the home is located: 1 for localities with 100,000 or more 
inhabitants; 2 for localities with 15,000-99,999; 3 for localities with 
2,500-14,999; and 4 in the case of 2,500 inhabitants. The next column, 
Tamaño, gives the size of the household. Folio is a combination of 
housing and household identifiers: the first two digits refer to the entity, 
the third to the date, the next three are consecutive numbers, and the last 
digit identifies the nature of the home (0 if main, and greater than 0 
otherwise). Decena refers to the ten days during which the survey was 
applied to the household; this information will be used later to calculate 
the exact monthly income. Finally, Decil indicates the income decil 
corresponding to that household. 
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The rest of the columns, and there could be many!, refer to each of the 
members of the household that receive any monetary income from work 
(not from interest payments, government transfers, etc.). If one finds 
under the headings IMSS, ISSSTE, ISSSTE estatal and PEMEX/Defensa a 
value of one, it means that the individual is enrolled in that social 
security system. The rest of the columns indicate the monetary income 
received by each individual for the reference period. 
The same data on enrollment in social security institutions and 
quarterly earnings from work are presented in condensed form for the 
workers of each household in Tabla 2 of the Simulador worksheet. From 
this table we can derive the monthly incomes presented in Tabla 3, 
depending on the period in which the survey was applied to each 
particular household. More precisely, quarterly income is divided by one 
of the following numbers: 2.99178 if Decena is equal to 1; 3.02465 if it 
is equal to 2, 3, 4, 8 or 9; and 3.00821 if Decena is equal to 5, 6 or 7. 
The income sources are grouped in Tabla 4 into monthly wage 
income (P001 + P002 + P003 + P006 + P011 + P015); income possibly 
exempted (P004 + P005 + P007 + P008 + P009 + P019 + P032); and 
other income (P013 + P017 + P018). The income that is actually 
exempted is less than the “income possibly exempted”, because of 
several legal constraints (as of 2008). First, in the case of income from 
overtime work the tax rate is reduced 50% for the amount corresponding 
up to 5 minimum daily wages per week, but the tax rate is the normal one 
for the rest of the extra income. Second, in the case of the end-of-the-
year bonus, it is exempted for up to 30 minimum daily wages, and in the 
case of other incentives they are exempted for up to 30 minimum daily 
wages as well. Third, holiday bonuses are exempted for up to 15 
minimum daily wages, as well as profit-sharing. And fourth, in 2008 
pensions were exempted for up to 9 minimum monthly wages. Taking 
into account the fourth constraints given above, Tabla 5 in the worksheet 
classifies each income item in taxable income or exempted income.3 
Using that table, Tabla 6 shows the monthly net income reported by 
each member of the household in the formal sector, and the monthly net 
income that was indeed taxed (so that the difference between the two is 
income exempted). Next, Tabla 7 presents annual figures for net income, 
taxable net income, exemptions and, if needed, an imputation of the 
income earned by the individual if he or she reported an income less than 
the corresponding to one minimum wage. More precisely, workers 
affiliated to IMSS and ISSSTE are imputed an annual minimum wage 
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income of $22,661.94 and $21,481.42 in cases when their wages were 
less than these amounts. 
Before continuing with the other tables in the worksheet, it is worth to 
present some algebraic identities and transformations that may help to 
clarify the issues involved. Given the actual (net) income that is received 
by an individual, netoY , his/her original (gross) income is given by: 
 
(1) SSIYY neto   ,  
 
where I and SS are the personal income tax payments and the social 
security contributions (made by the worker not the employer). 
If the exempted income is now denoted by exentoY , then 
 
(2) SULYYtCI exentoy  )]([  ,  
 
where C, ty, L and SU are, respectively, the flat amount of income tax 
payment in the individual’s tax bracket (if any), the corresponding tax 
rate, the lowest income in the bracket, and the so-called employment 
subsidy (if any). This last item might be thought to be a tax credit at first 
sight. But, as can be seen from (2), if income is small and/or the subsidy 
is large, then IR can become negative. As a matter of fact, in Mexico all 
tax payers that earn less than three monthly minimum wage salaries 
enjoy a negative tax, so that the worker’s firm has to transfer to (not 
retain from) him/her some amount of money (the firm will then credit the 
subsidy when it makes its own tax payments to the government). 
The last variable on the right-hand side of (1) is SS, the social security 
contributions. Assuming that the income that is tax exempt is exactly the 
same as the one that is exempted for the purposes of social security 
contributions,4 then 
 
(3) ][ exentos YYtCSSS   ,  
 
where CS and ts are, respectively, a fixed payment (to be clarified later) 
and the contribution rate for social security. 
To end the exercise, substitute (2) and (3) in (1), and get the following 
















Alternatively,  denoting by gravadoY  the difference between net income and 
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As is implied by the last equation, aside from the income exempted 
and the income actually taxed, we have to find for each working member 
in the household the effective tax and contribution rates, the fixed quotas 
paid, and the subsidy (if any). In that regard, the key tables in the 
Simulador worksheet are Tablas 8, 9 and 10 (the last two can be found 
scrolling to the right of the first). Because there is a given table to 
calculate the income tax, another for the employment subsidy, and two 
different rules for calculating the contributions to social security, it is 
very helpful to construct a single tax and contribution table depending on 
whether a particular individual is a member of IMSS or ISSSTE. One 
result is Tabla 9, with 19 different levels of income, for workers 
affiliated to IMSS, and the other is Tabla 10, with 18 income levels for 
workers affiliated to ISSSTE. 
To be more precise, the information needed to calculate the social 
security contributions in the case of IMSS is as follows: for retirement 
and unemployment in advanced age (1.125%); for benefits in kind in the 
case of retirement, illness and maternity (0.4%); for medical insurance 
for retired workers (0.375%); for sickness insurance and maternity leave 
(0.25%); and for disability and life insurance (0.625%). On the other 
hand, in the case of ISSSTE the following contributions apply: for 
unemployment in advanced age and old age insurance (4.025%); for 
sickness insurance and maternity leave (2.75%); for sickness insurance 
for retired workers (0.625%); for disability and life insurance (0.625%); 
and for child care and social services (0.5%). The consolidated social 
security contribution rates, and the limits of the minimum and maximum 
incomes corresponding to each rate, are summarized in Table 3 below, 
where Y denotes, as before, gross income, and Z denotes the minimum 
wage. Note that, even though for a particular individual there is no fixed 
quota as such, in equation (3) above we introduce one, named there as 
CS, precisely to account for the varied possibilities in Table 3. 
Using Tabla 9 and Tabla 10 thus constructed, together with equation 
(6) above, we then calculate each individual’s taxable income, 
employment subsidy (if any), and social security contributions, as shown 
in Tabla 11 and Tabla 12 in the worksheet.5 Finally, those incomes and 
payments obtained are multiplied by the so-called “Altimir factor”, in our 
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Table 3. Social security contributions 
Payment Condition 
ISSSTE 
None Y ≤ Z 
0.08525*Y Z < Y ≤ 10Z 
 0.08525*10Z Y > 10Z 
IMSS 
None Y ≤ Z 
0.02375*Y Z < Y ≤ 3Z 
 0.02375*Y + 0.004*(Y-3Z) 3Z < Y ≤ 25Z 
 0.02375*25Z + 0.004*22Z Y > 25Z 
 
case equal to 1.33573, in Tabla 13. This number is the result of dividing 
the figure of labor earnings according to the System of National 
Accounts and the corresponding one implied by the ENIGH 2008. Thus, 
by using this factor we can bring closer to reality the aggregate monetary 
results derived from the simulator; yet, since the same factor is used in 
all of the adjustments, its application is irrelevant for all the other 
simulation exercises that focus on the distributive impacts of the reforms. 
Lastly, Tablas 14-18 repeat the same procedure followed in Tablas 9-13 
but now for the new scenario proposed by the user. 
The final worksheet in the ISR module of the microsimulation model 
is Resultados. This sheet simply records the results obtained, household 
after household, by the macros contained in the Simulador worksheet. It 
automatically presents the simulations for, both, the current scenario and 
the proposed scenario. 
 
3.2. The IVA module 
 
The second module of our microsimulation model calculates the impact 
of changes in the indirect tax rates, assuming that consumers do not 
modify their behavior once the changes in the corresponding final prices 
take place. It may be noted in passing that in Chapter 6 we present 
another model for the Mexican economy that does allow for the 
possibility of behavioral changes. However, the nature of that model is 
quite different from the one presented here, since it crucially depends on 
the estimation of a demand system that requires a good number of 
assumptions that are not needed in this chapter. 
In the Excel file that contains this second module one can find the 
following worksheets: Presentación, Datos, Simulador and Resultados. 
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The simulations are run in the first of these worksheets. In there one can 
also find a table that present the different value added tax rates for 
different groups of goods and services in the economy, and another table 
that gives the corresponding excise tax rates (if any). That grouping of 
goods and services is made taking into account not only their different 
tax treatments, but also according to recent tax proposals that have been 
made by some legislators. 
As can be appreciated from the Presentación worksheet, there are 
twelve baskets in total: 1) alcoholic beverages, except for beer, for which 
both VAT and excise taxes apply; 2) the food items, with a zero VAT 
rate, that are not included in the so-called “basic basket”; 3) the basic 
basket, also taxed at 0%, which corresponds to the items in the most 
basic diet among Mexicans and whose affordability is used to estimate if 
a family is extremely poor or not; 4) the other goods with a zero VAT 
rate; 5) beer, which is separated from the rest of the alcoholic beverages 
since it has a lower excise tax rate; 6) services that are VAT exempt, 
mostly educative services (note that for simulation purposes we can think 
them as having a zero VAT rate, even though that is incorrect from the 
point of view of the companies offering the product); 7) the goods and 
services to which the general VAT rate apply, and do not have (and 
probably will never have) excise tax rates; 8) gambling; 9) medicines, 
with a zero VAT rate; 10) soft drinks; 11) tobacco products; and, finally, 
12) telecommunication services. The first columns of the two tables in 
the Presentación worksheet give the VAT and excise tax rates under the 
base scenario (2008 in the example given there, but that does not have to 
be the case), while the second columns can be used to modify any of the 
indirect tax rates. 
The Datos worksheet contains information about each household’s 
spending on those twelve baskets, as well as the household’s id number 
and expansion factor. The next worksheet, Simulador, processes the 
arithmetic operations for each household, and sends the results to the last 
worksheet, Resultados. Note that the arithmetic that is behind the 
simulation is quite simple. If, for instance, one wants to calculate the 
monetary consequences of increasing the general tax rate from 15% to 
16%, as it actually happened in 2010, then one has to select the goods 
and services to which that general rate apply and multiply the spending 
by the ratio 1.16/1.15. In the case of goods or services for which a 
specific tax applies as well, one just have to keep in mind that the value 
added tax has to be applied, by design, always at the final stage. 
114                            C. Absalón and C. M. Urzúa 
 
3.3. The Índices module 
 
The third and final module of the microsimulation model simply 
calculates for each fiscal scenario, the following coefficients: the Gini 
inequality index, the Reynolds-Smolensky distributive index, and the 
Kakwani progressivity index.6 
 
 
4. Distributive effects of the 2010 tax reform 
 
As an example of the use of our microsimulation model, this section 
presents an appraisal of the 2010 tax reform that was described earlier, 
which involved changes in both the personal income tax schedule and the 
indirect tax rates. 
 
4.1. Estimated effects of the changes in direct taxes 
 
The first step in the analysis is to simulate the status quo in 2008, the 
year when the survey was taken, in the case of personal income taxes 
using the Excel module ISR. The results, in millions of pesos and 
distributed by income decile, are shown in Table 4. It is important to note 
that the table contains information about the monetary income of all 
households, regardless of whether or not the workers in each family are 
incorporated to the formal sector.  Regarding that issue, it should also be 
 
Table 4. Estimated tax payments and social security contributions in 2008 
(Millions of 2008 pesos distributed by income deciles) 






I $37,574.19 -$568.42 $123.75 
II $87,414.01 -$1,018.69 $662.78 
III $122,616.91 -$1,035.32 $1,336.44 
IV $159,182.71 -$481.75 $2,333.92 
V $203,487.68 $811.82 $3,770.04 
VI $248,418.24 $3,285.97 $5,412.42 
VII $304,028.23 $8,720.41 $7,712.34 
VIII $383,254.07 $18,084.26 $11,498.91 
IX $493,996.35 $36,316.70 $16,161.99 
X $794,406.40 $96,315.91 $21,149.24 
Total $2,834,378.79 $160,430.90 $70,161.84 
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be noted that about 56% of the households in the survey do not have 
members affiliated to a social security institution. 
As shown in Table 4, the first fourth deciles do not make, on the 
aggregate, income tax payments, but rather receive a transfer (a negative 
tax) due to the employment subsidy. The bulge of that subsidy goes to 
the second and third deciles because, on the one hand, most of the 
individuals in the first decile are not in the formal sector, while a number 
of workers in the fourth decile have an income that is high enough to pay 
taxes. Even though some measures of tax progressivity will be given at 
the end of the section, it is interesting to calculate already from Table 4 
that about 23% and 60% of total income tax payments are made by the 
ninth and tenth deciles, while the corresponding percentages for social 
security contributions are 23% and 30%, reflecting the less progressive 
nature of the latter. 
The new income tax schedule that took effect after the 2010 reform 
was presented earlier in Table 1. The changes with respect to 2008 are 
essentially in the rates for the three highest brackets, which go up from 
19.94%, 21.95% and 28% to 21.36%, 23.52% and 30%, respectively. We 
estimate the new tax payments for each member of the household that 
works in the formal sector, and then aggregate the results by deciles in 
Table 5. Comparing the results in Table 4 and Table 5, it can be seen that 
tax payments for the eighth and ninth deciles increase by 3% and 4%, 
while taxes for the tenth decile increase by 7%. 
 
Table 5. Estimated tax payments and social security contributions in 2010 
(Millions of 2008 pesos distributed by income deciles) 






I $37,574.19 -$568.42 $123.75 
II $87,414.01 -$1,018.69 $662.78 
III $122,616.91 -$1,035.32 $1,336.44 
IV $159,182.71 -$481.75 $2,333.92 
V $203,487.68 $813.59 $3,770.04 
VI $248,418.24 $3,316.01 $5,412.42 
VII $304,028.23 $8,854.77 $7,712.34 
VIII $383,254.07 $18,478.82 $11,498.91 
IX $493,996.35 $37,420.28 $16,161.99 
X $794,406.40 $101,303.38 $21,149.24 
Total $2,834,378.79 $167,082.66 $70,161.84 
116                            C. Absalón and C. M. Urzúa 
 
Note that the implied real growth rate of the income tax revenue is of 
the order of 4.1%, comparing the 2008 and 2010 figures. Controlling for 
the corresponding changes in gross domestic product, did that expected 
rate of growth turn out to be close to reality? That question is difficult to 
answer since real GDP in 2010 happened to be 0.9% lower than in 2008, 
due to the 2009 crisis. Furthermore, at the moment of this writing the 
government had only liberated an aggregated figure for the case of both 
personal and corporate income tax revenues for 2010.7 But if one were to 
use the growth rate of this aggregated figure, 3.5%, as a proxy, and were 
to estimate its income elasticity as 1.15%,8 then (3.5+.9x1.15)% would 
not be far away from our forecasted growth rate. 
 
4.2. Incidence of the indirect tax changes 
 
As recounted in Section 2, the 2010 tax reform also involved changes in 
the indirect taxes: the VAT general tax rate was increased from 15% to 
16%; the excise tax rate on beer went up from 25% to 26.5%; the rate on 
other alcoholic beverages was raised from 50% to 53%; on gambling the 
excise tax rate was increased from 20% to 30%; and on cigarettes, after 
approximating the extra quantity tax to an ad-valorem tax, the rate was 
increased from 160% to 169%. 
Using the Excel module IVA of the microsimulation model, Table 6 
presents the incidence of the indirect tax system before and after the 
reform. As opposed to the aggregate results for the personal income taxes 
 
Table 6. Estimated incidence of indirect taxes in 2008 and 2010 
(Average monthly tax payment per household, in 2008 pesos) 
Decile Indirect tax payments      Tax/spending (%) 
      2008      2010   2008    2010 
I    $137.24    $146.40 5.27% 5.62% 
II    $184.83    $197.16 5.55% 5.92% 
III    $224.73    $239.73 5.74% 6.13% 
IV    $251.57    $268.37 5.97% 6.37% 
V    $299.82    $319.86 6.34% 6.77% 
VI    $356.13    $379.84 6.74% 7.19% 
VII    $445.01    $474.85 7.11% 7.58% 
VIII    $541.33    $577.84 7.44% 7.94% 
IX    $743.59    $793.71 8.01% 8.55% 
X $1,430.83 $1,528.06 8.92% 9.52% 
Average    $461.51    $492.59    6.71%     7.16% 
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given earlier, this time we focus directly on the average tax payments 
that have to be made by the households monthly, in such a way that we 
can illustrate the impact at the household level of the indirect taxes. The 
readers interested instead on the aggregate results may consult the 
Resultados worksheet in the Excel file. 
As shown in the table, after the 2010 reform the average monthly 
expenditure per household is increased by approximately $31, which 
represents an increase of about 6%. It might also be noted that the deciles 
that suffer the least impact, in terms of increases in tax payments relative 
to spending, are the first three. This is to be expected given that the 
consumption basket in the case of the poorest households is mostly made 
of goods that have a zero VAT rate. Likewise, since the consumption 
basket of the tenth decile contains, in relative and absolute terms, more 
goods subject to the 16% VAT rate, it is also to be expected that, as 
shown in Table 6, the largest increase in relative (and absolute) tax 
payments corresponds precisely to that decile. 
 
4.3. The overall distributive effects of the 2010 tax reform 
 
Taking together the results given in Table 5 and Table 6, the distributive 
impact of the entire 2010 tax reform can be now estimated. For that end, 
three indexes are calculated using the net incomes before and after the 
reform: the Gini index that evaluates changes in relative income 
inequality, the Reynolds-Smolensky index that quantifies the 
redistributive effects of the reform, and the Kakwani index that measures 
the progressivity of the tax schemes. In the first case, the pre-reform Gini 
is 0.6522 while the post-reform Gini is 0.6517, which suggests a 
marginal gain in terms of less income inequality.9 On the other hand, the 
Reynolds-Smolensky index goes from 0.0133 to 0.0140, which implies a 
slightly better redistributive tax system after the reform, while the 
Kakwani index goes from 0.1412 to 0.1438, confirming the marginal 
progressivity effects of the tax reform. 
 
4.4. Estimated impacts of the failed SHCP reform 
 
As a final example of the use of the microsimulation model, consider the 
failed proposal made by the Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público 
(SHCP) in 2009, as reviewed in Section 2 above. It involved in particular 
a new fiscal “contribution to fight poverty”, by means of a 2% sales tax 
that would apply to almost all goods and services. As opposed to the case 
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of the value added tax that under current law leaves untouched food and 
medicines (with a zero tax rate), and educational services (exempted), the 
new sales tax would apply to them as well. In return, the government 
proposal contemplated the use of part of the extra revenue to strengthen, 
in some unspecified way, the programs against extreme poverty. 
Table 7 presents the results of increasing the two different VAT rates 
from 15% to 17% and 0% to 2%, as well as imposing a 2% tax on 
educational services.10 It is evident from the table that the SHCP proposal 
is quite regressive. For example, households in the lowest income decile 
pay 36.2% more taxes than before, while tax payments in the case of the 
households in the highest decile grow 20.9%. If one were to present in 
the table the tax burden relative to income, rather than to spending, the 
SHCP proposal would be even more regressive. 
 
 
5. Concluding remark 
 
This chapter has presented a microsimulation model that can be used to 
estimate the social welfare impact of possible tax reforms. These may 
include changes in the personal income tax schedule, the VAT rates, the 
excise tax rates, and the social security contributions. The model is freely 
available and it is written using Excel,  in such a way that it can be easily 
 
Table 7. Estimated incidence of VAT, under the 2008 and SHCP scenarios  
(Average monthly tax payment per household, in 2008 pesos) 
Decile           VAT monthly payments        VAT/spending (%) 
           2008        SHCP      2008        SHCP 
I $133.24 $181.43 5.24% 7.13% 
II $179.40 $243.08 5.53% 7.41% 
III $216.84 $290.42 5.71% 7.59% 
IV $242.21 $323.82 5.94% 7.82% 
V $291.04 $382.17 6.31% 8.18% 
VI $342.86 $442.05 6.70% 8.56% 
VII $426.56 $541.28 7.06% 8.92% 
VIII $517.85 $650.78 7.39% 9.24% 
IX $721.70 $891.29 7.97% 9.81% 
X $1387.93 $1678.58 8.88% 10.69% 
Average $445.96 $562.49 6.67% 8.54% 
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modified by the users for their own needs. Two future improvements of 
the model come first to mind: to allow for the possibility of making 
monetary transfers to households, according to given social programs, 





1 Chapter prepared for the project “An Integrated Framework for the Assessment 
of Equitable, Pro-Growth Fiscal Reform in Latin America and the Caribbean: 
Fiscal Schemes for Inclusive Development (FSID)”, co-funded by UNDP and 
IDRC. Any errors or opinions are the authors’ and do not necessarily represent 
the views of the United Nations Development Programme or those of the 
International Development Research Centre. Without implicating them with any 
remaining errors, the authors appreciate the comments to an earlier draft from 
Samuel Freije, Luis F. López-Calva, Edgard Rodríguez and Amedeo Spadaro. 
2 See, for instance, the table presented in Cetrángolo (2011, p. 15). 
3 When calculating the exemption in the case of overtime earnings that exceed 
1,577.70 pesos per month (5 minimum daily wages per week), we make the 
innocuous assumption that the net overtime wages reported by the individuals 
can be used instead of the gross overtime wages. Gross and net coincide, of 
course, when the overtime wages do not exceed that amount, but there could be 
some very small discrepancies when only part of that income is exempted. 
4 This assumption is harmless since the income that is exempt from social 
security contributions is slightly lower than the one exempted for tax purposes. 
5 How do we know which tax bracket correspond to an individual if we do not 
have yet his/her gross income when calculating (6)? We first use net income as a 
proxy and identify the corresponding bracket; we make then all calculations to 
get the presumptive gross income, and, finally reverse the calculations to see if 
the original number is obtained. If not, the adjacent bracket (upwardly) is used. 
6 See Lambert (2001) for a very good review of those indexes. In Chapter 7 of 
this book, Amarante, Bucheli, Olivieri and Perazzo also provide the definitions 
of those measures, among others. 
7 The same lack of enough information applies to indirect tax revenues, since the 
government subtracts from the excise tax revenue all the energy subsidies and 
only reports the final result (which sometimes is even negative!). 
8 See Cárdenas, Ventosa-Santaulària and Gómez-Zaldívar (2008). 
9 Note that these quite large Gini values do not have to coincide at all with the 
value of the typical income distribution Gini index that would be calculated 
using all sources of income, monetary and non-monetary, and not only using 
wage incomes. 
10 Since the model only considers final consumption, the effect of a 2% sales tax 
can be equated to an increase of 2% in the VAT rates. Regarding the change in 
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the exempted status of educational services, another qualification has to be 
made: The estimated increase in tax revenue would be overestimated by the 
model, since, after changing their status, the schools would be able to credit their 
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6 The non-optimality of the Mexican indirect 
tax system1 
 






There have been, for more than a decade, continuous and heated 
discussions in Mexico about the desirability of imposing a value added 
tax on food, medicines and education. Aside from the fact that the three 
main political forces have diverging views on that subject, perhaps 
another of the reasons for the failure of deciding, once and for all, 
whether or not to make an indirect tax reform is the lack of empirical 
assessments about its possible impacts on social welfare. Chapter 5 
presents a microsimulation model that could be used for that end. In this 
chapter we present a complementary model that has a quite different 
nature: as opposed to the former, which is quite large and detailed but at 
the cost of neglecting possible behavioral responses, this smaller model 
is built on classical microeconomic foundations. 
For that end, the model follows the marginal tax reform methodology 
that was first advanced by Ahmad and Stern (1984). Broadly speaking, 
their approach assesses the impact of tax reforms by means of a first-
order approximation of a given social welfare function, in such a way 
that the only information needed are aggregate responses rather than 
individual demand responses. The attractiveness of such a simplification 
is attested by the large number of empirical papers that have applied that 
methodology over the years.2 
However, as it has been forcefully argued by Banks, Blundell and 
Lewbel (1996), the measurement of social welfare through the use of 
first-order approximations may lead to biases. This is so because, in the 
case of substantial tax changes, “[the] substitution effects can be non-
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trivial. The marginal (i.e. first order) approximations ignore these effects, 
and therefore can be seriously biased” (Banks et al., 1996, p. 1228). As is 
illustrated in this chapter, this shortcoming can be nevertheless 
ameliorated if one uses the second-order extension of the Ahmad-Stern 
marginal tax analysis due to Urzúa (2005), which makes use of sharper 
approximations of the welfare measures. 
Toward that end, the next section reviews the key issues involved in 
the Ahmad-Stern methodology (AS from now on), as well as its second-
order variant. After that, the third section reviews some aspects of the 
estimation of demand systems, a topic that, although well known to 
applied econometricians, might be unfamiliar to some of the readers. The 
fourth section, using the estimated demand system, identifies marginal 
and second-order improvements in the current indirect tax system. The 
conclusions are given in the fifth section, and, for the non-experts, an 
appendix provides a computer code in Stata that can be used to estimate 
demand systems of the type considered here. 
 
 
2. The Ahmad-Stern approach and a generalization 
 
According to Ahmad and Stern (1984), the optimality of an indirect tax 
structure may be evaluated by comparing the marginal cost, in terms of 
social welfare, of raising an extra unit of revenue by means of a tax 
increase on each good. Even though other possible criteria have been 
developed since then (see the references in Dahlby, 2008), the AS 
methodology continue to be quite reasonable. In particular, optimality 
requires that the marginal social welfare cost should be equal for all the 
relevant goods; otherwise a Pareto improvement could be implemented 
by lowering the excise tax on the good with the higher marginal cost and 
by raising the tax on the good with the lower marginal cost. 
In order to be more precise about that criterion, we present here the 
model considered by those authors. On the production side, we simply 
assume that all prices are fixed and that there are constant returns to 
scale. Hence, indirect tax changes are only reflected as consumer price 
changes and there are no profits; although this simple model, it should be 
noted in passing, could be enriched to account for other firm responses. 
Given N goods, indexed by i = 1, 2,..., N, let p denote the corresponding 
(fixed) producer price vector. Thus, if t is the vector of specific taxes, 
then q = p+t is the final consumer price vector. There are, furthermore, H 
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households, indexed by h = 1, 2,..., H. For each household h, the 
consumption bundle that maximizes the utility function uh(xh ) subject to 
the corresponding linear budget constraint is denoted as xh(q,mh ), while 
the associated indirect utility function is expressed as vh(q,mh ). We also 
assume the existence of a social welfare function W(u1,…,uH ), which can 
be rewritten in terms of prices and incomes as: 
 
(1) )),(),...,,((),...,,( 11 HH1H mvmvWmmV qqq  . 
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Now suppose that the excise tax on good i is to be increased at the 
margin. Given equations (1) and (2), the marginal social cost of that tax 
increase may be defined as the corresponding marginal decrease in social 
welfare relative to the corresponding marginal increase in government 
revenue. More formally, the marginal social cost of a marginal tax 













where the negative sign on the right-hand side of (3) is needed to obtain a 
marginal social cost that is positive in general. This is so because V/ti 
will always be negative, and, furthermore, we would expect R/ti to be 
positive in general. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that a commodity-
specific Laffer type effect cannot be ruled out a priori. 


















where the first term on the right-hand side of the equation is the private 
marginal utility of income for household h. Let us now consider its social 
counterpart, which is the social marginal utility of income for household 
h, defined as: 

















Each h  might be thought as a welfare weight, since, using the last two 
equations, the numerator in (3) can be written as the negative of the sum 
across households of the consumption of good i, each level weighted by 
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In a similar fashion, taking the partial derivative with respect to ti in 
(2), the impact on government revenue of a marginal increase in the 
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where ki is the (uncompensated) cross-price elasticity of the aggregate 
demand for good k with respect to price i. 
Finally, after defining τk = tk /qk (the proportion of the tax relative to 
the price),3 we can then use equations (3), (5) and (6) to find the marginal 



















An extensive discussion of the meaning of this expression is given in 
Ahmad and Stern (1984, p. 265). For our purposes, it suffices to note that 
in order to apply the AS methodology, which requires computing and 
comparing each marginal social cost across the N goods, we would just 
need the following data: the final consumer prices, the welfare weights 
for all households, the consumption levels, and the aggregate own- and 
cross-price elasticities. 
Thus, it would not seem to be necessary to estimate a full demand 
system. However, this last appreciation would be correct only if the 
welfare weights defined in (4) were independent of prices. Ahmad and 
Stern were, of course, fully aware of that fact and so they assumed in 
their model, as is commonly done in most of the applied papers on the 
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subject, that the indirect social welfare function could be locally 
approximated by a function independent of prices. More specifically, 
















where e is a nonnegative parameter that reflects the degree of aversion to 
social inequality, k is a constant of normalization, and where the arguments 
of the function may be taken to be, say, total expenditure per household. 
Note that each of the terms in the sum of equation (8) becomes a natural 
log function when e tends to 1. 
Using (4) and (8), each social marginal utility of income  may be 
calculated by taking the derivative of the social indirect utility function 
with respect to mh. Furthermore, Ahmad and Stern suggested, the 
constant k may be chosen in such a way that the welfare weight for the 
poorest household is equal to one (and hence marginal social costs are 
always relative to the poorest household). That is to say, assuming that 
households are ordered according to their ascending incomes total 
expenditures, the welfare weight for household h would be given by 
ehh mm )/( 1 . Thus, for instance, when e = 0, the social marginal utility 
of income is equal to one for all households and there is no aversion to 
social inequality; while if, say, e = 1, then a household with an income 
twice as large as the poorest would have a social marginal utility half as 
large. That is, as the parameter of inequality aversion is increased, the 
relative weight of the poorest household is increased as well. In the limit to 
infinite it is obtained the Rawlsian criterion of measuring social welfare 
only in terms of the well-being of the poorest household. 
It is important to note, however, that the assumption of independence 
of prices that lies behind (8) is quite restrictive. Indeed, as shown by 
Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1996, Theorem 1), the welfare weights 
defined in (4) are independent of prices if and only if the indirect social 
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for some functions ah of prices and constants ĸ h. In order to see how 
restrictive this last condition is, we can extend (8) to include the general 
class of indirect social welfare functions due to Bergson (1938): 
h
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According to the theorem just cited, the only members in the class that 
would have welfare weights independent of prices would be the ones for 
which each indirect utility function is multiplicatively separable in prices 
and income, and for which the parameter of inequality aversion is equal 
to one. Thus, in the particular case of (8) the local approximation 
argument is formally correct only when e is near to one. 
Given that all tax reforms are far from being marginal, it would be 
interesting to extend the AS methodology using at least second-order 
approximations as recommended by Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1996). 
In our context, such an extension requires that, both, the numerator and 
the denominator in equation (3) be replaced by sharper approximations. 
More formally, we would like to compute for each good the 
approximate impact on welfare that would have a tax increase that is 
small, but not marginal. That is, in principle, we would like to estimate 
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(the income arguments are dropped to make the expression shorter), and 
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In the last two equations by q-i is meant, as usual, the vector that includes 
all the elements of q except for its i-th component. 
We now proceed to obtain the second-order approximations for (10) 
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so that 
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where, for each household h, the first elasticity inside the parentheses 
refers to the price elasticity of the welfare weight defined in (4), while the 
second one refers to the own-price elasticity of individual demand. 























































Finally, after simplifying (12) and (13), we end up with the variant to 
the Ahmad-Stern approach suggested in Urzúa (2005). That is, in order 
to analyze the approximate impact on social welfare that would have a 
tax increase that is small but not necessarily marginal, instead of the first-
order approximation given in equation (7) above, use, for each good, the 
following second-order approximation for the marginal social cost of 



































































If there is not enough information to estimate in a reliable way the 
welfare weights as function of prices (see the discussion on demand 
estimation in the next section), then equation (14) can be approximated 

































































It is important to note that, as opposed to the Ahmad-Stern approach, 
both equations (14) and (15) recognize that tax changes involve more 
than variations at the margin, and also that a tax reform typically includes 
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a differential treatment across goods. Also note that in the numerator of 
both equations appear the own-price elasticities for each household. 
Although it is unlikely to have the required information for their 
estimation, given the lack of this type of panel data in most countries, 
one could use instead, if available, the average demand responses in each 
income decile. Furthermore; if one does not count with that disaggregate 
information either, then one could use as a proxy the own-price elasticity 
of aggregate demand. 
 
 
3. Brief remarks on the estimation of demand systems 
 
In order to estimate for each good the marginal social cost of taxation, be 
that (7) or (15), we need to estimate the own- and cross-price elasticities 
using a demand system. More realistically, we are interested in 
estimating those elasticities for baskets of goods which are grouped 
according to the different value added tax treatments and the variety of 
excise taxes that exist in an economy. For that end, both data collection 
and the estimation of a full demand system are required. Even though 
those tasks would seem relatively simple to accomplish, the following 
discussion shows that it is not necessarily so. 
• The first issue to face is whether or not there are available data that 
are totally suitable for demand estimation. Unfortunately, the answer is 
negative in the case of many developing countries. This is so because 
most expenditure surveys do not follow specific households over time; 
that is, the surveys are not longitudinal, but only cross-sectional. This 
implies, in particular, that the changes in the unit values of the goods 
implied by the survey may reflect variations in quality rather than only in 
prices. For instance, one household could have bought a kilo of steak 
while other a kilo of a much cheaper meat, and yet in the survey both 
purchases would be reported as a kilo for the same item (meat), but at 
different prices. Is it possible to take into account that variation in 
quality? Deaton (1987 and 1997) and Crawford, Laisney and Preston 
(2003) propose two different approaches for that end. However, it is not 
clear that their estimation procedures render robust results (see, for 
instance, Lahatte, Laisney, Miquel and Preston, 1998). Thus, in this 
chapter we will follow the traditional approach and will regard the unit 
values reported by the households (indirectly, since they typically report 
expenditures and quantities) as the correct prices. 
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• The second problem to solve is the dimension of the demand 
system. To start with, although the number of composite goods should 
depend in principle only on how varied the country’s indirect tax regimes 
are, in practice one should try to keep that number as small as possible. 
Five composite goods or less is perfect, more than seven is adventurous. 
• The next problem arises in the construction of the composite goods’ 
prices. Given a basket of goods, the simplest way to do that is to use 
Stone’s price index. For that end, first identify for each household the 
spending on each of the M items in the basket, as well as the prices (unit 
values). Then, for each good i one can compute the weighting factor ai as 
the amount of money spent on it over the total spending on the basket. 
Finally, using these weights and the unit prices of the items Stone’s price 





a ppp   
 
The implicit “quantity” could be derived (if needed, which is usually not 
the case) as the amount spent on the basket over its price index. Since the 
use of Stone’s price index is not exempt of criticisms (see Moschini, 
1995), sometimes the price of the composite good is calculated 
mimicking one of the several procedures used to compute price indexes 
(Fisher’s, Paasche’s, etc.) when prices change over time. But since in 
contexts as ours the changes are across households instead of over time, 
the reference prices used in those procedures are ad-hoc as well. 
• Another issue to face is the case of goods and services for which 
households do not report quantities, but only spending. This happens 
especially in the case of services (e.g., phone payments), and some 
energy goods (e.g., electricity payments). There are some procedures that 
have been devised over the years to try to estimate price elasticities 
without data on prices. The classical reference is Frisch (1959), and a 
more recent one is Lewbel (1989).4 Since these procedures depend on 
some separability conditions on the utility function that may not be 
warranted, it is better, if possible, to avoid the estimation of those cases. 
• A problem that typically arises when estimating demand systems is 
that for some goods the majority of households could report a zero 
consumption demand (e.g., for cases such as cigarettes, liquor, gasoline, 
etc.). What to do in that case? It all depends. In the case of single goods, 
the reasons for zero consumption could be, first, that the good is not 
bought because of a corner solution (the relative price is too high), or 
second, that the household simply buys the good in an infrequent fashion 
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or does not buy it at all. In the first case, the censored outcome, there are 
several ways to do the estimation, but one that is solid and not too 
difficult is due to Shonkwiler and Yen (1999). On the other hand, if the 
reason for zero consumption is infrequency of consumption, then Keen 
(1986) shows that the problem can be solved by instrumenting total 
spending with some measure of total income. 
• Another point that is often forgotten by practitioners is the difficulty 
of including, in a theoretically sound way, socio-demographic variables 
in the demand system. At first sight, one would just need to add on the 
right-hand side of each structural equation the exogenous variables that 
that may help to better explain the expenditure shares (like number of 
children in the household, regional dummies, etc.), and almost all 
researchers just do that. However, a bona fide demand system has to 
satisfy some conditions on the parameters, and those could be distorted 
once exogenous variables are included in the system (see Ray, 1983, and 
Blundell and Stoker, 2005). 
 
3.1. The QUAIDS model 
 
The last decision to make deserves a subsection by itself: What is the 
best demand system specification to use? There is no clear-cut answer to 
that question, but if one wants a relatively simple, comprehensive and 
popular one, we believe that the best choice is the Quadratic Almost 
Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS) due to Banks, Blundell y Lewbel 
(1997). This model can be seen as the extension of the Almost Ideal 
Demand System (AIDS), proposed earlier by Deaton and Muellbauer 
(1980), with the added feature that it allows for quadratic Engel curves. 
In what follows we describe the QUAIDS specification, while in the 
Appendix we provide the code that can be used to estimate it using Stata 
(for the case of five goods). 
As a first step, we define the representative household’s expenditure 
shares on basket i as: 
 
(16) , mxqw iii   
 
where, following the same notation as in Section 2 above, qi is the after-
tax price, xi is the quantity demanded, and m is total expenditure. Clearly, 
the following adding-up condition holds: 
 
(17) . 1...21  Nwww  
                         Non-optimality of the indirect tax system                        131 
According to the QUAIDS, the spending shares can be estimated as: 
 






































where εi is the error term that is assumed to be normally distributed with 
zero mean. The price index a(q) has the (translog) form 
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while b(q) is a price aggregator function that is homogenous of degree 
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By the adding-up condition, the homogeneity of degree zero in prices 
and spending for each demand function, and the Slutsky symmetry 
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for any j. After differentiating (18) with respect to both ln m and ln qj, it 
follows that 
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which can be higher or lower than one at different levels of spending, so 
that the same good can be a luxury or a necessity depending on the level 
of expenditure. On the other hand, the Marshallian (uncompensated) own 
and cross-price elasticities are of the form: 
 








where Kronecker’s delta equals 1 if i = j, and 0 otherwise. 
Finally, as illustrated in the Appendix, the system made by the 
nonlinear equations given in (18) and constrained by the conditions in 
(21), can be transformed into an N-1 equations system that can be 
estimated by, for instance, feasible generalized least squares. 
 
 
4. Marginal tax analyses 
 
We now proceed to estimate the QUAIDS. For that end, we use the 
income and expenditure survey known in Mexico as ENIGH (Encuesta 
Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares). This official survey is by 
far the most appropriate source of data for demand estimation in Mexico. 
Although it is not longitudinal, and hence it is subject to the criticism 
mentioned earlier, the survey is biannual and representative at the national, 
urban and rural levels. At the moment of this writing the latest survey 
available is the ENIGH 2008, which was applied to 29,846 households in 
the second half of the year 2008. The survey contains information about 78 
possible sources of income, and on the expenditure side it covers more 
than 660 goods and services. 
As shown in the first column of Table 1, we decided to group the goods 
and services reported in that survey into five different categories: 1) food, 
for which the VAT rate is currently equal to zero; 2) the goods for which 
 
Table 1. Own- and cross-price elasticities of composite goods 
     1        2     3     4     5 
1. Food -1.132 0.358 -0.092 -0.097 -0.196 
2. Subject to VAT -0.092 -0.905 -0.058 -0.018 -0.060 
3. Medicines 0.042 0.676 -1.591 -0.007 0.007 
4. Alc. bev. & tobacco 0.101 0.184 0.001 -0.915 -0.072 
5. Education 0.185 0.249 0.033 0.035 -0.931 
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the VAT general rate applies (15% when the survey was taken); 3) 
medicines, which are subject to a zero VAT rate; 4) a composite good 
made of all alcoholic beverages, including beer, and tobacco products, all 
of which are not only subject to VAT, but also to specific taxes; and 5) 
educational services, which are exempted from the value added tax. 
Regarding the fourth composite good, it should be noted that in 2008 the 
excise tax rate for most of the alcoholic beverages was 50%, for beer 
25%, and for cigarettes 160%. On the other hand, the demand system 
was complemented with the following socio-demographic variables: the 
size of the household, the number of children and the gender of the head 
of the household. 
Table 1 also presents the uncompensated price elasticities that are 
found after estimating the full demand system made of those five 
composite goods. As shown there, the demands for food and for 
medicines are the only ones that are price elastic. It should also be 
pointed out that the income (expenditure) elasticities for food, the items 
subject to VAT, medicines, alcoholic beverages and tobacco, and 
education, turn out to be 0.667, 1.056, 0.825, 0.693 and 0.596, 
respectively. Thus, except for the items subject to VAT all the other 
goods turn out to be necessities. 
Using the own- and cross price elasticities in Table 1, the data on the 
market demand of those composite goods, as well as equations (7) and 
(15) above, we can then calculate the marginal (λi) and approximate (i) 
social costs of taxation for each of the five composite goods. In order to 
compute the i’s, it is also necessary to provide discrete (not marginal) tax 
changes as well. For that end, we set Δti = 0.0666 in the case of all goods, 
an increase in the quantity tax that roughly corresponds to an increase in 
the ad-valorem general tax rate from 15% to 16%, as it was the case after a 
2010 tax reform. The results thus obtained are shown in Table 2 for three 
different levels of inequality aversion: the first is e = 0, which means that 
there is no inequality aversion whatsoever; the second is e = 1, the classical 
case of a mild aversion; and the third is e = 2, which implies a definite 
aversion to inequality, since the welfare of the poorest has a substantial 
relative weight in the social welfare function. 
Now suppose that the Mexican government decides to increase tax 
revenue at the lowest social welfare cost. According to Table 2, when there 
is no inequality aversion, the Ahmad and Stern’s marginal approach 
suggests to increase taxes in the case of alcoholic beverages and tobacco 
(since the value of λ4 is the lowest among the small lambdas in the column 
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Table 2. Marginal and approximate social welfare costs 
          Degree of inequality aversion 
           e=0        e=1    e=2 
1. Food λ1 1.1887 0.0267 0.0013 
Λ1 1.1911 0.0266 0.0018 
2. Subject to VAT λ2 1.4523 0.0185 0.0006 
Λ2 1.4523 0.0186 0.0029 
3. Medicines λ3 0.5912 0.0092 0.0004 
Λ3 0.5914 0.0093 0.0097 
4. Alc. bev. & tobacco λ4 0.2917 0.0050 0.0002 
Λ4 0.2918 0.0051 0.0019 
5. Education λ5 0.5804 0.0078 0.0003 
Λ5 0.5805 0.0079 0.0127 
 
for e = 0); the next two composite goods with the lowest social costs are 
medicines and education since they have similar values. In the case of the 
second-order approach (represented by the big lambdas), the social costs 
are almost the same as in the first-order approach, and so is the ranking. 
When e is increased to one, which corresponds to a mild inequality 
aversion, the absolute and relative choices continue to be the same in the 
case of both the first- and second-order approaches. Nevertheless, when 
the inequality aversion becomes stronger (e = 2), and even though 
alcoholic beverages and tobacco continue to be the preferred goods to 
tax, the ranking for the rest of the goods depend on the lambda used: in 
the case of first-order approach the goods that could be taxed next 
continue to be medicines and education, but in the second-order approach 
the goods are now food and the items subject to VAT. 
 
 
5. Concluding remark 
 
The approach suggested here constitutes a preliminary analysis that can 
shed some light on the optimal tax changes across goods. After such 
directions are identified, the analysis of the reform could be 
complemented with a systemic one, more akin to the literature on 
optimal taxation. A classical paper on that regard is King (1983), which 
shows how to make use of the equivalent income concept to make global 
welfare comparisons among different tax regimes. See Urzúa (1994 and 
2001) and Campos (2002) for some examples in the case of Mexico. 
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Appendix: Stata program 
 
Given that the writing of the computational code for a demand system as large 
as QUAIDS can quickly become prone to error, in this Appendix we present the 
Stata program for the five goods case given in the text. The program does not 
include socio-demographic variables, but these can be easily incorporated. 
 
program nlsurquaids 
syntax varlist(min=10 max=10) if, at(name) 
tokenize `varlist' 
args w1 w2 w3 w4 lnq1 lnq2 lnq3 lnq4 lnq5 lnm 
tempname a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 
   scalar `a1' = `at'[1,1] 
   scalar `a2' = `at'[1,2] 
   scalar `a3' = `at'[1,3] 
   scalar `a4' = `at'[1,4] 
   scalar `a5' = 1-`a1'-`a2'-`a3'-`a4'-`a5'-`a6' 
tempname b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 
   scalar `b1' = `at'[1,5] 
   scalar `b2' = `at'[1,6] 
   scalar `b3' = `at'[1,7] 
   scalar `b4' = `at'[1,8] 
   scalar `b5' = -`b1'-`b2'-`b3'-`b4'-`b5'-`b6' 
tempname g11 g12 g13 g14 g15 
tempname g21 g22 g23 g24 g25 
tempname g31 g32 g33 g34 g35 
tempname g41 g42 g43 g44 g45 
tempname g51 g52 g53 g54 g55 
   scalar `g11' = `at'[1,9] 
   scalar `g12' = `at'[1,10] 
   scalar `g13' = `at'[1,11] 
   scalar `g14' = `at'[1,12] 
   scalar `g15' = -`g11'-`g12'-`g13'-`g14' 
   scalar `g21' = `g12' 
   scalar `g22' = `at'[1,13] 
   scalar `g23' = `at'[1,14] 
   scalar `g24' = `at'[1,15] 
   scalar `g25' = -`g21'-`g22'-`g23'-`g24' 
   scalar `g31' = `g13' 
   scalar `g32' = `g23' 
   scalar `g33' = `at'[1,16] 
   scalar `g34' = `at'[1,17] 
   scalar `g35' = -`g31'-`g32'-`g33'-`g34' 
   scalar `g41' = `g14' 
   scalar `g42' = `g24' 
   scalar `g43' = `g34' 
   scalar `g44' = `at'[1,18] 
   scalar `g45' = -`g41'-`g42'-`g43'-`g44' 
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   scalar `g51' = `g15' 
   scalar `g52' = `g25' 
   scalar `g53' = `g35' 
   scalar `g54' = `g45' 
   scalar `g55' = -`g51'-`g52'-`g53'-`g54' 
tempname l1 l2 l3 l4 l5 
   scalar `l1' = `at'[1,19] 
   scalar `l2' = `at'[1,20] 
   scalar `l3' = `at'[1,21] 
   scalar `l4' = `at'[1,22] 
   scalar `l5' = -`l1'-`l2'-`l3'-`l4' 
quietly { 
tempvar lnap 
gen double `lnap' = 5+`a1'*`lnq1'+`a2'*`lnq2'+`a3'*`lnq3'+`a4'*`lnq4'+`a5'*`lnq5' 
forvalues i = 1/5 { 
   forvalues j = 1/5 { 
      replace `lnap' = `lnap'+0.5*`g`i'`j''*`lnq`i''*`lnq`j'' 
   } 
} 
tempvar bp 
gen double `bp' = 0 
forvalues i = 1/5 { 
   replace `bp' = `bp'+`lnq`i''*`b`i'' 
} 
replace `bp' = exp(`bp') 
replace `w1' = `a1'+`g11'*`lnq1'+`g12'*`lnq2'+`g13'*`lnq3'+`g14'*`lnq4'+`g15'*`lnq5'+ 
                      `b1'*(`lnm'-`lnap')+`l1'/`bp'*(`lnm'-`lnap')^2 
replace `w2' = `a2'+`g21'*`lnq1'+`g22'*`lnq2'+`g23'*`lnq3'+`g24'*`lnq4'+`g25'*`lnq5'+ 
                      `b2'*(`lnm'-`lnap')+`l2'/`bp'*(`lnm'-`lnap')^2 
replace `w3' = `a3'+`g31'*`lnq1'+`g32'*`lnq2'+`g33'*`lnq3'+`g34'*`lnq4'+`g35'*`lnq5'+ 
                      `b3'*(`lnm'-`lnap')+`l3'/`bp'*(`lnm'-`lnap')^2 
replace `w4' = `a4'+`g41'*`lnq1'+`g42'*`lnq2'+`g43'*`lnq3'+`g44'*`lnq4'+`g45'*`lnq5'+ 




Finally, the Stata command that should be used to estimate the QUAIDS system 
is the following: 
 
nlsur quaids @ w1 w2 w3 w4 lnq1 lnq2 lnq3 lnq4 lnq5 lnm, parameters (a1 a2 a3 a4 b1 





1 Chapter prepared for the project “An Integrated Framework for the Assessment 
of Equitable, Pro-Growth Fiscal Reform in Latin America and the Caribbean: 
Fiscal Schemes for Inclusive Development (FSID)”, co-funded by UNDP and 
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IDRC. Any errors or opinions are the authors’ and do not necessarily represent 
the views of the United Nations Development Programme, or those of the 
International Development Research Centre. 
2 For the Mexican case, see in particular Nicita (2004), Urzúa (2005), Palacios 
(2006), and Valero Gil (2006). 
3 Note that in our model tk is a quantity tax, not an ad-valorem tax. Thus, given a 
15% VAT rate, the corresponding τk (the proportion of the tax relative to the 
consumer price) is 0.15/1.15 ≈ 13%. 
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7  Distributive impacts of alternative tax 
structures: the case of Uruguay1 
 
Verónica Amarante, Marisa Bucheli, Cecilia Olivieri 






The redistributive action of the state is undertaken through taxes and 
spending. A usual concern among economists is the association between 
these actions of the state and their redistributive effects. The effects of 
this Robin Hood role of the state, aiming to reduce welfare disparities, 
will depend both on the progressivity of the tax system and on the degree 
to which social benefits go to the less well off. But extensive empirical 
research concludes that most of the redistribution is accounted for by 
spending rather than by taxation (see Esping-Andersen and Miles, 2009). 
Despite the fact that redistribution through taxes is limited, the tax 
system has a role to play in terms of achieving higher equality, and 
knowledge about how tax reforms may potentially affect income 
distribution is central for policy makers. On theoretical grounds, 
properties derived from the theory of optimal taxation indicate that direct 
income taxation should be preferred to indirect taxes as instruments to 
achieve redistribution. 
The analysis of the performance of Latin American fiscal systems 
from the perspective of redistribution presented in Goñi, López and 
Servén (2008) highlights that, contrary to industrial countries, in most 
Latin American countries the fiscal system does not significantly reduce 
inequality. The main explanation for this is driven by two facts. On the 
one side, transfers, which are the main mechanism of redistribution in 
European countries, have a limited effect in redistribution in the region. 
On the other side, redistribution is severely constrained by the region’s 
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low levels of tax collection.2 The authors argue that the region’s low 
income tax receipt is associated with narrow tax bases (due to evasion, 
informality and low levels of income) rather than tax rates. They 
conclude that even significant increases in the progressivity of Latin 
America’s tax systems are likely to have modest effects on the 
distribution of income, as the priority to reduce inequality is the overall 
volume of tax revenue.3 
In Uruguay, the recent changes in the tax system, under the reform 
implemented in 2007, enhanced progressivity through the tax system, 
mainly due to the creation of a dual income tax and, to a lesser extent, 
through the reduction in the VAT rate (see Instituto de Economía, 2006; 
Amarante, Arim and Salas, 2007; and Llambí, Laens, Perera and 
Ferrando, 2009). New modifications are being discussed at present. In 
this public discussion, achieving higher equality has been highlighted as 
one of the main objectives in any reform. This article aims at providing 
new evidence on the redistributive impacts of alternative modifications in 
the actual tax system. 
 
 
2. The Uruguayan tax system4 
 
2.1. The actual system 
 
The Uruguayan tax system relies mainly on indirect taxes. As shown in 
Table 1, the value added tax (VAT) accounts for 55% of total tax 
collection, whereas IMESI, an excise tax, represents almost 10% of total 
tax revenue. On the other hand, the recently implemented dual personal 
income tax (IRPF) represents 11% of the tax revenue whereas the 
corporate income tax (IRAE) accounts for 14% of it. 
 
Table 1. Tax revenue in Uruguay in 2008 
 Millions of dollars Relative contribution 
Indirect taxes 3626 64.28% 
VAT 3113 55.18% 
IMESI   513   9.10% 
Direct taxes 2015 35.72% 
IRPF   647 11.47% 
IRAE   785 13.91% 
Other direct taxes   583 10.34% 
  Source: Dirección General Impositiva, Boletín 2008. 
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Most of the sales are taxed by the basic VAT rate of 22%. A rate of 
10% applies to certain basic goods and services such as basic food 
(bread, meat, chicken, etc.), medicines and transportation. In turn, the 
IMESI applies to a few goods; the rates vary from 4% (as it is the case of 
sugar) to 81.5% (spirits). Finally, a series of goods and services are zero-
rated (for example milk, water, books). The main principle behind the 
assignation of different VAT rates is whether the good is considered a 
necessity or a luxury. 
Regarding direct taxes, the system consists of a dual personal income 
tax (IRPF) that combines a progressive tax schedule for labor income 
with a low flat tax rate on capital income. This dual system was installed 
in 2007, when an important tax reform was undertaken, seeking to create 
a more efficient and equitable tax system. Its dual structure responds to 
the plight of small open economies that are unable to trace non-domestic 
sourced income in the face of increased capital mobility across countries. 
Thus, a low flat tax on capital income was chosen to reduce the risk of 
tax evasion from residents with foreign investments (World Bank, 2008). 
As shown in Table 2, the tax on labor income consists of six marginal 
income tax rates ranging from zero in the first bracket to 25 percent in 
the 6-th bracket. In that table annual incomes are expressed in terms of 
BPC units, an acronym for base de prestaciones y contribuciones. Table 
2 also presents the 2008 US dollar equivalent incomes. 
The tax rates on capital income vary depending on the source. It is 3% 
in the case of interest earnings on fixed deposits (in domestic currency or 
in unidades indexadas) that mature in more than a year, as well as on 
debentures and public debt titles. The tax rate increases to 5% for other 
deposits, and to 7% in the case of profits and utilities from IRAE 
contributors. Finally, rental and lease income above a certain threshold 
(around 3,000 dollars per year) is taxed at 12%. 
 
Table 2. Tax schedule for the labor income component of the IRPF 
Annual income in BPC Annual income in US$ Rate 
Less than 84 Less than 8,878   0% 
From 84 to 120 From 8,878 to 12,683 10% 
From 120 to 180 From 12,683 to 19,025 15% 
From 180 to 600 From 19,025 to 63,415 20% 
From 600 to 1,200  From 63,415 to 12,6831 22% 
More than 1,200 More than 126,831 25% 
142           V. Amarante, M. Bucheli, C. Olivieri and I. Perazzo 
 
The tax system also includes a tax on pensions (IASS), whose 
marginal rates are presented in Table 3.5 Thus, in this paper we consider 
that the IRPF has three components: the labor income tax, the capital 
income tax and the pension tax. In the case of tax deductions, they 
include: a proportion of the social security contributions; health 
expenditures corresponding to children younger than 18, up to 6.5 BPC 
by year and child; health expenditures of pensioners, up to 120 BPC by 
year; and a proportion of a tax that finances public tertiary education. 
Deductions can also be made from capital income for the following 
concepts: bad debts, real estate taxes, and commissions for renting. The 
latter are not considered in our simulations. Additionally, some capital 
rents such as donations to public entities are exempt. 
 
2.2. Alternative schemes 
 
We evaluate in this paper the distributional effects of different 
modifications of the Uruguayan tax system. First of all, we consider the 
impact of modifications in indirect taxation. We analyze two different 
scenarios. The first one consists on a reduction of the basic VAT rate 
from 22% to 20%. It turns out that this reform is very costly in fiscal 
terms, as it implies a reduction of the VAT collection of 16.1% and a 
decline of total tax revenues of 8.9%, as shown in Table 4. 
Alternatively, in the second scenario we simulate the effects of setting 
a zero VAT rate in the case of a consumption basket composed by goods 
that are intensively consumed by the poor. In order to choose this ideal 
basket, we first use a set of 52 prototypical consumptions baskets to be 
described in the next section. For each of those baskets we calculate its 
participation in the spending of the whole population, denoted by zi, 
(where i is the basket), and in the spending of the first decile of the per 
capita household income distribution. Denoting by wi this last quantity, 
we next calculate the difference di = zi – wi and we select the baskets that 
have the largest differences, until finding one with a fiscal cost similar to 
 
Table 3. Tax schedule for pensions (IASS) 
Annual income in BPC Annual income in US$ Rate 
Less than 96 BPC Less than 10,146   0% 
From 96 to 180 From 10,146 to 19,025 10% 
From 180 to 600 From 19,025 to 63,414 20% 
More than 600 More than 63,414 25% 
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Table 4. Fiscal cost of alternative tax modifications 
Tax system modification Change in tax revenue 
1. Reduction of two points of VAT rate   -8.9% 
2. Zero VAT rate for specific goods   -8.5% 
3. Widening of the IRPF (labor) untaxed bracket   -1.7% 
4. Combination of scenarios 1 and 3 -10.6% 
5. Combination of scenarios 2 and 3 -10.2% 
 
the one in scenario 1 (compare them in Table 4). This so-called basket of 
the poor is composed by food items that are taxed with a zero VAT rate. 
Regarding direct taxes, we consider an increase in the upper limit of 
the untaxed bracket for the labor component of the dual income tax, from 
80 to 100 BPC. Note that we do not consider the potential effects of 
changes in the tax burden on capital income, as our simulations are based 
on information from household surveys, and the latter tend to 
significantly underestimate that source of income (see Amarante, Arim 
and Salas, 2007). The corresponding changes in tax revenue for each 
scenario are also presented in Table 4. 
 
 




Theoretically, we would need a data base that reports the pre-tax income 
of individuals and their spending. With this information we would be 
able to calculate the per capita direct and indirect taxes paid by the 
households, and so to perform the inequality and progressivity analysis. 
In order to calculate the amount of direct taxes paid by each individual 
we use the income information reported by the Household Survey (HS) 
collected by the Institute of Statistics (INE) in Uruguay in 2008. The HS 
gives information about characteristics of the household and its members 
(sex, age, relationship, etc.), labor attachment of individuals and their 
income by source. It also records the after-tax income received the month 
before the interview. Some sources of income are reported at the person 
level but other ones are reported at the household level. 
Specifically, the HS reports the labor income and transfers of every 
member of the household. Using the schedules of social contribution 
rates and IRPF, we estimate for each individual the pre-tax labor income 
and pensions, and the amount of tax paid.6 Notice that in the analysis of 
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inequality and progressivity, we assign to each individual the per capita 
labor income and tax payments of the household. 
In order to estimate the per capita indirect taxes paid by the 
households, we combine the information of the HS with the information 
of the Expenditure Survey (ES), collected throughout November 2005 
and October 2006 by the INE.7 The ES reports the expenditure of the 
household and records many of the characteristics informed by the HS. 
To combine both data sets, we follow three steps. First, we classify 
household spending on the basis of three criterions: the standard 
classification used by the INE that basically identifies the type of good or 
service by purpose; the tax structure of 2006; and the tax structure of 
2008. Using that procedure we obtain 52 consumption baskets. 
The second step consists on predicting the 52 consumption baskets of 
the HS. For each household we proceed to impute a consumption basket 
based on a multiple regression on variables reported by the ES and the 
HS. More specifically, to perform the match we use the command “uvis” 
of the software Stata (version 11). We assume that the household’s 
spending on each basket depends on: the household’s income; the size of 
the household; the average years of schooling of the adults of the 
household; a deprivation index; the total hours worked in the labor 
market by all the members of the household; the participation of age-
groups by sex in the household (we consider ten age groups); and a set of 
regional dummies. The first five variables are introduced as a polynomial 
of degree three in order to have a more parsimonious functional form. 
Finally, we assign to each individual the per capita spending of his 
household. Thus, the indirect tax paid by each individual is the per capita 




Our simulation exercise is based on data reported by households, which 
usually present some shortcomings that are worth considering. On the 
side of expenditure, one major shortcoming is that we are considering 
that all consumption is undertaken in legal or formal markets, and so it is 
subject to indirect taxes.8 We are not making any adjustments due to 
informal consumption. Nevertheless, we can evaluate the goodness of 
our exercise by comparing tax revenue from indirect taxes coming from 
the ES with administrative data. This comparison shows that the indirect 
tax revenue estimated using the ES, as well as the estimation based on 
the combination of this survey with the HS one is relatively similar to the 
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Table 5. Estimated tax revenues and administrative data, 2008 
 IVA IRPF 
ES (2005-06) & HS (2008) 60,431 million    14,273 million 
DGI 67,958 million    12,940 million 
Ratio 0.89 1.10 
  Note: IRPF = labor taxes +IASS (the latter implemented in mid-2008). 
  Sources: Based on HS, ES and DGI. 
 
information given by the Uruguayan Tax Office (DGI), assuming a tax 
evasion of 20.6%. See Table 5. 
On the side of the HS, the problem stemming from evasion is also 
present. The HS allows identifying those workers who contribute to the 
social security system. In this article we assume that these formal 
workers are the ones that pay taxes.9 Our simulation exercise makes the 
reasonable assumption that a tax reform does not change the contributory 
status. It must be stressed that existing studies for Uruguay indicate that 
the HS captures very well income from wages, salaries and pensions 
(Mendive and Fuentes 1996, Arim and Vigorito 2006). As discussed 
before, it presents serious problems for capturing capital income, both 
rental and interest income from bank deposits (Amarante, Arim and 
Salas, 2007), and that is why simulations on the capital component of 
IRPF are not performed. The comparison of our estimations of tax 
revenue with the information from administrative records shows that we 
tend to overestimate direct taxes (Table 5). Nevertheless, global results 




Our model is written in Stata and it is freely available in the address 
http://ideas.repec.org/c/ega/comcod/201106.html through the Ideas-
RePEc site. It basically allows for the calculation of the total amount of 
direct and indirect taxes paid before and after the change in the tax 
system. In our model, the effect of an increase in the indirect tax rate on 
good i for individual j is to reduce the “real” disposable income of j by 
an amount equal to the change in the final price caused by the tax times 
the consumption of good i by that individual. On the same token, the 
effect of a reform of the income tax is the generated change in the real 
disposable income. This arithmetic model allows considering how each 
individual and household are affected by the policy change, identifying 
winners and losers and assessing the overall impact on population 
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welfare. With this purpose, inequality and progressivity indexes are 
calculated before and after the reform. This technique has the advantage 
of allowing the possibility to consider the heterogeneity of economic 
agents observed in the data, as well as evaluating the financial costs or 
benefits of any reform (Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2006). 
As our analysis is based on a static model, it does not incorporate 
changes in individual behavior in response to changes in the tax system. 
So we are estimating first order changes in tax incidence. This is one 
obvious shortcoming of this exercise, as we are assuming that the 
population does not change its labor market attachment or its 
consumption pattern as a result of the modification of the tax system.10 
Some other simplifying assumptions undertaken in this exercise 
deserve to be clarified: First, markets are assumed to be competitive, and 
so the burden of indirect taxes falls entirely on consumers. Second, direct 
taxes are paid by the taxed factors, except in the case of workers who do 
not contribute to the social security system, who are supposed not to pay 
the labor income tax. And third, the household survey does not indicate 
the currency of bank deposits in the case of interest. In our simulation 
exercise, all interests from tax deposits are taxed at 12%, assuming that 
they are in foreign currency (approximately 86% of deposits in the 
Uruguayan financial system are foreign currency deposits) 
In order to carry out our simulations, we first define the following 
income variables: 
 
(0) Ypre: Original income before taxes, 
 
including labor income (wages, salaries, self-employment income), 
pensions and capital income; contributions to social security and income 
taxes are also included. 
 
(1a) Ypost true VAT = Ypre  ITt 
(1b) Ypost true IRPF = Ypre – IRPFt 
(1c) Ypost true total = Ypre – VATt – IRPFt, 
 
where t indicates the “true” variable and IT refers to the indirect taxes (IT 
= VAT + IMESI). 
For simulations of changes in indirect taxes, we define: 
 
(2) Ypost sim1 = Ypre – ITs,  
 
where s indicates that the variable is being simulated. The analysis of the 
redistributive impact of the actual VAT is done by comparing (1a) and 
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(0). The effect of the proposed tax reform (indirect taxes) is reflected by 
comparing (1a) with (2). 
For simulations of changes in direct taxes, we define: 
 
(3) Ypost sim2 = Ypre – IRPFs. 
 
The analysis of the redistributive impact of the actual income tax is done 
by comparing (3) and (0). The effect of the potential tax reform (direct 
taxes) is reflected by comparing (3) with (1b). 
For simulations of changes in both direct and indirect taxes, we 
define: 
 
(4) Ypost sim3 = Ypre – IRPFs – ITs. 
 
The analysis of the redistributive impact of the actual VAT and income 
tax is done by comparing (4) and (0). The effect of the tax reform (direct 
and indirect) is reflected by comparing (4) with (1c). 
 
3.4. Progressivity and distributional impact 
 
The literature about the effect of taxes on income inequality distinguishes 
between measuring the progressivity of a certain tax, and assessing its 
distributional impact. A tax is said to be progressive when its payments 
are an increasing proportion of the ability to pay, whereas it is regressive 
when payments are a decreasing proportion of the ability to pay. 
Evaluating the progressivity of a tax implies comparing its concentration 
curve with the pre-tax income distribution. On the other hand, the 
indexes of redistribution assess the distributional impact basically 
comparing income distribution pre and post taxes. If households were 
identical in their composition and taxes were determined only on the 
basis of income, the concepts of progressivity and re-distributional 
impact of a certain tax would coincide, and a progressive tax would 
imply an improvement in the distribution of income pre- and post-tax. 
But households are heterogeneous and so progressivity and distributional 
impact can differ. This is due to reordering of households that takes place 
after a tax is introduced.  
In this article, we consider two progressivity indexes, the Kakwani 
index (1977) and the Suits (1977) index. The Kakwani index is 
calculated by comparing the Lorenz curve of pre-tax income and the tax 
concentration curve.11 The index is defined as two times the area 
comprised between the concentration curve of the tax CT, and the Lorenz 
curve of the initial income distribution LX. It is then equivalent to the 
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difference between the Gini coefficient and the concentration index (or 
pseudo-Gini index): 
 





If the tax rate is proportional to income for all households, then the 
Kakwani index is zero. If the tax is progressive (tax payments increase 
with income), then the Kakwani index is positive, whereas if tax 
payments are decreasing with income, the Kakwani index is negative, 
indicating that the tax is regressive. The value of the Kakwani index 
depends on the level of inequality prevailing in the pre-tax distribution. It 
takes the value GX – 1 if the tax is totally regressive, and GX + 1 if it is 
totally progressive.12 
Another well-known progressivity index is the Suits (1977) index, 
which is an adaptation of the Gini index. Suits proposed a figure similar 
to the Lorenz curve, but plotting the cumulative percentage of tax burden 
on the vertical axis, against the cumulative percentage of income on the 
horizontal axis. In this way, he is comparing a relative concentration 
curve with a 45 degree line. The index can then be formulated as: 
 
  .  )( 2 1
0
diiCiS F   
 
If the tax is proportional, the concentration curve coincides with the 45 
degree line and the Suits index is zero. If the tax is progressive, the Suits 
index will be positive, whereas if it is regressive, the concentration curve 
will be above the 45 degree line and the Suits index will be negative. If 
only the poorest person paid taxes, the Suits index would be -1, whereas 
if only the richest person paid all the tax, the Suits index would be 1. 
The Kakwani and Suits index are similar in design, but there are some 
differences between them. Whereas the Kakwani index integrates with 
respect to population, the Suits index integrates with respect to income. 
Formby, Seaks and Smith (1981) showed that both indexes differ by a 
weighting factor equal to the slope of the Lorenz curve, and this may 
result in conflicting evolutions of both indexes in time or in cross 
sectional comparisons. 
The most well-known index to analyze the net redistributive impact of 
a tax is the redistribution index proposed by Reynolds and Smolenky 
(1977), which compares the Gini indices of pre-tax and post-tax income: 
 
. TXX GGRS   
                    Distributive impacts of alternative tax structures                149 
 










The first term is the Kakwani index weighted by t/(1+t) where t is the 
average tax; the second term is the re-ranking effect. The formula 
indicates that the redistributive effect depends positively on progressivity 
but negatively on re-ranking, and that it is monotonically increasing in 





Before considering the distributive impacts of the different tax reforms, 
we analyze the overall effect of the actual tax system on income 
distribution. With this purpose, we compare pre-tax income with post-tax 
income, separating the effect of indirect taxes and direct taxes, and, in the 
case of the latter, considering the role of the capital, labor and pensions 
components separately. 
The ratio of IT to income is decreasing by percentile, as shown in 
Figure 1. Along the first decile, this ratio decreases sharply from 0.56 at 
the 1st percentile to 0.21 at the 8th percentile.  From this percentile on, the 
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Percentiles (per capita household income)
IT/income
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ratio declines gradually taking the value 0.11 at the median of the 
distribution and 0.09 at percentile 95. The fact that the IT burden on 
household income decreases with income indicates that indirect taxes are 
regressive both in absolute and relative terms. In Figure 1 we also 
illustrate the IRPF burden. It is null up to the 35th percentile and for 
higher incomes, it increases gradually and reaches the value 0.09 at the 
97th percentile. 
In Table 6 we present four measures of inequality of the per capita 
income of the households before and after taxes. All of them indicate that 
indirect taxes are regressive and direct taxes (and each component 
separately) are progressive. However, as is also shown in Table 6, when 
taken as a whole, the total effect of the present Uruguayan tax system on 
inequality is mixed, depending on the indexes considered. 
Both, the Gini index and the Generalized Entropy (GE) index with 
parameter 1, also known as Theil’s index, indicate that the tax system is 
progressive as a whole, contributing to more equality. On the contrary, 
the GE index with parameter 0 (mean log deviation), as well as the ratio 
90/10 indicate a regressive effect. This is explained by the fact that the 
GE(0) gives more weight to distances in the lower tail. The same is true 
for the ratio 90/10, which directly considers distances among tails. On 
the other hand, as the Gini and the GE(1) give similar weights across the 
distribution, these indexes are more sensitive to changes around the 
mode. The regressive impact of the indirect taxes in the lower tail is then 
amplified by the former measures and drives the unequalizing result. 
In what follows, we present the main results from our simulation 
exercises. To assess the overall impact on welfare, we use different 
distribution indicators. We present the results of changes in indirect taxes 
in subsection (4.1), a change in direct taxes in (4.2), and the combination 
of changes in direct and indirect taxes in (4.3). 
 
Table 6. Distributive impact of the Uruguayan tax system 
Pre-tax and post-tax income Gini GE(0) GE(1) 90/10 
Pre-tax 0.518 0.500 0.521 12.514 
Post-tax (only VAT) 0.530 0.547 0.551 14.142 
Post-tax (only labor) 0.508 0.480 0.499 11.940 
Post-tax (only capital) 0.516 0.496 0.515 12.444 
Post tax (only pensions) 0.517 0.498 0.519 12.440 
Post-tax (IRPF)  0.504 0.473 0.490 11.780 
Post-tax (VAT and IRPF) 0.515 0.517 0.517 13.222 
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4.1. Changes in indirect taxes (VAT) 
 
As stated before, when we consider the prevailing indirect tax system in 
Uruguay, the pre-tax Gini is lower than the post-tax Gini, implying that 
the progressivity indexes, Reynolds-Smolensky and Kakwani, are in turn 
negative. More precisely, their values are -0.012 and -0.108, respectively, 
as it is shown in Table 7. Regarding the changes in indirect taxes 
contemplated under Scenario 1, a reduction of the VAT basic rate from 
22% to 20% brings a decline of the average IT/income ratio from 9.4% to 
8.9%. Under this alternative scenario, the ratio IT/income by percentile is 
always lower than in the baseline. Indeed, as Figure 2 shows, the 
difference between the tax burden in the baseline and the alternative 
scenario 1 is negative along all the income distribution. 
Also, as reported in Table 7, the post-tax Gini and the progressivity 
indexes are similar in the alternative scenario 1 than in the baseline. In 
brief, the reduction of two percentage points of the VAT does not change 
the overall picture regarding the progressivity of the tax.15 
Alternatively, under Scenario 2 the change of the VAT rate to zero for 
a basket of food items that are consumed by the poorest households 
maintains the average tax rate of Scenario 1, lower than in the baseline, 
but has a slightly progressive impact. In effect, progressivity indexes 
continue to be negative but their absolute values are lower than those of 
the baseline and of the Scenario 1. The post-tax Gini declines, according 
to that table, from 0.531 to 0.529, indicating a redistributive effect. The 
change in the RS index is statistically significant, although its magnitude 
is very small. In Figure 2 we can appreciate the reduction of the 
IT/income ratio along the distribution with respect to the baseline. This 
reduction is higher than in Scenario 1 for the poorest up to percentile 80, 
and then becomes smaller. 
 
Table 7. Redistributive impact of changes in VAT  
Measures Baseline Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Pre-tax Gini  0.518  0.518  0.518 
Post-tax Gini  0.530  0.530  0.528 
Average tax rate  0.095  0.089  0.089 
RS net redistributive effect -0.012 -0.011 -0.010 
Kakwani -0.108 -0.108 -0.093 
Re-ranking  0.001  0.001  0.001 
Suits -0.124 -0.125 -0.109 
Change in total tax revenue  -8.9% -8.5% 
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Figure 2. Difference between the tax burden in the scenarios and the baseline 
 
In sum, as expected, in both scenarios indirect taxes continue to have 
a regressive impact. Although changes are of a very small magnitude, the 
second alternative, consisting on a zero VAT rate for a basket of goods 
consumed by the poorest population, implies a more progressive change, 
with a higher re-distributional effect driven by its higher progressivity. 
Nevertheless, decisions about the best modification in indirect taxes must 
also take into account efficiency considerations. In effect, this second 
alternative is more difficult to implement in practical terms and may have 
undesired effects in terms of the efficiency of the tax system. 
 
4.2. Changes in direct taxes (IRPF) 
 
Under Scenario 3, we study an increase in the upper limit of the untaxed 
bracket of the labor component of the IRPF, from 84 to 100BPC. The tax 
rates for the different income brackets remain the same. As shown in 
Table 8 and Figure 3, Scenario 3 brings a reduction in payments of the 
labor income component of the IRPF along all the income deciles, a 
reduction that is decreasing in percentage terms by income decile. 
Furthermore, as shown in Table 9, the average tax rate decreases from 
4.6 to 4.3%. The simulated change on labor tax suggests an improvement 
in terms of progressivity according to both the Kakwani and the Suits 
indexes, although the Reynolds-Smolensky index does not show any 
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Table 8. Payments of IRPF (labor component, per capita) by income decile 
 IRPF 2008 Simulated Relative change 
Absolute 
change 
1 50.5 0.0   
2 32.6 18.4 -43.6 -14.2 
3 76.9 58.8 -23.5 -18.1 
4 114.0 84.0 -26.2 -29.9 
5 167.2 135.5 -19.0 -31.7 
6 232.3 194.6 -16.2 -37.7 
7 377.6 313.1 -17.1 -64.4 
8 620.9 525.5 -15.4 -95.4 
9 1162.7 1004.3 -13.6 -158.5 
1
0 3108.7 2894.5   -6.9 -214.2 
 
tax rate (which decreases RS) and the increase in progressivity (which 
increases RS) cancel each other, and there are no reordering effects. 
In brief, the simulated labor tax rate continues to be progressive, but 
the proposed change under Scenario 3 does not reduce the income 
inequality respect to the baseline. Further increases in progressivity at the 
expense of lower average tax rate end up not having a net effect on 
distributional terms. 
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Table 9. Redistributive impact of changes in IRPF on labor 
Measures Baseline Scenario 3 
Pre-tax Gini 0.518 0.518 
Post-tax Gini 0.504 0.504 
Average tax rate 0.046 0.043 
RS net redistributive effect 0.014 0.014 
Kakwani 0.297 0.311 
Re-ranking 0.000 0.000 
Suits 0.393 0.419 
Change in total tax revenue  -1.7% 
 
The main message of this particular exercise is that it is very difficult 
to achieve important decreases in inequality through changes in direct 
taxes on labor income, as the actual design of this component of the 
IRPF is already progressive. Although more progressiveness could be 
achieved, it would imply no changes in overall inequality. 
 
4.3. Changes in indirect and direct taxes (VAT and IRPF) 
 
As a final step, we analyzed joint effects of changes in direct and indirect 
taxes, as specified in Table 4. In Scenario 4, there is a reduction of two 
points in the VAT rate, and an increase in the upper limit of the IRPF 
untaxed bracket. In scenario 5, the change in direct taxes is the same, but 
there is an elimination of the VAT for certain goods. 
As shown in Table 10, both scenarios show a progressive impact 
respect to the baseline. Even when the average tax rate declines, the 
increase in progressivity leads to an increase in the net re-distributional 
effects. Obviously, given the modification in direct taxes, the progressive 
 
Table 10. Redistributive impact of changes in direct and indirect taxes 
Measures Baseline Scenario 4 Scenario 5 
Pre-tax Gini 0.518 0.518 0.518 
Post-tax Gini 0.515 0.515 0.513 
Average tax rate 0.141 0.132 0.132 
RS net redistributive effect 0.003 0.003 0.005 
Kakwani 0.025 0.029 0.039 
Re-ranking 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Suits 0.046 0.052 0.063 
Change in total tax revenue  -10.6% -10.3% 
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impact is higher when we simulate a reduction of the VAT rate for the 
goods consumed by the poor rather than the elimination (zero rate) for 
only some of those goods (the RS index is statistically higher in Scenario 
5 when compared to the baseline, although Scenario 4 and the baseline 
are equivalent on statistical grounds).  
 
 
5. Final remarks 
 
The design of the tax structure is a central issue in any economy due to 
its implications on efficiency and equity grounds. In this article, we 
focused on the distributive impacts of alternative designs of direct and 
indirect taxes. Two scenarios of changes in indirect taxes were analyzed, 
both implying a similar and significant cost in fiscal terms. We 
concentrated on equity effects, leaving aside efficiency considerations. 
As expected, these two scenarios continue to have a regressive impact. 
Although changes are of very small magnitude, the second alternative, 
consisting on the elimination of the VAT for a basket of goods consumed 
by the poorest population, implies a net redistributive effect with respect 
to the baseline. On the direct taxes side, our results indicate that it is very 
difficult to achieve important decreases in inequality. As the actual 
design of this component of the IRPF is already progressive, an increase 
of progressivity through the proposed labor component tax does not have 
any significant redistributive effect. 
Overall, more progressivity is achieved through the combination of 
reductions in the VAT rates for specific goods and changes in the labor 
component of IRPF. Nevertheless, as found for other countries in the 
region by Goñi, López and Servén (2008), redistribution through the tax 
system in Uruguay, at least with the tax changes that have been 





1 Chapter prepared for the project “An Integrated Framework for the Assessment 
of Equitable, Pro-Growth Fiscal Reform in Latin America and the Caribbean: 
Fiscal Schemes for Inclusive Development (FSID)”, co-funded by UNDP and 
IDRC. Any errors or opinions are the authors’ and do not necessarily represent 
the views of the United Nations Development Programme or those of the 
International Development Research Centre. We are grateful for useful 
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comments and suggestions received from Guillermo Alves, Andrea Vigorito, 
Samuel Freije-Rodríguez, Luis Felipe López Calva, Amedeo Spadaro and Carlos 
M. Urzúa, as well as from researchers of other teams in the project, and from 
participants of the XXV Jornadas de Economía del Banco Central del Uruguay 
and the XV LACEA Meeting held in Colombia. 
2 As an example, those authors argue that whereas the direct taxation system 
lowers the Gini coefficient of household income by an average of about five 
percentage points for fifteen European countries, the average decline in the Gini 
coefficient for Latin American countries due to direct taxes is just about a single 
percentage point. 
3 In the case of Chile, the analysis presented by Engel, Galetovic and Raddatz 
(1997) shows that before- and after-tax Gini coefficients go from 0.4889 to 
0.4929, suggesting that the redistributive role of taxes is limited. 
4 What follows is a brief account of the Uruguayan tax system. An in depth 
description of both taxes and social benefits in Uruguay is given in Amarante, 
Bucheli, Olivieri and Perazzo (2011). 
5 In the original tax reform, pensions were taxed by the labor component of the 
IRPF. Pension preceptors, arguing that this was not constitutional, took legal 
actions. As a result of the judicial resolutions favorable to pensioners, the IRPF 
on pensions was derogated, and a new tax, the IASS, was installed in July 2008. 
6 In the case of the workers, we take into account the specific social security and 
health contributions that correspond to the individual occupational group. 
Furthermore, in the case of both workers and pensioners we consider their 
personal tax conditions. 
7 The HS 2006 has a sample size of 85,316 households, while the ES sample was 
made of 7,043 households. Both surveys are representative at the national level. 
8 Other minor concern refers to the under reporting of consumption of certain 
goods, such as alcohol, cigarettes, etc. 
9 In 2008, 67% of workers made contributions to the social security system. 
10 Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006) argue that ignoring behavioral responses 
may not be so restrictive. The estimation of first round effects may be a good 
approximation of the final welfare effect if changes are small enough and 
individuals operate in perfect markets. 
11 The concentration curve of a tax plots the cumulative percentage of tax 
burden on the vertical axis against the cumulative percentage of population on 
the horizontal axis. 
12 If only the poorest household paid taxes, then the pseudo-Gini index would 
be 1, and the Kakwani index would be GX – 1, its minimum possible value. If 
only the richest household paid taxes, the pseudo-Gini index would be -1, and 
the Kakwani index would be GX + 1. 
13 This index is also known as RS reformulated, to differentiate it from the RS 
that prevails when there is no reordering among households. In this case, RS = 
GX – CX-T. See Lambert (2001) for a discussion on this. 
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14 Note that if taxes do not imply re-ranking, the K and RS indexes are only 
differentiated by a function of the average tax rate, and are equivalent in 
qualitative terms. 





Amarante, V., R. Arim and G. Salas (2007), “Impacto distributivo de la reforma 
impositiva”, background paper for World Bank (2008). 
Amarante, V., M. Bucheli, C. Olivieri and I. Perazzo (2011), “El sistema de 
impuestos y beneficios en Uruguay”, in L. F. López-Calva and C. M. Urzúa 
(eds.), Sistemas de Impuestos y Prestaciones en América Latina, Puebla: 
BUAP-IDRC-ITESM-PNUD. 
Arim, R. and A. Vigorito (2006), “Las políticas de transferencias de ingresos y 
su rol en Uruguay, 2001-2006”, background paper for World Bank (2008). 
Bourguignon, F. and A. Spadaro (2006), “Microsimulation as a tool for 
evaluating redistribution policies”, Journal of Economic Inequality, 4, pp. 
77-106. 
Engel, E., A. Galetovic and C. Raddatz (1997), “Reforma tributaria y 
distribución del ingreso en Chile”, Serie Economía 40, Universidad de Chile, 
Santiago, Chile. 
Esping-Andersen, G. and J. Myles (2009), “Economic inequality and the welfare 
state”, in W. Salverda, B. Nolan and T. M. Smeeding (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Economic Inequality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Formby, J, T. Seaks and J. Smith (1981), “A comparison of two new measures 
of tax progressivity”, Economic Journal, 91, pp. 1015-1019. 
Goñi, E., H. López and L. Servén (2008), “Fiscal redistribution and income 
inequality in Latin America”, Policy Research Working Paper 4487, World 
Bank, Washington. 
Instituto de Economía (2006), “Impactos de la reforma tributaria sobre los 
ingresos de los hogares”, in Informe de Coyuntura, Montevideo: Instituto de 
Economía. 
Kakwani, N. (1977), “Measurement of tax progressivity: an international 
comparison”, Economic Journal, 87, pp. 71-80.  
Lambert, P. J. (2001), The Distribution and Redistribution of Income, 3rd edition, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Llambí, C., S. Laens, M. Perera and M. Ferrando (2009), “Assessing the impact 
of the 2007 tax reform in Uruguay”, Report MPIA 11061, Centro de 
Investigaciones Económicas, Montevideo, Uruguay. 
Mendive, C. and A. Fuentes (1996), “Evaluación de la captación del ingreso de 
los hogares”, in Aspectos Metodológicos sobre la Medición de la Línea de 
Pobreza: El Caso Uruguayo, Montevideo: CEPAL and INE. 
158           V. Amarante, M. Bucheli, C. Olivieri and I. Perazzo 
 
Reynolds, M. and E. Smolensky (1977), Public Expenditures, Taxes and the 
Distribution of Income: The United States, 1950, 1961, 1970, New York: 
Academic Press. 
Suits, D. (1977), “Measurement of tax progressivity”, American Economic 
Review, 67, pp. 747–752. 
World Bank (2008), “Poverty and social impact assessment of the tax reform”, 
Report 44939-UY, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, 
World Bank, Washington. 






8 Redistributive effects of indirect taxes: 
comparing arithmetic and behavioral 
simulations in Uruguay1 
 
Verónica Amarante, Marisa Bucheli, Cecilia Olivieri 






The literature that analyzes the redistributive effect of taxes and/or public 
benefits using microsimulation models is quite extended. Indeed, those 
models constitute useful tools to assess the distributional impact of 
policy changes (see, e.g., Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2006). In this paper, 
we use a microsimulation model to analyze, in the case of Uruguay, the 
redistributive impact of setting the value added tax (VAT) rate to zero in 
the case of specific goods that make up for a large share of consumption 
among the low income population. 
Most of the ex-ante analyses of changes in taxes and transfers are 
undertaken using typical microsimulation models (including ours in 
Chapter 8 of this book). However, a well-known limitation of these 
models is that they only use arithmetic (accounting) rules for determining 
the outcome of some economic policy, and not behavioral relations. This 
implies that the results thus obtained assume, in particular, that the 
individuals do not change their consumption patterns as a result of a 
modification of tax rates. This may be a strong assumption especially in 
the case of indirect taxes, as the variation in rates results in variation in 
consumer prices, and this might probably lead to variations in the 
individuals’ demand. 
In this paper we compare results from an arithmetic model and a 
behavioral model when both are used to evaluate a change in the VAT 
rates. The arithmetic model is the same as in Chapter 8, while the 
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behavioral microsimulation model is based on the estimation of a 
demand system using the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System 
(QUAIDS) proposed by Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1997). Our 
analysis is made using data from the combination of income and 
expenditure surveys of Uruguayan households. We also make two key 
assumptions: that the effects of changes in indirect taxes are beard 
entirely by the consumers, and that there is no tax evasion. We present 
the methodological details of the microsimulation models in Section 2, 
and contrast the main results of both models in Section 3. The 
conclusions are given in Section 4. 
 
 
2. Methodological aspects 
 
In order to undertake a welfare analysis that takes into account demand 
responses, we first estimate income and price elasticities for a limited 
number of baskets of goods. As mentioned earlier, these estimations are 
done using the QUAIDS, a consumer demand system with Engel curves 
that include on the right-hand side log income and higher order income 
terms. Based on an empirical analysis of Engel curve relationships for 
different goods for the United Kingdom, Banks, Blundell and Lewbel 
(1997) show that although the traditional definition of expenditure share 
over the logarithm of deflated income or total expenditure provides a 
reasonable approximation for some goods (for example in the case of the 
food share curve), non-linear behavior is evident for other goods (for 
example in the case of clothing). On this basis, those authors argue that 
higher order income terms have to be included in the estimation, 
allowing goods to be luxuries at some income levels and necessities at 
others. Their proposed quadratic logarithmic model nests the Almost 
Ideal (AI) model of Deaton and Muelbauer (1980) and the Translog 
model of Jorgenson, Lau and Stocker (1982). 
As a first step, we define the household’s expenditure shares on 
basket i as: 
 
(1) ,  
m
qp
w iii   
 
where pi is the price and qi the quantity of good i, and m is total 
expenditure. If the number of goods is N, then w1 + … + wN = 1, and each 
expenditure share can be estimated, according to the QUAIDS, as: 
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where p is the vector of prices and εi the error term.2 
The price index a(p) has a translog form, being homogenous of 
degree one in prices: 
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which can be higher or lower than one at different levels of expenditure, 
allowing for a good to be a luxury or necessity depending on the 
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household’s total expenditure. On the other hand, the uncompensated 
price elasticities are given by: 
 








where Kronecker’s delta equals 1 if i = j, and 0 otherwise. Finally, the 
compensated or Hicksian price elasticities are calculated through the 
Slutsky equation: 
 




ij ewee   
 
Our estimations are based on the income information reported by the 
household survey (HS) collected by the Institute of Statistics (INE) in 
Uruguay in 2008. Specifically, the HS contains information about labor 
income, transfers and other income for every member of the household. 
Given that the HS does not include information about household 
spending, we combine this survey with the Expenditure Survey (ES), 
collected throughout November 2005 and October 2006 by the INE (see 
Chapter 8 in this volume for more details).  
We estimate an eight demand equation model, and the estimation is 
done using an extension of the nlsur Stata command.3,4 We classify the 
expenditure in nine baskets. One of them corresponds to services; we do 
not consider it in the demand system to avoid the usual problem of lack 
of report of data on unit values. The other eight ones represent 62% of 
expenditure and 58% of the VAT. The description of these eight 
composite goods, their expenditure and VAT are reported in Table 1. We 
also report the expenditure by decile in Table 2. Finally, it should also be 
noted that, in what follows, the price of each of the eight composite 
goods is calculated as: 
 
,  ..........11 n
a
n
a ppP   
 
where ai represents the spending on good i in relation to total spending 
on the composite good. 
Before carrying out our simulations, we also have to define the 
following income variables: 
 
(8) Ypre: Original income before taxes, 
 
including all labor income (wages, salaries, self-employment income), as 
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Table 1. Distribution of expenditure and VAT among baskets 
Basket VAT rate Spending (%) VAT (%) 
1. Low income basket 10%   7.2   6.7 
2. Food and beverages Exempt, 10%   3.5   1.9 
3. Food and beverages 22%   8.6 15.5 
4. Apparel and shoes 22%   4.2   7.5 
5. Furniture and building Exempt, 10% 20.9   0.2 
6. Furniture and building 22% 10.7 17.7 
7. Entertainment Exempt, 10%   2.8   1.1 
8. Entertainment 22%   4.2   7.2 
9. Services Exempt, 10%, 22% 37.9 42.2 
Total   100 100 
  Source: calculations based on household expenditure survey 
  Note: Most of the sales are taxed by the basic VAT rate of 22%. A rate of 10% applies 
  to certain basic goods and services such as basic food (bread, meat, chicken, etcetera), 
  medicines and transportation. Finally, a series of goods and services are zero-rated (for 
  example milk, water, books). The main principle behind the assignation of different 
  rates schedule is whether the good is considered essential or luxury. 
 
well as pensions and capital income; contributions to social security and 
income taxes are also included. The second variable is 
 
(9) Ypost true VAT = Ypre  ITt 
 
where t indicates the “true” variable and IT refers to the indirect taxes. 
 
Table 2. Expenditure on the eight composite goods (%) 
Deciles 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X Total 
B1 19.6 18.1 17.3 16.0 14.9 13.6 12.3 10.7 8.7 5.7 11.5 
B2 9.5 8.6 7.8 7.4 6.9 6.3 5.8 5.2 4.7 3.2 5.6 
B3 13.8 14.8 14.2 14.4 14.7 14.8 14.7 14.8 14.6 11.8 13.9 
B4 6.7 6.7 6.5 6.7 6.6 6.6 6.9 6.7 7.0 7.0 6.8 
B5 26.3 27.2 28.2 29.6 30.4 31.7 32.2 34.2 35.7 40.2 33.7 
B6 16.8 16.9 17.4 17.2 17.1 17.1 17.3 16.7 16.6 17.4 17.1 
B7 2.6 2.6 2.8 2.6 3.2 3.5 4.0 4.1 5.3 7.0 4.5 
B8 4.5 5.3 5.6 6.1 6.4 6.5 7.0 7.4 7.4 7.7 6.8 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: calculations based on the household expenditure survey. 
164          V. Amarante, M. Bucheli, C. Olivieri and I. Perazzo 
 
For simulations of changes in indirect taxes, we define: 
 
(10) Ypost sim1 = Ypre – ITs,  
 
where s indicates that the variable is being simulated. The analysis of the 
redistributive impact of the actual VAT is done by comparing (8) and (9). 
The effect of the proposed tax reform (indirect taxes) is reflected by 
comparing (9) with (10). In the arithmetic model, ITs comes from 
changing the VAT rate and assuming that consumption remains 
unchanged, whereas in the behavioral model, the change in consumption 
due to the change in prices is included in the simulation. To perform the 
redistribution analysis, we calculate the Gini index of both distributions 
and its difference, that is, the Reynolds-Smolensky index. We also 





After estimating the demand system and using equation (7) above, Table 
3 presents the own- and cross-prices elasticities in the case of the eight 
composite goods. As expected, the own-price elasticity is negative for all 
baskets considered, as shown in the diagonal of the table. On the other 
hand, the first composite good, which corresponds to the consumption 
basket of the poorest population, is a substitute of those baskets that are 
made of other food and beverages (baskets 2 and 3), while it is 
complementary to the rest of the goods. 
Using the estimated behavioral model, as well as a typical arithmetic 
model, Table 4 presents the redistribute impact of a reform that reduces 
to zero the VAT rate of specific goods. These are the ones that constitute 
 
Table 3.  Own- and cross-price elasticities of the eight baskets 
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 
B1 -0.968 0.203 0.107 -0.017 -0.008 -0.001 -0.048 -0.221 
B2 0.545 -1.224 0.187 -0.006 0.002 0.017 -0.040 -0.241 
B3 0.183 0.106 -1.023 0.003 0.003 -0.022 0.009 -0.081 
B4 0.076 0.037 0.058 -0.633 -0.015 -0.016 0.013 0.000 
B5 0.242 0.112 0.158 -0.093 -0.468 0.002 0.016 -0.114 
B6 0.098 0.049 0.017 -0.017 0.003 -0.648 -0.006 -0.019 
B7 0.004 0.010 0.092 0.030 0.018 0.006 -0.591 0.013 
B8 -0.046 -0.031 -0.031 -0.025 -0.019 -0.027 -0.021 -0.994 
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Pre-tax Gini 0.518 0.518 0.518 
Post-tax Gini 0.527 0.525 0.525 
Average tax rate 0.049 0.044 0.041 
Reynolds-Smolensky net effect -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 
Kakwani progressivity index -0.168 -0.150 -0.149 
Reranking 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Suits progressivity index -0.190 -0.171 -0.170 
Change in total tax revenue -.- -0.064 -0.096 
 
the consumption basket of the population with the lowest income. The 
table also presents the impact under the current VAT rate structure. 
As can be observed from there, in the case of both models the 
Kakwani and Suits indexes indicate that the value added tax is 
regressive, whereas the Reynolds-Smolensky index shows that it has a 
negative redistributive effect as well.5 Naturally, the elimination of the 
VAT rate for those goods implies a decrease in the average tax rate, and 
hence a decrease in tax revenue. Under the arithmetic model this 
reduction is the highest (the average tax rate is 4.1 under the reform, 
whereas it is 4.9 under the baseline scenario). According to the arithmetic 
model, the regressivity of the VAT decreases when we eliminate the tax 
for the consumption basket of the low-income population. We also 
observe that the negative redistributive effect is weaker: the post-tax Gini 
is 0.527 in the baseline and 0.525 after the reform. 
Finally, it is important to note that in the case of the arithmetic model 
the spending on the basket of the low-income population declines 9% 
(given the no VAT payments), but when we introduce the possibility of 
behavioral reactions, it only decreases by 1.1%. On the other hand, 
regarding the progressivity and redistributive impact of indirect taxes, the 






In this paper, we considered an arithmetic model and a behavioral model 
to simulate the redistributive effect of the elimination of the VAT in the 
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case of the basket that is intensively consumed by the by the poorest 
population. We find that the negative redistributive effect of the reform 
declines under the simulated regime. The proposed change in the VAT 
rate implies an equalizing change in the distribution, but the magnitude is 
very small. Though in the behavioral model the patterns of consumption 
change, the global effects are almost the same than those obtained under 





1 Chapter prepared for the project “An Integrated Framework for the Assessment 
of Equitable, Pro-Growth Fiscal Reform in Latin America and the Caribbean: 
Fiscal Schemes for Inclusive Development (FSID)”, co-funded by UNDP and 
IDRC. Any errors or opinions are the authors’ and do not necessarily represent 
the views of the United Nations Development Programme or those of the 
International Development Research Centre. 
2 Note that the QUAIDS model reflected in (2) can turn into the AI model when 
the parameters λ are zero across all equations. 
3 We are thankful to Carlos Urzúa for providing us the STATA code for this 
extension. 
4 These equations do not include demographic variables, usually introduced to 
control for heterogeneity across households. 
5 Results from the arithmetic model differ from those presented in Chapter 8 
because expenditure in services is excluded from the analysis. Another 
methodological difference is that in this exercise we consider only eight 
consumption baskets, as a relatively small number of baskets is needed in order 
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This book presents several microsimulation models that can be 
used to assess the welfare consequences of a number of policy 
reforms in ve countries: Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico and 
Uruguay. By using micro data from national surveys, the models 
not only characterize the population on the aggregate but also 
on a number of dimensions such as age, family composition and 
income level, which are important for distributive analysis. The 
models also quantify and identify those who win and those who 
lose with a reform. Furthermore, the open-source nature of the 
models presented here will help to build-up technical capacities 
on the subject across Latin America.
